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FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION CONTEXTUALISING CHANGING CONTOURS OF ELECTORAL POLITICS IN INDIA Pramod Kumar 2010 INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION (IDC) SECTOR 38-A Chandigarh - 160014 Tel: 0172-2625941, Fax: 0172-2625942 email: idcindia@idcindia.org, web: www.idcindia.org © Institute for Development and Communication, 2010 Published by Institute for Development and Communication, 2010 Sector 38A, Chandigarh - 160 014, India Tel : 0172-2625941 Fax : 0172-2625942 E-mail : idcindia@idcindia.org web : www.idcindia.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing of Institute for Development and Communication and respective publishers. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The monograph is a collection of three contributions made in three different projects. The article on Coalition Politics: Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? has been written for a forthcoming edited volume by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy to be published by Sage. The article on Contextualising Religious, Caste and Regional Dynamics in Electoral Politics: Emerging Paradoxes was published in a volume titled India’s 2004 Elections: Grassroots and National Perspectives edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy and published by Sage. Third contribution was sponsored by University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India (UPIASI), New Delhi and Ford Foundation, New Delhi. These articles have been compiled in the form of a monograph for private circulation. I am grateful to Paul Wallace (for first two contributions) and E. Sridharan (for third contribution) for their untiring efforts to inspire me to put my thoughts in a cogent manner. CONTENTS List of Tables ii -iii List of Graphs iv List of Maps iv List of Charts iv I. Introduction 1-3 II. Coalition Politics: Withering Of NationalRegional, Ideological Positions? 4-23 III. Contextualising Religious, Caste And Regional Dynamics In Electoral Politics: Emerging Paradoxes 24-42 IV. Coalition Politics In Punjab 43-122 LIST OF TABLES Table No. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 Title Performance of National and Regional Parties Transfer from Centre to States as percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Centre: Finance Commission period average Trends in expenditure to GDP Ratio (percent) Caste-wise candidate summary – Lok Sabha Elections – 1971-2009 1994 and 2004 Vidhan Sabha elections in Andhra Pradesh Seats Won by Bharatiya Janata Party in Parliament Elections (1984-2004) Party Preference by Social Group Performance of BJP and Congress in Gujarat Parliament and Vidhan Sabha Elections BSP Vote Support in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab Legislative Assembly Occupation and Party wise distribution of Activists Religion and Party wise distribution of Activists Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won Caste-wise Party preference in 1997 Election and Electoral Coalitions in Punjab 1967-2007 ii Page No. 6 13 14 15 30 35 36 36 38 47 48 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 61 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 4.22 4.23 4.24 4.25 Caste, Year and Party Wise Distribution of MLAs Year and Party wise Distribution of MLAs belonging to Hindu and Sikh Religion Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Region Bargaining power of different alliance partners : Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (1997 Assembly Election based on 1996 Parliament Election) Party Activist Perception on Basis of the Coalition between BJP + AKALI DAL (Badal) Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (2002 Assembly Election based on 1999 Parliament Election) Party Activist Perception on basis of the Coalition between Congress and CPI or CPI (M) Impact of rise in land prices On lack of Congress-CPI Alliance On SAD-BJP Coalition (SAD Supporters) On SAD-BJP Coalition (BJP Supporters) Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (2007 Assembly Election based on 2002 Assembly Election) Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Location Taagepera and Shugart Index for General Assembly Elections of Punjab from 1967 to 2007 Year and Caste wise Distribution of Council of Ministers at the Initial Constitution of Ministries iii 76 78 80 91 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 100 103 106 109 LIST OF GRAPHS Graph No. Graph-1 Graph-2 Graph-3 Graph-4 Page No. Title Partywise Support Base [Post Election (1967 – 1969) to Pre Election Coalition (1997-2002-2007)] Party wise Support Base - Location wise Party wise Support Base – Region wise Durability of Government and Tenure 107 107 108 110 LIST OF MAPS Map No. Map-1 Map-2 Map-3 Page No. Title Percentage Share of Constituencies won: Shiromani Akali Dal(Badal) 1967-2007 Percentage Share of Constituencies won: Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) 1967-2007 Percentage Share of Constituencies won: Congress (INC) 1967-2007 49 57 59 LIST OF CHARTS Chart No. 4.1 Page No. Title Post-Election Alliances, Single Party and PreElection Alliances iv 70 I INTRODUCTION ELECTORAL POLITICS has come of age. It is marked by opulence, megamergers, media managers, a slew of promises and doles and politics of amnesia. It has liberated politicial parties from consistent political positions and ideological filters. The electoral process has also acquired its own autonomous space. It has become a battle of false claims and empty promises, of political leaders presenting themselves as representatives of the common persons and servants of the privileged, of trivialising of issues and appealing on a modelled image. In other words, it has been reduced to a “parade of clowns and acrobats, elephants and donkeys. If politicians are to be believed, elections are a matter of Atta-Dal subsidies, freebies, shagun at the time of marriage, and enticements of a foreign leave travel concession (LTC) for government employees. And if you have pretensions of being a psephology literate, then you may believe the pollsters that elections are a matter of incumbency levels, of popularity ratings-that too of leaders and not parties, with vote swings emerging from individual candidates. But can elections be absolved from the reality of people’s fight for mere survival, demand for dignity in governance and protection from abuse? Elections have become a ritual of democracy. They have failed to make democracy distributive and justice oriented. They use the popular screen to make their politics appear pro-people. To provide content to this, serious issues are reduced to doles rather than the right of electorate. Politics parties, however, are not expected to confess, particularly at the time of elections, that they have ceased to govern. When the market is allowed to govern, the government becomes powerless to effect any radical changes. And the proponents of market reforms have no plans for those who do not have the resources and income to buy even two meals a day. These poorer sections of society are reduced to mere victims, beneficiaries, client and recipients. In this dichotomous relationship the state is seen as the ‘dole giver’ and the people the ‘dole receiver’. In other words, a patron-client relationship defines the boundary conditions for electoral discourse. Introduction Not only this, it has many more additionalities attached to it. In the words of a well acclaimed political analyst Michael Parenti, “The candidate sells his image as he would a soap product to a public conditioned to such bombardments. His family and his look; the experience in office and devotion to public service; his sincerity, sagacity, and fighting spirit; his military record, patriotism, and ethnic background; his determination to limit taxes, stop inflation, improve wages, and create new jobs by attracting industry into the area; his desire to help the desire to help the worker, farmer, and business person, the young and old, the rich and poor, and especially those in between; his eagerness to fight poverty but curb welfare spending while ending government waste and corruption and making the streets and the world itself safe by strengthening our laws, our courts, and our defences abroad, bringing us lasting peace and prosperity with honour, and so forth-such are the inevitable appeals that like so many autumn leaves, or barn droppings, they cover the land each November”1 these image building pronouncements without much content. In the background of these the style of governance, doles and electoral arithmetic emerge as preferable parameters for participation in elections. With political parties ideologically supporting economic reforms, pauperisation people do not find voice in the popular arena of electoral politics. Economic reforms encourage privatisation of health, employment and other public facilities such as electricity, water, transportation without providing them with means of livelihood. Real issues like the challenge posed by the WTO agreement to small and marginal farmers, decline in the social development index with the status of women being the lowest in India, increasing non-productive youth population, unemployment, etc. thus remain outside the realm of electoral politics. Elections then are treated like events where the voters need to be ‘managed’. Anti-incumbency becomes a saviour by providing parties rotational preference. Besides anti-incumbency that provides a safe passage to issueless politics, winability criteria allow faceless politicians to find entry into 1 Michael Parenti, Democracy For the Law, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1974), p. 146. 2 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India political management. In the course of the selection of candidates, political parties use this novel criterion. It does not matter whether a candidate is with or without a criminal record, has or does not have the capacity to do pro-people work. But if he has the capacity to manipulate votes and is himself ‘manageable’, there is every chance of his being selected. Above all, the money a candidate can invest with the hope of recovering it at a later date is a major facilitating factor. All these tendencies are symptomatic of the erosion of the ideological support base of political parties. This led to a methodological infirmities, for instance, to categorise political parties as pro- and anti-economic reforms, communal and non-communal, casteist and non-casteist. This also hampers the mapping of performance in relation to electoral promises made by political parties. All these issues in this monograph have been contextualised in the qualitative shift from a command economy to a competitive liberal market economy, from one party dominance to coalition of parties, from nation-building to representation of polarised socio-economic reality into politics. 3 II COALITION POLITICS: WITHERING OF NATIONALREGIONAL, IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS? Electoral politics in the 20th century has been mirrored by a nationbuilding project propelled by a one-party dominant system. Politics since 1989 redefined the role of national and regional political parties, as it transformed the content of electoral discourse and use of ideological filters as per convenience. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to capture the tensions between state politics, populist politics and people’s politics. It also deals with the politics of ‘presence’ and of ‘representation’ in their interaction with democracy, federalism and diversity as reflected in elections. To undertake this task, there is a need to capture the changing spectrum of interactive relationship between political parties, citizens and the policymakers in formulating and setting the agenda for governance. These interactive relationships shape the nature and level of political participation of the citizens, regions and their diversities. All of these considerations have vital implications for federalism, the electoral system and social democracy in terms of the stakes of social cleavages in political decision-making, and the extent of social and economic inclusiveness. The shift from a command to market economy has redefined the role of the state. The mandate of governance changed from welfarism to fiscal management, public sector growth and employment to leveraging public resource for private growth and retrenchment of jobs in the public sector and subsidies to the private sector for making provision for health and education and imposition of user charges on the citizens. This shaped two divergent kinds of discourse, one emanating from the shift in the path of development manifesting in what has been termed as ‘state politics’, and another found articulation at the time of elections in the form of ‘populist politics’. It has been argued that the practice of democracy has a select domain restricted to those who govern and those who avail its governance. The two have entered into a collaborative relationship and emerged as custodians of the state shaping the terms of political discourse under the banner of ‘state politics’. People on the margins outside the realm of democratic practice need doles for their survival that is provided by Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India electoral politics, which becomes their mainstay lending content to what is known as ‘populist politics’. This has provided dominant space in mainstream politics to a coalition of interests in negation to the participation of citizens, diversities and regions in democratic governance. This tension has been reflected in the dichotomous relationship between populist politics and state politics. In populist politics it emanates from an articulation of politics of representation as synonymous with the presence of citizens, diversities and regions in exclusion of their stake building in state politics.1 The ‘politics of presence’ has overtaken politics of ideas, values and purpose. The outcome of this vacillation is that the ideological difference between political parties has got blurred while the difference between ‘populist’ and ‘state politics’ has become more manifest. Political transformations in a decade starting from 1967 were significant in so far as one-party dominant system is concerned. It led to the polarisation of the Indian party system into two blocks with antiCongressism being the only unifying factor for the opposition parties. From 1989 onwards, the Congress party’s hegemony of being an umbrella party became questioned and the space thus vacated was appropriated by regional political parties. Examples include the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Janata Dal (U), Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Samajwadi Party (SP), DMK, and the AIDMK. A perusal of the electoral results shows that since 1989, the multiparty character of the party system is illustrated by the fact that the values of the Laakso-Taagepera Index (N) (of the effective number of parties) by votes/seats were 4.80/4.35, 5.10/3.70, 7.11/5.83, 6.91/5.28, 6.74/5.87, 7.6/6.5 and 7.6/5.0 in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 respectively, whereas prior to 1989, the effective number of the parties by seats exceeded 3 only once (3.16 in 1967) and the effective number of parties by votes exceeded 5 only once (5.19 in 1967).2 Further, within the multi-party character of the party system, the space occupied by the regional political parties in terms of votes and the elected members has increased. For instance, the percentage share of votes of the national parties is on the decline. Their share of votes was around 78 per cent in the 1984 parliamentary elections which declined to 64 per cent in the 2009 parliamentary elections. And the share of the regional parties increased from 12 per cent to 31 per cent during the same period. Further, the share of the national political parties in the elected members of parliament has decreased from 85 per cent to 69 per cent and that of the 5 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? regional parties increased from 12 per cent to 29 per cent in 1984 and 2009 elections respectively. Table 2.1 Performance of National and Regional Parties Party Party-wise representation amongst elected members Percentage votes 2009 2004 1999 1998 1984-85 2009 2004 1999 1998 1984-85 National parties 69.24 67.03 67.96 71.27 85.40 63.58 62.89 67.11 67.98 77.86 Regional parties 29.10 32.04 30.94 27.62 12.20 31.23 32.87 30.15 29.66 12.73 Independents 1.66 0.92 1.10 1.10 2.40 5.19 4.25 2.74 2.37 9.41 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: (i) Statistical Reports on General Elections from 1984 to 2004, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. (ii) For 2009, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/results_of_the_2009_Indian_general_election_by_party The change in the nature of party system from one-party dominance with greater emphasis on the unitary aspects of Indian federation and the moderate level of political participation of the citizens, regions and social cleavages to the multiparty system, with higher participation of the people on the margins of society in the elections and greater presence of the diversities in legislatures has unfolded paradoxes of India democracy. In the political science literature, the first phase up to the mid-sixties has been characterised as one-party dominance system.3 In this, the agenda of governance and of electoral discourse were in consonance with each other. This was the phase of one-party dominance in Indian politics. In this phase, it was assumed that there is a consensus on stateled capitalism, where state intervention was meant to create conditions of development in underdeveloped regions and groups. There was a broad understanding in politics about the strategy of state-led capitalism for moderating the uneven impact of development on regions, citizens and social cleavages. For instance, there were conscious attempts to assign central dole to the public sector to take the economy to ‘commanding heights’ and ‘build a socialistic pattern of society’. Election manifesto of the Congress Party in 1962 declared that ‘the public sector will increasingly expand and play a dominant role, both for the purpose of accelerating the speed of industrialisation and yielding additional resources. Public, private and co-operative sectors should function in unison as parts of a single mechanism. Government should exercise effectively its powers of control and the use of appropriate fiscal measures.’4 Public investment was made to create 6 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India physical infrastructure; land reforms legislation was enacted; affirmative action for providing reservations in jobs for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was taken, and the Community Development Programme for creating rural infrastructure was also launched. The assumption was that the logic of development and broadening the base of democracy will lead to overall empowerment of the underprivileged sections and create conditions for the withering away of the primordial identities based on caste, region and religion. The outcome of these initiatives, no doubt, blurred the divergence between economic policies under the banner of state capitalism and political mobilisation for building ‘socialistic pattern of society’. But the contradiction between the path of development, electoral promises and social expectations became glaring. As a consequence, people’s politics found expression through various protest movements of the youth, the Naxalite movement, and unrest among the Dalits, peasantry and public sector employees. In the sphere of electoral politics, people on the margins could see the importance of their votes and political leadership realised that electoral outcomes were dependent upon garnering the votes of the poor. The Garibi Hatao slogan, nationalisation of banks and abolition of the privy purses were used as major planks to woo voters in the 1972 elections. Election manifesto of the Congress Party in 1977 made promises with a tinge of apologetic welfarism. It assigned the private sector a national role and hoped to make the public sector efficient. In its 1977 election manifesto, Congress Party declared, “To enlarge the role and efficiency of the public sector, to give proper scope to the private sector to play a national role without concentration of economic power, to control prices and ensure supplies of essential commodities.”5 These pronouncements were adequately reflected in the plan documents and government policies. These policies and programmes provided content to these slogans by introducing a number of poverty alleviation programmes. They sought to provide income to the poor such as Food for Work and subsidies to agriculture. In this phase also, the attempt was to reflect electoral promises in the government programmes and policies. However, the outcome of this phase was the emergence of regional politics as reflected in multiparty competition in the electoral domain and protest movements across the regions. 7 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? In the political domain, the Congress Party suffered a setback and a number of regional parties emerged at the state level. The strategy adopted was to vanquish dissent and negate regionalism. To the contrary, the strategy strengthened the opposition parties. Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi attempted to curb the opposition through divide and rule politics and an authoritarian mode which reached its peak with the imposition of emergency rule in the country. Her emergency could not be sustained as India’s multi-cultural ethos blended with political democracy required an institutional mechanism which could articulate the coalition of diverse regional, cultural and class interests. A new political formation representing this diversity under the banner of the Janata Party, a replica of the earlier Nehru Congress Party, captured the political space and facilitated the return of political democracy. Political instability continued and the Janata regime was replaced by Indira Gandhi in 1980. The politics of populism was unleashed to woo the regional interests, religious and caste spectrum and the poor for electoral competition. The arena of conflict shifted from eradication of poverty to decentralisation of power to the centre versus the states to right to self-determination. Regional movements took the form of terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and in several parts of the north-eastern states. The political system failed to cope with these issues. Paradoxically, because of the excessive centralisation the leaders became all powerful, but with a weak institutional base that rendered them powerless to mediate between the conflicting interests, conflicts and to bring about social transformation. From 1989, the crisis in politics deepened coupled with economic reforms and the emergence of coalition politics. Electoral compulsions, which required the support of the people through their votes, unleashed a competitive politics of populism. Political parties and political leaders across the board sought to woo the people with sops…The number of promises made multiplied, but the number of promises kept dwindled.6 The state increasingly abdicated its governing role to market forces and in elections political parties made promises which were in contradiction with the economic reforms agenda. 8 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India For example, the Congress Party in Punjab, caught between Assembly elections (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004), became a victim of the paradox between electoral promises and government mandate. In the 2002 Assembly elections, its promise of free electricity to farmers contributed to its victory over its opponent the Akali Dal. After coming to power, at both the state and central levels, the party started implementing the government mandate to introduce economic reforms. At the state level, it imposed electricity tariff on agriculture and, consequently, it performed poorly in the 2004 national elections. The Congress Party was quick to announce the implementation of sops like free electricity to the farmers in the wake of the next elections in 2007. This ambivalence between electoral compulsions and their commitment to implement an economic reforms agenda led to a tension between populist politics and state politics. Not only the national but even the regional political parties also promised sops to the electorates at the time of elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections and 2009 Parliamentary elections, the SAD in Punjab promised free electricity to the farmers. But in the wake of fiscal reforms in 2010, the SAD-BJP coalition government imposed electricity tariff on the farmers.7 Furthermore, the national and regional parties promised a number of other sops at the time of elections. For instance, the answer to the price rise was to subsidise Atta-Dal and this was used to spearhead their election campaigns. For example, the SAD manifesto read: Prices of wheat atta have gone up from Rs. 6.50 per kg in 2002 to Rs. 17 at present. Similarly, the price of ordinary pulses has also shot up from Rs. 18 per kg in 2002 to Rs. 65 at present. Diesel prices have gone up from Rs. 14.50 per litre to Rs. 32 per litre whereas a cooking gas cylinder which cost only Rs. 210 in 2002 now costs Rs. 375. The new government will provide atta at Rs. 4 per kg and dal at Rs. 20 per kg to the poor.8 And in Tamil Nadu, the DMK election manifesto promised the sale of rice at the rate of Rupees 2 per kg. to the ration cardholders.9 9 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? Similarly, the Congress campaign took up this issue belatedly and their manifesto read: “Strengthen Public Distribution System (PDS) in the state to ensure timely availability of sufficient foodgrains and cereals to the Dalits, economically weaker sections and BPL families at affordable prices. Ensure provision of 35 kg of wheat/Atta and 10 kg of rice @ Rs. 2 per kg for the poorest of the poor (Antyodaya families). Ensure provision of dal up to 5 kg to the poorest of poor (Antyodaya families) @ Rs. 20 per kg.”10 Political parties have not cared to analyse the causes and ways to reduce the prices and raise the purchasing capacity of the poor, and are silent on formulating policies for ensuring food security. This situation led to a disconnect between the people, the political parties and the government. In government, these political parties give subsidies as doles to the poor and as a right to the interest groups and stakeholders. However, during elections, subsidies are promised as rights to the poor. It is because of this reason that subsidies directed at the poor are termed as doles and subsidies directed to protect profits are described as a rescue package. The former is presented as populist and the latter a survival need. Coalition politics functioned more as coalition of interests between big business, land speculators, big farmers and government contractors. As a leading political analyst, Alan Altshuler, commenting on the claims of political parties in the USA said: “Though their little favours went to little men, the big favours went to land speculators, public utility franchise holders, government contractors, illicit businessmen and, of course, the leading members of the machines themselves.”11 Within the party system, coalition politics functioned more as a “coalition of patronage for sharing spoils between the national and regional political parties”. The state was “increasingly unable to mediate between conflicting interests and competing demands resorted more and more to a politics of patronage. This patronage, which came to be extended in a bewildering variety of ways, was a means of sharing the spoils among the constituents of the ruling elite’.12 Consequently, in order to appease regional political parties so as to form a coalition government at the national level, national political parties shifted their stance in the electoral discourse in favour of greater autonomy for the regions, while regional political parties also amended 10 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India their position from anti-centrism to co-operative federalism. In its 2009 election manifesto, the Congress Party claims that: It is only the Indian National Congress that has demonstrated its commitment to a strong Centre, to strong States, and to strong panchayats and nagarpalikas. India’s political system must have space for institutions at each of these three levels. Each has a vital and specific role to play.13 And the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2009 elections declared: “ We will place Centre-State relations on an even keel through the process of consultation. The genuine grievances of States will be addressed in a comprehensive manner. The moribund National Development Council will be revived and made into an active body’14…. for devolution of more financial and administrative powers and functions to the States. We will take suitable steps to ensure harmonious Centre-State relations in the light of the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission’.15 But, on the contrary, the BJP implemented policies which compromised autonomy of the states and reinforced the tendencies of centralisation. In the political domain, the emphasis on mutually acceptable trade-offs between the national and regional political parties was loud in accommodation and feeble in substance. It only meant reconciliation to achieve power equilibrium. The language of political discourse was strongly influenced to construct ‘coalition through patronage’ across the ideological spectrum of political parties. Moreover, there is a regionalisation of national political parties and nationalisation of regional political parties. For instance, the Congress government in Punjab passed the Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on SYL much to the annoyance of the central leadership of the Congress Party. In other words, the Congress in competition with a regional alliance started appropriating the anti-centre constituency in the state. The BJP changed its position from a strong centre to greater autonomy for states.16 11 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? Similarly, the SAD shifted its position from anti-centrism to antiCongressism to co-operative federalism. The Akali Dal in its 1973 resolution proclaimed that “it would endeavour to have the Indian Constitution recast on real federal principles, with equal representation at the Centre for all the states.” The same Akali Dal through its president Parkash Singh Badal, who was party to the 1973 resolution, asserted in the year 2000, that “Our constitutional framework was for more federal structure, but owing to the rule of the Congress government, both at the Centre and in the states, the powers of the states were slowly usurped and a unitary set-up was nearly established.” The shift in the Akali Dal’s position is mainly due to the emergence of coalition politics and the decline of one-party dominance. As a result, the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from anti-centrism to cooperative federalism. “The Akali-BJP government has opened a new chapter in Centre-State relations, ushering in the age of co-operative federalism in the country. The era of confrontation has been effectively ended and replaced with a forward looking thrust on working together for the overall good of the state and the nation”.17 This position marks a radical shift from the anti-centre stance as reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and in its later 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. The shift was first made public on the occasion of the Hola Mohalla festival near Gurdwara Takht Keshgarh at Anandpur Sahib in a political conference. The resolution passed stated, “Today’s conference demands of the centre that for the prosperity of the country, in favour of development of people, the centre-state relations should be redefined in the light of the Anandpur Sahib resolution. Setting up of a true federal structure in the country was the need of the hour.”18 The issue of greater autonomy for the states was nurtured in a political climate marked by over-centralisation of power and one-party dominance since Independence. This has worked in two ways: on the one hand, it has provided greater access to regional parties to share spoils of power reducing the alliance between the national and the regional political parties as ‘coalition for patronage’ and, on the other hand, it has made the regional parties stand on redefining the CentreState relations as ambivalent.19 12 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Interestingly, in coalition politics, regional groups have become strong, and the forces of regionalism have become weak. It has, no doubt, created opportunities for the small regional opposition parties to have important ministerial berths as rewards, but the same has weakened the regional agenda and interests. Consequently, it has made Indian politics less federal and more centralised, extending ad hoc benefits to those regions which are strategic partners in the coalition. A few illustrations to prove the point. In centre-state fiscal relationship, the statutory transfer of funds to the states have become secondary and the role of discretionary grants to finance the State plans by the Centre have become more prominent. This is especially noticeable between the eighth and ninth Finance Commission even when the total transfers had increased. Between the two components of transfers from the Finance Commission, the share of grants has substantially increased in the reform period, suggesting a declining access to the collective pool of national tax resources by the provinces put differently greater access to revenue to the Central government.20 Table 2.2 Transfer from Centre to States as percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Centre: Finance Commission period average Year Share in central taxes 1 Finance Commission transfers Other transfers Total Total transfers Grants Non-plan grants (nonstatutory) Other transfers (5+6) (4+7) Total transfer through Finance Commission (2+3) Grants through Planning Commission 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 VII FC 22.39 1.96 24.35 12.11 1.66 13.77 38.11 VIII FC 20.25 2.52 22.77 13.56 1.54 15.10 37.86 IX FC 21.37 3.42 22.79 14.48 1.06 15.54 40.33 X FC 21.40 2.34 23.75 10.57 0.63 11.19 35.79 XI FC (first two years) 20.93 5.20 26.13 10.39 0.82 11.21 37.20 Source: 11th Finance Commission Report, Government of India. Further, the Central Government expenditure has declined and States’ expenditure share has multiplied. This acquires significance in view of the States’ declining access to resources. 13 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? Table 2.3 Trends in expenditure to GDP Ratio (percent) Combined Centre 1990-91 26.83 17.74 1991-92 26.3 16.52 1992-93 26.11 16.37 1993-94 25.89 16.49 1994-95 25.03 15.27 1995-96 24.2 14.66 1996-97 23.38 14.13 1997-98 24.16 13.64 1998-99 25.19 14.27 1999-00 26.26 14.79 2000-01 26.1 14.5 2001-02 28.1 15.2 Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IIPFS), various issues States 14.3 14.84 14.43 14.21 14.37 13.78 13.46 13.76 14.06 14.95 14.8 15.8 Not only this, the centrally sponsored schemes funding has increased in the social sector. In most of the cases, these schemes are not commensurate with the needs of the local people. This results in nonperformance of the states which adversely affects their claim to central resources. In other words, the apportionment of resources are to the disadvantage of the states irrespective of the fact that the regional parties have emerged as important players in the national politics. And, the national parties alongwith the regional parties have also promised to build a genuine federal structure in the electoral discourse, but the character of the state and the policy regime continue to be in favour of centralisation. In practice, the emphasis of politics has shifted from ideology of representation of the regions in governance to the distribution of patronage to the regional parties and interest groups. Similarly, in the case of common citizens and social cleavages, the focus has been to ‘privilege political presence over common interests’. In the dominant discourse, the arguments are advanced to make voting compulsory or provide reservation of seats in the legislature on the basis of gender, social cleavages and minorities or the apportionment of the state resources on the basis of target groups. The politics of presence was practiced not only to co-opt regions, but also the citizens and social cleavages based on caste and religion. The test of democratic participation is seen through voter’s turnout, number of contestants and the representation of common people in the legislatures rather than the outcomes in terms of mainstreaming the 14 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India poor and disadvantaged and also to achieve a more just and equitable society. A study of voter’s turnover shows an increase from 58.07 in the 2004 elections to 58.43 per cent in the 2009 elections. The number of contestants has also increased from 5435 in 2004 to 8070 in the 2009 elections. In addition, the representation of people from low social origins has also multiplied. For instance, the number of Scheduled Caste candidates increased from 10 per cent (63) in 1989 to 24 per cent (1933) in the 2009 parliamentary elections. Similarly, the number of scheduled tribes candidates increased from 4 per cent (224) in 1989 to 7 per cent (565) in 2009 elections. But the basic issue remains: how far has the increase in participation in elections benefitted people with low social origins in the decisionmaking process and created conducive conditions for equity? Not only this, it is worth analysing the shift in political discourse from, to use Benedict Anderson, categories “unbound serialities” and “bound serialities”. In electoral politics in the earlier phase, the language of politics referred to nation-building. Citizen rights, equality for all religion, castes and ethnicity largely remained within the domain of “unbound serialities”.21 Table 2.4 Caste-wise candidate summary – Lok Sabha Elections – 1971-2009 Year 1971 1977 1980 1984-85 1989 1991-92 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total ALL India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total Gen. 2263 81.73 2026 83.07 3913 84.53 4661 84.85 5306 86.14 7508 85.82 12123 86.89 3936 82.86 3816 82.10 3674 67.60 5572 69.05 SC 343 12.39 291 11.93 502 10.84 592 10.78 630 10.23 899 10.28 1356 9.72 571 12.02 602 12.95 1372 25.24 1933 23.95 ST 163 5.89 122 5.00 214 4.62 240 4.37 224 3.64 342 3.91 473 3.39 243 5.12 230 4.95 389 7.16 565 7.00 Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. 15 Total 2769 100 2439 100 4629 100 5493 100 6160 100 8749 100 13952 100 4750 100 4648 100 5435 100 8070 100.00 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? In 1962, the Congress party in its election manifesto declared it would build: a social order based on justice and offering equal opportunity to every citizen… The social services and, more especially, education and health should be expanded, greater attention being paid to economically and educationally backward people. The test of giving particular attention should be that of economic backwardness. Thus, low income groups, irrespective of castes and communities should receive special consideration.22 In the 1977 elections, the Congress party promised “to safeguard the interests of the minorities and weaker sections, to end privy purses and other such privileges, to provide the basic requirements of the people, speedily through dynamic rural programmes, to provide new employment avenues”.23 However, after the mid-eighties, sectional interests based on caste and religion were articulated in the elections and the slogan of ‘justice for all’ was replaced by ‘justice for backward castes, Dalits and minorities’. These exclusive category usages for ‘inclusive governance’ led to polarisation in the elections. For example, in 2009 parliamentary elections, the projection of Mayawati, a dalit leader, as the prime ministerial candidate by the Third Front led by Communist Parties, may have polarised the middle class non-Dalit votes to the advantage of the Congress party. This can be seen from the increase in the urban votes in favour of the Congress party. The main thrust of the argument is that in the post-economic reforms, competition for the scarce resources is being shaped around sectional interests and identities. The tension between economics of the market, i.e. state politics and populist politics, led to the inclusion of sectional interests based on religion and caste. This became a major factor for electoral mobilisations by the competing political parties. For instance, Mandal Commission has promised job opportunities to the Backward Castes in an environment where jobs opportunities in the public sector are shrinking. And, it also acknowledges that politics of populism can only promise hope. It is not at all our contention that by offering a few thousand jobs to the OBC candidates we shall be able to 16 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India make 52 per cent of the Indian population as forward, but we must recognize that an essential part of the battle against the social backwardness is to be fought in the minds of backward people, when a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, the material benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin-off of this phenomenon is tremendous, the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated.24 The state has abdicated its responsibility to build a secular society through affirmative action, where caste shall not be the basis of dispensation of justice, and religious identities shall not be the basis of entitlement of national resources. On the contrary, it consolidated the hold of regional, communal and caste-based parties in elections. Most of the regional parties have provided impetus to the “sons of the soil” and articulated these concerns in their electoral discourse. For example, in Maharashtra, it has been reported that the Congress party benefitted in the 2009 parliamentary and state assembly elections due to the radical assertions of Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) Chief Raj Thackeray. These assertions brought about a division in the vote bank of Shiv Sena. MNS Chief Raj Thackeray attempted to involve ‘sons of the soil’ parochialism when he asserted that “Nashik was facing an influx of north India. They are earning here and sending the money to their native place…I am not against them, but they should have some affection for Maharashtra…He warned that north Indians who did not speak Marathi and did not respect Marathi culture would be driven away,”25 The Congress government in Maharashtra has made their support to the MNS agenda explicit in announcing it would strictly implement the eligibility criteria for a driving taxi permit, which stipulated that a person must be a resident of Maharashtra for a minimum 15 years and can read, write and speak Marathi.26 These articulations acquire significance in the backdrop of the political parties mobilising support for elections on the basis of region, caste and religious group affiliations. A perusal of the election manifestos of the political parties clearly shows that the parties 17 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? promised subsidies, social security and safety nets to the electorates based on social cleavages.27 In the 2009 elections, the Congress party asserted that ‘The empowerment of the weaker sections of society — scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, OBCs, minorities and women — has been an article of faith with the Indian National Congress. This will be carried forward with emphasis on education, particularly skill-based and professional education’.28 For instance, communalism has been used to even present problems like unemployment as affecting the Hindus or the Muslims or the Sikhs. Articulation of the findings relating to backwardness of Muslims in the Sachar Commission Report, reservation of jobs for backward castes and social and economic backwardness of Dalits have been used as vote catching devices. The logical outcome of this approach is the feeling of a deep sense of discrimination amongst those who are either denied access to employment opportunities or who remained on the margins of the employment market. ‘Coalition of presence’ became rather the norm to co-opt social cleavages and offer doles to the common citizens under the banner of citizen-centric governance. But a majority of the women representatives in the local bodies, as per a pre-election survey conducted in 2008, were dissatisfied as they were promised at the time of election that the ‘politics of presence’ shall provide answers to their claims to equity, access and accountable governance.29 But these political parties, while in government pursued an agenda of downsizing the public sector and have, in fact, leveraged public sector resources to the private sector with a claim to provide efficient and accountable governance to the people. People have been reduced to ‘consumers with the ability to choose and complain (although) not the ability to proactively shape services’.30 Results in developing countries especially have shown that the interests of the powerless, the hardcore poor, the ethnic minority and the aged have been sidelined while the existing democratic institutions (the representative democracy) have been hijacked by the rich and the lobbyists and continued to function as a platform for the vested interests and not that of the 18 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India poor. This has mirrored the regulatory dimension of the ‘state politics’ and the abdication syndrome ingrained into the practice of politics.31 The post-colonial state has failed to transform the status of people from colonial subjects to citizens. It has been very aptly described by Nicholas Dirks when he termed the colonial states as ethnographic states.32 In other words, the states do not seek participation of the citizens in decision making, but claim to provide for the welfare of population. This made governance less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy. The foremost ingredient of this has been mistrust in the subjects or populace. It can be exemplified in a number of ways, but the most visible is the filing of affidavits for almost every interaction with the government. These affidavits are required in support of the facts given by the applicants for various services provided by the government. In other words, these are affirmations by the applicants in some cases supported by third parties. These affidavits in most of the cases are given on legal papers sworn before a Magistrate or public notary. For instance, affidavits are even required for public utilities such as new connections for electricity, sewerage and water supply. Besides resulting in citizen’s harassment and corruption, it has perpetuated the dichotomy between the state and the nation. Instead of providing universal representation for the citizens as expected, these elections contribute nothing, but “plundering rotating government…in many of these countries, multiparty elections are but a vehicle to legitimise an existing political economy and perpetuate an equation of patron/client dependency relationship in a society.”33 A major casualty of this is citizen-centric democratic governance. If the citizens are treated as population and targets of governance, rather than participatory stakeholders guiding the democratic processes, democracy becomes redundant and citizens’ backlash is built up even against the right kind of intervention. Conclusion Coalition politics in pre and post-election 2009 has shown that it is the politics of presence that played a predominant role in shaping issues 19 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? relating to citizenship, federalism and multi-culturalism. Political parties have formed coalitions in contradiction to their professed electoral ideological pronouncements. While in partnership with each other, they nurtured coalitions for patronage rather than articulation of their professed political agenda. For example, most of the regional political parties bargained for the ministries of their choice rather than the restructuring of the policies which govern centre-state relations.34 The regionalisation of the national political parties and nationalisation of the regional political parties as reflected in the electoral discourse melts down in the power-sharing coalition matrix. It is not only the economic meltdown, but the political meltdown in the coalition era which should merit the attention of political analysis. It is a coalition of bargaining through which stability of the tenure of government is ensured. The coincidence between ideological flux and dichotomous relationship between populist politics and state politics with an emphasis on privileging presence over representative stakeholding of the regions, social cleavages and citizens is not accidental through patronage. There are heterogeneous needs which defy any general formula and its solutions are situational, strategic and historical-specific. How far a coalition of interests and coalition through patronage shall be able to balance the needs to transform entitlements of regions, diversities and citizens particularly living on the margins into rights is a moot question? ENDNOTES 1 This distinction between politics of representation and politics of presence has been very aptly described by Zoya Hasan who argued that politics of presence blurs the underrepresentation and the representation of interests of the constituents specifically vulnerable sections. Zoya Hasan, Constitutional Equality and the Politics of Representation in India (Delhi: Sage; 2006). London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, http://dio.sagepub.com. 2 E. Sridharan, “Coalition Strategies and The BJP’s Expansion, 1989-2004,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, 2005, pp. 194-221. For 2009, the data were gathered from the Institute for Development and Communication (IDC) Unit. 3 The distinction between one party dominance system and one-party system has been described by Rajni Kothari. He noted that one-party dominance system is competitive party system, but one in which the competing parties play rather dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. 20 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India See for details, Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress System in India’, Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12, 1964, pp. 1161-73. 4 Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 5 Lok Sabha Elections 1977: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 6 Deepak Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction of Economics and Politics in Independent India”, in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 381. 7 The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), January 23, 2010. 8 Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal). 9 Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The DMK. 10 Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 11 Quoted in Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1974), p. 141. 12 Deepak Nayyar, op. cit., 2001, p. 381. 13 Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 14 Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Bhartiya Janata Party. 15 Lok Sabha Elections 1999: Manifesto of The National Democratic Alliance. 16 The BJP in its 1962 election manifesto declared that “The present Constitution which, by calling the Centre as ‘Union’ and provinces as ‘States’, has recognised a separate and somewhat sovereign status of the constituents, is also a hindrance to national unity. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend the Constitution and declare India a Unitary State, with provision for decentralisation of power to the lowest levels”. The Congress Party manifesto was more explicit on issues relating to national integration and unity in diversity. The issue of centre-state relationship did not find any expression in its 1962 manifesto. 17 Lok Sabha Elections 1998: Manifesto of The Shiroman Akali Dal.. 18 The Hindu (Delhi), March 24, 1997. 19 For instance, the Akali Dal in Punjab in its 1973 autonomy resolution and, later in its 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, asked for apportionment of financial resources within the framework of command economy. In the 1973 resolution, the Akali Dal demanded, “Complete nationalisation of the trade in food grains and, as such, shall endeavour to nationalize the wholesale trade in food grains through the establishment of state agencies.” 21 Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions? It further stated that “the SAD shall try to fix the prices of the agricultural produce on the basis of the returns of the middle class farmers. Such prices would be notified well before the sowing season and only the State governments would be empowered to fix such prices.” However, in its 2007 election manifesto these issues were not raised. 20 For detailed analysis of this aspect, please see Atul Sood, ‘”Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway” in Social Watch India (Delhi: Sage, 2007), Chapter II, pp. 89-94. 21 Partha Chatterjee has very perceptively reflected on Anderson’s categorisation of bound and unbound serialities and has observed that for each category of classification any individual can count only as one on zero, never as a fraction, which in turn means that all partial or mixed affiliations to a category are ruled out. For limited purpose, in this paper these categories have been used with a qualification that the identity perceptions are real and that which of the elements of ethnic identity like caste, religion, language etc. shall acquire dominant manifestation is history-specific and contextually-based. Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed. (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006),p.6. Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South-East Asia and the World (London: Verso, 1998). 22 Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 23 Lok Sabha Elections 1977: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 24 B.P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Government of India, 1980) Vol. 1, Chapter XIII, Recommendations, pp. 57-60. 25 http://www.rediff.com/election/2009/apr/27slde1-raj-thackeray-attractscrowds-everywhere.htm. 26 The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), January 21, 2010. Subsequently, the Congress government in Maharashtra moderated its statement in response to adverse reactions from North-Indian states. 27 The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Commission for Minority Educational Institutions to provide direct affiliation for minority professional institutions to central universities. Special steps will be taken to spread modern and technical education among women in minority communities particularly… (Congress: 2004). A comprehensive national programme for minor irrigation of all lands owned by Dalits and adivasis will be introduced. Landless families will be endowed with some land through the proper implementation of land ceiling and land redistribution legislation…(Congress: 2004). 22 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 28 Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 29 The study indicated that women representatives were assigned the task to look into social engagements such as marriage alliances, information on birth, health and household activities in the domain of gender segregated roles. See for details, Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of Masculinities, (Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 2008). 30 M. Adil Khan, “Engaged Governance”: A Strategy for Mainstreaming Citizens into the Public Policy Processes (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 13. 31 M. Adil Khan, ibid., p. 13. 32 For an elaborate analysis of this aspect, please refer to Partha Chatterjee, op.cit., 2006. 33 M. Adil Khan, op. cit., 2005, pp. 8-9. 34 In post-2009 elections, DMK, the key ally of the Congress, demanded an increase in its ministerial berths as compared to 2004. It also made a determined pitch for lucrative ministries like Telecom, Information Technology, Surface Transport and Shipping. On the other hand, Trinamool Congress smoothly bargained for the Ministry of Railways and five Ministers of States. It also demanded the imposition of President’s Rule in West Bengal in contradiction to the demand of the regional parties for the imposition of Central rule in any state only in extreme circumstances. The Tribune (Chandigarh), May 22, 2009. 23 III CONTEXTUALISING RELIGIOUS CASTE AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN ELECTORAL POLITICS: EMERGING PARADOXES* Indian politics is confronted with a new set of issues and challenges posed by the dynamic process of development. This is reflected in the qualitative shift from a command to a competitive liberal market economy1, from one party dominance to coalition of parties2, from nation building to representation of polarised socio-cultural reality into politics3. These shifts have brought to the surface certain paradoxes as reflected in the electoral process. The paradox in electoral promises and mandate of governments, in threat from and need of democratic institutions, in ideological monotheism and ideological pluralism has been reflective of the Indian electoral system since the mid-sixties. As a result it may not be possible to evolve neat categories of political analysis for labelling political parties as pro and anti-economic reforms, communal and noncommunal, casteist and non-casteist. In fact, the two national political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC), while in power favour economic reforms, but oppose reforms at the time of elections. Similarly, both parties have compromised with communal persuasions. For instance, the Congress has been accused of being anti-Sikh and branded as communal in elections in Punjab, whereas, elsewhere in India the Bharatiya Janata Party has been labelled as communal by the Congress-led front. Therefore, it would be appropriate to analyse the 2004 elections in an historical context and as a process rather than through often misleading labels, pronouncements of political parties and their shifting coalition partners. Historically, the state-led nation-building project has provided the necessary conditions for the existence of divergent phenomena and also the emergence of paradoxes in electoral politics in India. The nationbuilding project attempted to bridge the gap between organised interest groups and people without means with a well entrenched * Published in a volume titled India’s 2004 Elections: Grass Roots And National Perspectives edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy, sage New Delhi (2007), pp. 58-75. Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India middle class4. The Congress which has been the main protagonist of the nation-building project claimed in its manifesto for the 2004 parliamentary elections, the creation of the middle class as its main achievement without integrating marginalised sections into the market and decision making system. This strata in collaborative arrangement with the organised interest groups became the custodians of the state while the nation consisting of people without means looked the other way5. These poorer sections of society are reduced to mere victims, beneficiaries, clients and recipients. In this dichotomous relationship the state is seen as ‘dole giver’ and the nation the ‘dole receiver’. In other words, a patron-client relationship defines the boundary conditions for electoral discourse. The relationship uncovers itself in a variety of ways. Political leaders mediate between the state and the electorate through: (i) policies, whereby subsidies are given as doles for poverty alleviation, debt redemption, augmentation of income; (ii) facilitating access to schemes, government services and protection from crime and violence. For providing access to doles, the discretion available with government functionaries, enlarges the scope of political patronage. For instance, to have access to these doles, the poor need ration cards, identity proof and a residential certificate which are to be provided by the functionaries, often mediated by political leaders; (iii) application of ideological filters at the level of policies and their implementation. Non-secular categories like caste, religion, region and secular categories like aam admi (common man) are used to acquire legitimacy for their political claims. This complex interaction between aam, admi and electoral politics is dynamic in nature and has been undergoing a change. The transformation agenda within the nation building project dominate Indian electoral politics. PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE: FROM GAP TO PARADOX The paradox between the transformational discourse and economic reforms agenda has shaped the electoral politics in India. This discourse occupied a large space in electoral politics until the eighties. Populist slogans like “garibi hatao”, “land to the tiller”, “social justice for all”, 25 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics “anticorruption” and “fight against authoritarianism” have been raised for election purposes. The theme of elections has undergone a change with successive political leaders. Under India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, it was social justice for all, expressed in various forms like land to the tiller. In the 1971 parliamentary elections, Congress leader Mrs. Indira Gandhi won with the slogan “garibi hatao” (poverty eradication), and under the non-Congress leadership in the 1977 parliamentary elections, it was restoration of democracy and antiauthoritarianism. All these slogans, along with the promise of building a socialist society remained the hallmark of Indian politics. The Congress promised what Nehru called the socialistic pattern of society by following a policy of industrialisation with increased government ownership so as to command the heights of the economy. The state took upon itself the task of building infrastructure like dams, steel plants, oil refineries and machine tool factories. In fact, these were essential for the fast growth of private industries. Indian industrialists were unwilling and unable to undertake the construction and management of these capital intensive heavy industries. In other words, the national political leadership sought to realise the goal of socialism by creating a large industrial and agricultural base and by developing science and technology. This process of industrialisation and even the policy of nationalisation were used for increasing production and not as a means of attaining social justice. Another populist slogan of land reforms was used to create a vision of equality. Land reforms and the way they were implemented transformed big land owners from a class solely dependent on land and feudal privileges to a class of rural entrepreneurs. These rural entrepreneurs, no doubt, retained substantial interest in land, but made considerable investment in transport, warehouses and rice mills. All these measures threw up a class of privileged people who were gripped by a kind of ‘scarcity psychology’. On the other hand, the same process multiplied and marginalised the poor sections of the population. The strategy adopted was to attain self-reliance by assigning lead role of public investment in agriculture and industry leading to import substitution. This strategy was implemented within the broad protectionist framework to ensure domestic markets for goods and services produced. 26 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India For one, there was a conscious attempt to limit the degree of openness and of integration with the world economy, in pursuit of a more autonomous, if not self-reliant, development. For another, the state was assigned a strategic role in development because the market, by itself, was not perceived as sufficient to meet the aspirations of a latecomer to industrialisation.6 This strategy was being implemented in a society intermeshed with feudal attitudes, capitalist practices and egalitarian pretentions. Correspondingly, the political discourse, presented state-led capitalism as ‘socialism’, state-patronage extended as doles to eradicate poverty and affirmative action package as a deal to dispense with primordial identities like caste, religion, linguistic. The outcome was paradoxical. The mid-sixties mirrored a discernible qualitative shift in Indian politics. Efforts were made to co-opt emerging interests to provide continuity to the ruling coalition. The co-option of peasantry was operationalised through introduction of subsidy regime by lowering the prices of inputs like fertilizers, power and water and higher procurement prices. And, at the popular level, slogan of garibi hatao was raised to connect with the commonperson. The co-option strategy did work to the advantage of the Congress party in 1971 general elections, but simultaneous deepening of economic crises nurtured number of protest movements. These protest movements became more widespread and intense in view of the incapacitated institutions of the state. Consequently, attempts to control these protest movements and silence dissent within the political system and, more so, within the Congress party through authoritarian modes led to imposition of Emergency. The postemergency events changed the character of political democracy in India, but economic policies became more dole-oriented. The only difference was that the slogan of ‘justice for all’ was replaced by ‘justice for backward castes, Dalits and minorities’. It provided hopes to the downtrodden without providing any concrete gains. The Mandal Commission itself acknowledged it. When a backward class candidate becomes collector or a superintendent of police, the material benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin-off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the 27 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated.7 The Mandal Commission had little to do with equality and social justice. It focused on a strategy of co-option by multiplying caste cleavages and attempting to achieve a balance of group interests. This, in a limited way, provided continuity to the discourse on transformational politics. In the nineties the emphasis was shifted from the public sectoradministering of prices, subsidies, control of wages and poverty-to structural reforms with a veneer of liberal non-regulatory state.8 The major initiative for economic reforms was taken during the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Within months after taking office, the Prime Minister announced new policies to accelerate India’s slow industrial growth – liberalising imports, providing new economic incentives for exports, permitting the import of technologies, encouraging foreign investment through joint ventures, reducing taxes and de-regulating the economy so as to make it more competitive.9 Thereafter, a near consensus on economic reforms package among the major political parties and actors was built, notwithstanding the occasional noises relating to Swadeshi. For instance, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party election manifestos for 2004 on economic reforms reinforced each other. The Bharatiya Janata Party highlighted its commitment to: further broadening and deepening the economic reforms based on a self-reliant approach, sustained double-digit GDP growth rate to achieve complete eradication of poverty and unemployment, end of regional and social disparities and bridging the urban-rural divide.10 The Congress manifesto asserts that, The Congress would broaden and deepen economic reforms. The overriding objectives would be to attain and sustain year after year a 810% rate of economic growth and to spread this growth over all sectors, particularly agriculture and industry… aimed at local level economic and social transformation that directly benefit the poor in rural and urban 28 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India India, bringing prosperity to the 6 lakh-odd villages of India and improving the living conditions of the urban poor.11 The space vacated by slogans like ‘garibi hatao’ was allowed to go unattended with symbolic references in election manifestos. The dichotomy between electoral promises and the mandate of governance became pronounced. Earlier, electoral promises used to be in line with the ideological commitment of the government. Now with the adoption of economic reforms, electoral promises were in contradiction with the government’s mandate. In elections, political parties ideologically support economic reforms but find it difficult to politically popularise them. This is because the content of economic reforms is to reduce employment in the public sector without creating corresponding employment in the private sector, to encourage people to participate in self-help groups and launch small businesses in the face of intense competition. Nor, can they tell the people to mind their own health and give subsidies to private hospitals and above all, in the name of building their stakes, ‘motivate’ them to pay for life saving services even if they do not have the opportunities to earn a livelihood. It is important to note there has been a wide gap between electoral promises and government performance in both the phases, i.e. 1947 to 1977 and 1977 onwards. The difference is that in the earlier phase, the electoral promises were ideologically in convergence with the mandate of the government, whereas in the later phase the electoral promises and the government’s mandate were ideologically divergent. The reasons identified for this crisis of non-performance range from structural causes to political behaviour of leaders. However, in the first phase it became manifested in the form of a leadership crisis, whereas in the second phase it took the form of a crisis of trust in leadership. The 2004 elections have empirically shown that the legitimacy of the government in power declines faster due to the mismatch between the electoral promises and the stark realities of the new economic policies. The National Democratic Alliance, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party, made implementation of economic reforms a major poll plank in the 2004 elections. The campaign was labelled “India Shining”. Congress raised issues relating to “Aam Aadmi” (common man) and branded the 29 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics Bharatiya Janta Party anti-poor. The mismatch between the electoral mandate of the 1999 elections and the performance of the BJP-led government contributed to poor electoral results in the 2004 parliamentary elections. It won 138 seats with 22.16 per cent vote share. Further, this paradox between electoral promises and government performance can be captured clearly from two case studies, i. e. Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. Andhra Pradesh was considered the best governed state with shifting emphasis from state as provider of services to being merely a facilitator. In the 1994 elections the Telgu Desam Party won by opposing the economic reforms of the Congress. A decade later, in 2004, the Congress launched itself into a pro-poor bandwagon and against economic reforms to defeat the TDP-led by Chandrababu Naidu government.12 Table 3.1 1994 and 2004 Vidhan Sabha elections in Andhra Pradesh 1994 2004 Seats Seats % of Seats Seats % of Contested won votes Contested won votes polled polled Loss or gain % increase in seats won Congress 294 26 33.85 234 185 38.56 611.54 TDP 251 216 44.14 267 47 37.59 -78.24 Left 37 34 6.35 26 15 3.37 -56.0 BJP 280 3 3.89 27 2 2.63 -33.34 TRS 54 26 6.68 Others 2357 15 11.78 1288 19 11.17 26.67 Source: Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh (various years). The Congress made electoral promises like free electricity for agriculture, subsidies on crop loans, more funds for irrigation projects, relief package to the families of suicide victims, loans to women self-help groups at 3 per cent interest per annum, and the sanction of a revolving fund to all DWACRA groups which completed six months, 2.5 lakh jobs for the youth by lifting the ban on recruitment in government service, enhancement of old-age pension, and revival of the subsidised cloth scheme13. Chandrababu Naidu opined that the Congress was making fantastic promises that could not be implemented by anyone in power and that it was resorting to 30 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India populist promises to deceive the voters. He said international financial agencies, such as the World Bank, would not approve free electricity to the agriculture sector and that would mean the stoppage of loans to the state. The Congress immediately termed the TDP government as anti-farmer and pro-World Bank.14 The results of the elections were dismal for the TDP and the Congress won the elections. The first step the Congress government took after coming to power was to announce free electricity for the farmers as was promised in its election manifesto. In Punjab, the Congress demonstrated this paradox between electoral promises and government mandate in a blatant manner as it was caught between Assembly elections (2002) followed by Parliamentary elections (2004). In the 2002 Assembly elections it promised free electricity to farmers, removal of octroi and registered a victory over its major opponent, the Akali Dal. The election manifesto committee was chaired by Dr. Manmohan Singh, present Prime Minister of India.15 After coming to power it backtracked from its electoral promises and announced a number of initiatives for introducing economic reforms. Consequently, it did poorly in 2004 parliamentary election. Learning lessons from its defeat, the Congress government announced sops like free electricity to farmers in the wake of the forthcoming Assembly elections in early 2007. Interestingly, these sops were opposed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Chief Minister, Capt. Amarinder Singh, reminded the Prime Minister that he chaired the election manifesto committee which made these promises in 2002 elections. The patron-client relationship is carefully nurtured by offering doles in the name of subsistence subsidies to the electorate. Doles have been used as a poverty-alleviating and vote catching device. People without means constitute the backbone of Indian electoral politics. There are more illiterates, rural-based people, Scheduled Castes and OBCs who comprise voters today than earlier…. In 1996 over the average polling of 58 per cent there were 1 per cent more OBCs voting as against merely 2 per cent less than the upper castes; that is 59 per cent OBCs voted as against 56 per cent upper castes. It becomes more pronounced if we 31 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics look at the Scheduled Castes who are 2 per cent above the average, that is, about 60 per cent of them voted as against 56 per cent upper castes.16 It is this reality that sustains the paradoxical response of the political parties not only in terms of electoral promises, but also in their performance. The politics of populism became more pronounced with the introduction of economic reforms. Political parties, in order to compete with each other, promise doles. Consequently, it has liberated political parties from the burden of adopting political positions based on transformational politics. Threat and Need Paradox of Democracy The interaction of the state-led nation-building project with the path of development produced shifts in political discourse from a transformational thrust to the consolidation of sectional interests. The waning away of the aura of national freedom movement and the weakening of the central leadership in post-Nehruvian phase led to the strengthening of the regional politics. It also brought about a shift from the need of democratic institutions to meet a perceived threat from these same institutions leading to institutional collapse in the eighties.17 As a result, participatory institutions were either made defunct or ineffective and consequently led to the decreased power of liberal democratic institutions and their leadership. There has been centralisation of authority and deinstitutionalisation of governance in the midst of popular revolts in Gujarat, the mass movement in Bihar led by Jayaprakash Narayan leading to the imposition of internal emergency in 1977. This process of deinstitutionalisation was attributed to the then Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, by some political analysts. Myron Weiner opined that ‘in Mrs. Gandhi’s view, these institutions – state Congress organizations with local leaders independent of the Centre, a hostile opposition, a critical press and an independent judiciary – had impeded the movement towards a modern, socialist, equalitarian social and economic order.’18 The structural and historical causes were not analysed and reflected available political options and choices. The issue of deinstitutionalisation was identified as a principle reason for the nonperformance and collapse of democratic political processes.19. No 32 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India doubt, there has been gradual dedemocratisation and whittling down of the basic rights of the people and abdication of the basic obligation of the system leading to downgrading the most precious facet of democratic system, i. e. legitimacy. Retrospectively, it can be conceptualised as a cyclical process and can be termed as a threat and need paradox of Indian democracy. The institutional collapse which was caused by the threat perception of these leaders was selectively reversed. Having curtailed the democratic functioning of various institutions, these leaders frequently misused the paramilitary forces to overcome the crises. The eighties saw the revival of law enforcing agencies with an overactive police; as a result, the heroes of the eighties were the supercops. The nineties produced an ‘overactive judiciary’ which took upon itself most of the functions of the state, including the moral and ethical role of the non-state institutions. The Chief Election Commissioner shared the glory of performing the role of reforming the system single handedly. This selected restoration of institutional framework did not ‘restore the secular institutional culture.20 However, competitive electoral politics became activated leading to the decline of one party dominance. Competing political parties in order to mobilise regional electoral constituencies based on caste, language, tribal and religious considerations, built bridges with ideologically divergent groups. This ‘bridge politics’ blurred ideological differences. For instance, the party responsible for atrocities against Sikhs in 1984 was being wooed by all secularists and parties known for their communal outbursts were in alliance with former socialists and liberal democrats. POLITICS OF IDEOLOGICAL MONOTHEISM AND MULTI-CULTURAL SECULARISM This seeming paradox contributed to a shift from one variety of ideological monotheism to another and the negation of forces of ideological pluralism. Nehruvian institutional secularism was replaced by ideological monotheism having its basis in unified conception of indigenous (Hindu) nationhood, negating the policies of appeasement of minorities and in opposition to secular nationhood terming it as pseudosecularism. On the other hand regional, caste and tribal groups became mobilised for the expansion of electoral constituencies. It has been 33 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics argued that democracy in India has been vacillating between reconciling the claims of communities vis-à-vis each other and finding ways to harmonise the citizenship rights and claims of the collectivities. The project of democracy is, thus, confronted by at least two kinds of problems: first, making democracy receptive to the claims of communities in a plural society, and preventing it from degenerating into majoritarianism in a way that consistently disprivileges the minorities; and second, searching for ways of rendering compatible conflicting identities, without the effacement of either and, in a manner that safeguards the equal rights of citizenship. The Shah Bano case and its aftermath are adequately illustrative of both these problems.21 The mono-cultural secular nation-building project, in interaction with multicultural social reality, led to the subversion of the rights of various cultural and linguistic groups. This provided a context to strengthening of communal assertions and currency to caste groupings as electoral capital. There are at least three crucial events in this chronology; the Shah Bano-Muslim Women’s Act affair of 1985-86, the BJP’s defection in 1990 from the United Front government of V.P. Singh, and the ongoing Mandir-Masjid saga’…. By overturning the Shah Bano decision in the widely publicized case, available and explicable to a nation-wide audience, the Rajiv Gandhi Government gave apparent credence to the widespread and long-held charge against the Congress that the substance of its secularism was “pseudo-secularism,” communally divisive “vote bank politics,” and “pampering” Muslims in order to get their votes.22 Communal Monoliths as Vote Banks The Ram Janam Bhoomi movement consolidated the Hindu majority vote bank and consequently the Bharatiya Janata Party increased its electoral tally in Parliament from 2 seats in 1984 to 182 seats in the 1999 elections. As a ploy to fragment and weaken the Hindu vote bank, 34 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India a caste based political co-option strategy in the form of Mandal Commission was unleashed. To illustrate, the Bharatiya Janata Party won two seats in the 1984 elections with 8 per cent vote share. It increased its tally as it won 85 seats in 1989, 120 seats in 1991, 161 seats in 1996, 182 seats in 1998 and in 1999 and 138 seats in 2004. Table 3.2 Seats Won by Bharatiya Janata Party in Parliament Elections (1984-2004) Seats Seats won % of votes % of seats won out of Contested polled contested seats 1984 224 2 7.74 1 1989 225 85 11.36 38 1991 468 120 20.11 26 1996 471 161 20.29 35 1998 388 182 25.59 47 1999 339 182 23.75 54 2004 364 138 22.16 38 Source: Statistical Report on General Elections to the Lok Sabha (various years). Political mobilisation of backward castes found expression in parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party, Samata Party and other regional parties. Dalit politics also emerged as a powerful force and found articulation through the Bahujan Samaj Party. The participation of Dalits in elections increased. In 1996 parliamentary elections the percentage of SC voter turnout was 89.2 per cent as against the national average of 87.3 per cent in the case of upper castes. This trend continued in the 1998 elections where voter turnout of the SCs and the upper castes was 93 per cent and 91.9 per cent respectively. In 1971 SC voter turnout was 78.7 per cent (CSDS data unit, CSDS Delhi).23 In the initial years of post-independence India, the dominant political discourse was secular in its thrust and was not consistent with areas governed by caste or religious domains. Whereas since the mid-eighties, the dominant political discourse increasingly became consistent with a communal, sectarian and caste based cultural reservoir. The political parties transformed this reservoir into electoral capital. Therefore, to label electoral battles between political parties as communal versus non-communal is a misnomer. 35 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics Political formations in Punjab labelled the Congress as communal as it was seen as responsible for Operation Bluestar at the Sikh religious shrine, the Golden Temple at Amritsar and anti-Sikh riots following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Similarly, Bharatiya Janata Party could be labelled communal as being allegedly responsible for the communal carnage in Gujarat. In 2004 parliamentary elections and even in 2002 Assembly elections in Gujarat the Bharatiya Janata Party could consolidate the Hindu vote and win with massive margins. Table 3.3 Party Preference by Social Group Congress – NCP BJP N Upper Castes 33 60 161 Patidars 18 75 158 OBCs 55 40 230 Dalits 67 *23 89 Adivasis 46 48 172 Muslims 60 *20 79 Note: The Sample size for Dalits and Muslims voting for the BJP is too small to be statistically significant. Source: National Election Study 2004; weighted data set. Table 3.4 Performance of BJP and Congress in Gujarat Parliament and Vidhan Sabha Elections Lok Sabha Vidhan Sabha 1999 2004 1998 2002 BJP Congress BJP Congress BJP Congress BJP Congress Seats 26 26 26 25 182 179 182 180 Contested Seats Won 20 6 14 12 117 53 127 51 % of vote 52.48 45.41 47.37 43.86 44.81 34.85 49.85 39.28 Source: Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Gujarat (various years) Statistical Report on General Elections to the Lok Sabha (various years) In the 2002 Gujarat Assembly elections, out of 182 constituencies 154 were affected by communal riots. And the BJP could win in 127 constituencies. Can communal riots influence people’s response to political parties? In fact, the results do not validate the thesis that the riot-hit constituencies or even those with high rioting had BJP as the sole claimant. Gandhinagar and Dessa were among the worst affected by riots yet they returned Congress candidates. Thus, the Congress has won in a significant number of constituencies (12 per cent) which witnessed a high degree of riots and others which had moderate riots (24 per cent). On the other hand, among the riot-free constituencies, 36 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India more seats went to the BJP than to the Congress (more than 60 per cent), even in the proclaimed anti-incumbency heartland of Saurashtra. In other words, the BJP won irrespective of the presence or the extent of riots in Gujarat, where it could win more than 60 per cent of the constituencies which had no rioting or low rioting. The Congress, on the other hand, did win seats in the heavily and moderately riot hit constituencies.24 The Gujarat elections have produced a major shift from one variety of ideological monotheism to another, i. e. from the minority religious group to the majority religious group, from nationalisation of Hindutva to regionalisation of Hindutva. The nurturing of regional sentiments and aspirations around Hindutva is a unique experiment which has serious implications for the nation-building project. It has not only reversed the secular nation-building project launched at the time of Independence, but has also distorted the RSS concept of nationalisation of Hindutva. The whole tenor of electoral mobilisation in Gujarat was a clever blend of Gaurav of Gujarat25 and Hindutva identity. Providing a saffron garb to regional aspirations cannot be explained as a consequence of postGodhra developments. In fact, the Godhra episode and the riots that followed are the products of an ideological fermentation carefully nurtured by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the BJP. The massive response to regionalisation of the Hindutva ideology and regional leadership can be understood in the backdrop of globalisation. The process of globalisation has undermined the concept of a nation. Having compromised on economic sovereignty, countries like India and Pakistan have surrendered their political sovereignty, as maintenance of domestic peace has been pushed into the realm of global politicaldecision making and diktats. It is in this context that President Pervez Musharraf raised the question of Gujarat riots at the United Nations and the ‘Mian Musharraf’ symbolism gained currency in the Gujarat elections. The process of globalisation provided an impetus to son-ofthe-soil movement, particularly in Gujarat, which has a long history of communalising the job market. In the 2004 parliament elections Congress could win in 12 out of 26 Lok Sabha seats as compared to six seats held in the 1999 elections. The Congress was leading in 92 of the 182 assembly segments as compared to 51 assembly seats in the 2002 elections. The moot question is that in 37 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics less than 15 months, is it possible that anti-incumbency could become a potent factor overriding communal polarisation? Or did the defensive response of the Congress under the leadership of former RSS activist Shanker Singh Vaghela provide the electorates a choice between soft and hard communalism.26 Caste as a Political Capital Similarly, caste as a political capital has found varied responses blended in regional flavours covering a vast political spectrum. The content of the emerging Dalit identity includes an assertion of de facto recognition of their rights, occupational mobility, status parity and parallel religious symbols. The local cultural context has shaped Dalit response to political parties. For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) could find a positive response in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), whereas, in Punjab with the highest percentage of Dalit population in the country, it could find a nominal response. To illustrate, the BSP vote share in Uttar Pradesh increased from 11 per cent in 1993 to 23 per cent in 2002.27 Both in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the initial response was to identify with the BSP as there was a low degree of representation of the Scheduled Castes. But in Punjab there is a trend to move away from the BSP. Table 3.5 BSP Vote Support in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab Legislative Assembly Uttar Pradesh Punjab 2002 1996 1993 2002 1997 1992 Seats contested 401 296 164 100 67 105 Seats won 98 67 67 0 1 9 % of vote 23.06 19.4 11.12 5.69 7.48 16.32 Source: 1. Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh (various years). 2. Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Punjab (various years) Why couldn’t the BSP make electoral inroads in Punjab? Punjab has been known for its liberal ritualistic religious practices in relation to caste. Both Sikhism and the Arya Samaj have liberated the Dalits from the stringent purity-pollution based behavioural patterns. For instance, equality in religious gatherings, establishment of common kitchen and the institution of langar were initiated to overcome caste-based superior and inferior relationships. Not only this, offering of ‘Karah Prasad’ by any one irrespective of his caste was a symbolic departure from the notion that forbade food sharing by the upper and lower castes.28 38 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Interestingly, in Punjab Dalit assertion has usurped the idea of purity to present itself as a competing identity. Notions of honour, revenge and levirate marriages (‘chaddar’ system) that were considered exclusive to peasant groups are now being adopted by the Dalits29. Levirate marriage, a customary practice of Punjabi peasantry in which a widow is ‘married’ to her deceased husband’s brother or other male relative by performing a specific ritual. The patriarchal family thus retains land, assets and children within its fold, while also providing legitimate protection and space to the widow. Levirate marriages are now also being practised by Dalits in Punjab, claiming parity with the Jat peasantry by providing protection to ‘family honour’. For the Dalits, it meant preventing ‘pollution’ of their exclusive identity. At the individual level, the Dalits are resentful of being unable to protect their women from what they now perceive as transgression of their manhood and identity. Sharing the common cultural reservoir to acquire social parity without getting assimilated into the hierarchical system provided them with a greater political bargaining capacity without becoming hostage of a particular Dalit party. Further the ideological content of BSP has been unable to capture the regional, cultural and economic specificities of Punjab. The puritypollution and Manuwad that are the BSP’s main ideological planks do not find expression in the socio-cultural domain of Punjab in its fundamental form as it exists in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see the impact of globalisation and regional dimension on the communal and caste-based political formations and their electoral performance. To sum up, the above analysis shows that the promises and performance of political parties may not be analysed in terms of gap, but as a paradox. Further, the crisis of leadership has acquired a systemic form leading to a crisis of trust in politics and political leadership. Ideological filters have become convenient labels for acquiring legitimacy for what is otherwise a blatantly legislative power game. 39 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 Robert E. B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek (eds.), The Indian Economy: Recent Development and Future Prospects (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988). 2 E. Sridharan, “Electoral Coalition 2004 General Elections”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, pp. 5418-25. Paul R. Brass, “India, Myron Weiner and the Political Science of Development”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 29, July 20, 2002, pp. 3026-40. 3 Robert W. Stern, Changing India: Bourgeois Revolution on the Subcontinent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 4 “A nation which had two-thirds of its people under the poverty line at independence is now a nation with two-thirds of its population above the poverty line in the half century since independence. The middle class of India is the proud creation of the Congress.” Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of the Indian National Congress. 5 Pushpendra, “Dalit Assertion Through Electoral Politics”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 36, September 4, 1999, p. 2611. 6 Deepak Nayyar, ‘Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction of Economics and Politics in Independent India’ in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 370. 7 B. P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission, (Government of India, 1980), Vol. I, p. 57. 8 To quote, P. N. Dhar, the then advisor to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi: “The broad purpose of policy changes now is to move away from directives, regulations and controls to a greater role for market incentives and to indirect policy instruments as against direct physical controls. Greater importance is now being attached to productivity, competitiveness and technological modernisation with a view to promoting more rapid growth of manufactured exports. Similarly, quantitative limits on imports are being replaced by tariffs to expose domestic industry to a reasonable amount of external competition. Some more items have also been added to the open general licence.” P.N. Dhar, “The Indian Economy: Past Performance and Current Issues”, in Robert E.B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek (eds.), The Indian Economy: Recent Development and Future Prospects (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.15. 9 Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 297. 10 ‘Bharatiya Janata Party: Vision Document – 2004’ p. 2. 40 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 11 ‘Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of the Indian National Congress’, p. 8. 12 He undertook a 1,500 km-long padayatra across Andhra Pradesh in May 2003. During his campaign, he called Chandrababu Naidu an agent of the World Bank and alleged that the reforms pursued by the TDP government had landed the state in a debt trap and resulted in underdevelopment. He charged huge loans taken from international agencies had been spent on unproductive sectors, and much of it had been pocketed by Telugu Desam functionaries. K. C. Suri, “Andhra Pradesh: Fall of the CEO in Arena of Democracy”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, p. 5494. 13 Ibid. p. 5495. 14 Ibid. 15 Punjab Congress Election Manifesto, 2002 16 Javed Alam, ‘What is Happening Inside Indian Democracy’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 37, September 11, 1999, p. 2654. 17 Pramod Kumar, “Flaws in the System”, The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), June 30, 1999. 18 Myron Weiner op.cit., 1989, p. 269. 19 To quote, Rajni Kothari, “among other things, I have focused on what I believe to be the principle malaise, namely the erosion of institutions and the challenge of both ‘restoring political process (by which I have meant restoring political institutions) and reinstitutionalising the political terrain in terms of processes and interactions that emerge from the grassroots upwards to macro ‘political structures”. Rajni Kothari, “Fragments of a Discourse: Towards Conceptualization”, in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), State and Nation in the Context of Social Change (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 42. 20 Paul R. Brass, op. cit., 2002, p. 3027. 21 Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘The State and Democracy in India or what Happened to Welfare, Secularism, and Development’ in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-206. This appeared as a footnote to above quote, is being reproduced to contextualise the argument. The case of Shah Bano vs. Mohammed Ahmed Khan (Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981) was decided by the Supreme Court in a landmark judgement delivered in April 1985. The case pertained to the claim for maintenance of a seventy-three year old divorcee, Shah Bano. Her husband, Ahmed Khan had moved the Supreme Court in appeal against a High Court judgement making the payment of a small maintenance allowance incumbent upon him. Ahmed Khan argued that sine he had fulfilled his obligations under Muslim Personal Law by paying her an allowance for the three months of the iddat period, and paid her mehr as well, he was not bound to do more. The 41 Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics Supreme Court was thus implicitly asked to pronounce on the relationship between religious personal law and some provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, which relate to destitution and vagrancy, and were being regularly invoked for maintenance petitions by abandoned wives. The Court upheld the High Court judgement, ruling that the criminal law of the country overrides all personal laws, and is uniformly applicable to all, including Muslim women. This judgement sparked off a political storm in which guarantees were demanded for safeguarding personal law, ground in the claim of rights to cultural community. In deference to the opinion of the politically influential community leadership, the Rajiv Gandhi government hastily drafted a legislation which explicitly excluded Muslim women from the purview of the criminal law, to which all citizens otherwise have recourse. 22 Robert W. Stern, op. cit., 2003, pp. 185-86. 23 Pushpendra, op. cit., 1999, p. 2609 24 Pramod Kumar, “Ideology Overrides Anti-incumbency”, The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), December 24, 2002. 25 The Gaurav of Gujarat means pride of Gujarat. The Chief Minister of Gujarat on August 12, 2002 said, “I am determined to take out the yatra and tell the world the Gaurav Gatha [Story of Pride] of five crore [50 million] people in the state. It is not the story of Godhra, Naroda Patia or Gulmarg. Gujarat was not a state of murderers and rapists as the pseudosecularists, fanatic and powerhungry Congress leaders are attempting to project” India: Modi Determined to Take out Gaurav Yatra in Gujarat. Http://www.rediff.com, August 12, 2002. 26 The BJP was ahead of the Congress by 7 per cent votes in LS polls of 1999. Winning 12 seats in 2004 from six in 1999 was a great boost to the Congress, which was terribly demoralized after the 2002 verdict. Then and now, the Congress has been clueless about countering the religio-communal propaganda and mobilization of the BJP. Priyavadan Patel, “Gujarat: Anti-Incumbency Begins”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, p. 5475. 27 A. K. Verma, “Uttar Pradesh: Caste and Political Mobilisation”. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, pp. 5463-66. 28 Pramod Kumar, “Checking Caste Antagonism to Prevent Violence”, The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), August 13, 2003. 29 Pramod Kumar and Rainuka Dagar, ‘Gender in Dalit Identity Construction in Punjab’ in Harish K. Puri (ed.), Dalit in Regional Context, (Jaipur: Rawat Publication, 2004), p. 279. 42 IV COALITION POLITICS IN PUNJAB* The history of Punjab is replete with its political parties entering into mergers, post-election coalitions and pre-election alliances. Pre-election electoral alliances are a more recent phenomenon, occasional seat adjustments, notwithstanding. While the mergers have been with parties offering a competing support base (Congress and Akalis) the post-election coalition and pre-election alliance have been among parties drawing upon sectional interests. As such there have been two main groupings. One led by the Congress, partnered by the communists, and the other consisting of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has moulded itself to joining any grouping as per its needs. Fringe groups that sprout from time to time, position themselves vis-à-vis the main groups to play the spoiler’s role in the elections. These groups are formed around common minimum programmes which have been used mainly to defend the alliances rather than nurture the ideological basis. For instance, the BJP, in alliance with the Akali Dal, finds it difficult to make the Anti-Terrorist Act, POTA, a main election issue, since the Akalis had been at the receiving end of state repression in the early ‘90s. The Akalis, in alliance with the BJP, cannot revive their anti-Centre political plank. And the Congress finds it difficult to talk about economic liberalisation, as it has to take into account the sensitivities of its main ally, the CPI, which has campaigned against the WTO regime. The implications of this situation can be better understood by recalling the politics that has led to these alliances. These contexts can be understood in the backdrop of nation-building projects in their interaction with Punjab’s political; economic and cultural specificities. This interaction has shaped and nurtured regional aspirations and political and electoral articulations. This can be categorised around three axes. Historically, Punjab has a culture and language which transcends religious group boundaries, unified politicoadministrative unit and has promoted a modern culture which has * Sponsored by: University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India (UPIASI), New Delhi And Ford Foundation, New Delhi. Coalition Politics in Punjab initiated the integration process of diverse religious, caste and other ascriptive group identities. Inspite of the process of formulation and reformulation of the composite linguistic cultural consciousness, the tendency to evolve a unified sub-nationality with a common political goal remained weak in Punjab. This, in a way, provided sufficient space for a competitive multi-party system and emergence of coalition politics. ‘Dwarfed’ Identity Assertions The state and its interaction with the structural conditions dwarfed, the articulations of a secular Punjabi identity and assertions of communal groups and distinct religious identities. All these identities co-existed.1 To illustrate, linguistic and regional issues were articulated within the communal frame, the most obvious examples, of this were the Hindi agitation, the Punjabi suba movement in the pre-reorganisation phase and Khalistan assertions in the mid-eighties. At the same time, a secular Punjabi identity also coexisted. For example, an estimated 47 per cent of the Punjabi Hindus, according to the 1971 census, mentioned their mother tongue to be Punjabi, even though the language question had got communalised and in 1991 it increased to 84 per cent2. The adoption of the Moga Declaration by the SAD and the BJP emphasising Punjab, Punjabi and Punjabiat is a testimony to this fact.3 Minority-Majority Persecution Complex The second axis emerges out of the peculiar demographic composition which has provided space for this co-existence of competing identities. Of the three religious groups i.e. the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs, as per the 1931 census, the Sikhs were in a minority. No doubt, the percentage share of the Hindus was 28, as compared to the Muslims 56 and the Sikhs 134. This configuration provided a conducive ground to coalition politics in the state as all religious groups considered themselves to be in a minority.5 To illustrate, in 1937 the Akali Dal fought the elections in alliance with the Congress on Congress-cum-Akal ticket. In the Legislative Assembly they shared seats with the Congress and their representative became the Leader of the Opposition. In 1942, difference arose between the parties on the issue of supporting the war. The Congress was opposed 44 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India to participation in the war. The Akali Dal decided on the contrary as they argued it would adversely affect the interests of the Sikhs in the Army. Consequently, a pact was signed between the Muslim League and the SAD and the Akali Dal representative, S. Baldev Singh, joined the Cabinet. At the time of partition, the migration of population made a significant impact on the future course of political, economic and social events. The Sikh population increased from 13 per cent to 33 per cent and the Hindu population from 28 per cent to 64 per cent as per the 1961 census. During this period Punjab was divided in two regions i.e. Punjabi speaking and Hindi speaking. In eight of the 12 Punjabi speaking districts, the Sikhs were in a majority.6 Further with the reorganisation of the state in the mid-sixties, the Sikhs constituted a majority with 60 per cent and the Hindus were 37 per cent7. This introduced a situation as both the Hindus and the Sikhs continued to suffer from the minority persecution complex but with a difference. Interestingly, the Hindus suffered from a majority-minority complex as they perceived themselves to the majority in India and a minority in the reorganised Punjab. Similarly the Sikhs perceived to have a minoritymajority complex as they were majority in Punjab and minority in India. This complex was not based merely on numbers, but their involvement in diverse occupations provided the basis for interest articulation in secular spheres on religious group lines. Caste-Religious and Class Axis The third important aspect was the interaction of caste with politics within the broad boundary conditions reformulated by religious reform movements. Punjab has been known for its liberal ritualistic religious practices in relation to caste. Both Sikhism and the Arya Samaj liberated the Dalits from the stringent purity-pollution based behavioural patterns. This can be termed as regionalisation of caste. For example, the dalits, as per the 2001 census, constitute nearly 29 per cent of the total population of the state, perhaps the highest in the country8. A unique regional feature is that the dalits are sharing the common cultural reservoir to acquire social parity without getting assimilated into the hierarchical system9. This has provided them with a greater 45 Coalition Politics in Punjab political and social bargaining capacity without becoming hostage to a particular dalit party. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see the relationship of these axes with party dynamics and coalition politics. Interface of ‘Axes’ with Party Dynamics These characteristic features have shaped the politics of the state, whereby caste has yet to become an idiom of politics, and religious, linguistic and regional identities have got so much intermeshed that none of these parameters have emerged as an exclusive factor in electoral mobilisations and coalitions. A perusal of background of elected representatives and core support base shows that the major political parties represent the diversity despite changing political context since mid-sixties. For example, the Sikh majority was clearly reflected as nearly 70 per cent of Legislators belonged to this religion. However, the number of Sikh Legislators had been more than the average in 1969 (76 per cent), 1977 (74 per cent) and 1997 (74 per cent). In these elections the Akali Dal emerged as a majority party and formed the government. In contrast in 1992, the Akali Dal boycotted the elections and number of Sikh Legislators decreased to its lowest of 58 per cent. Of the total legislatures elected on the Akali Dal ticket, 97 per cent belonged to the Sikh religion. Its coalition partner the BJP averages 88 per cent in all the elections from the Hindu religion. The Congress party maintained a more healthier representation with 55 per cent the Sikhs and the remaining being the Hindus. In the Congress party the selection of the candidates remained fluid in response to the political context. For instance, in 1985 the Congress returned to power with 69 per cent Hindus and in 1992, 62 per cent of the MLAs belonging to the Sikh community got elected on Congress ticket (the Akalis boycotted the elections). The stunted dimension of caste politics in Punjab can be gauged from the fact that the BSP has almost equal number of its legislators from both the Hindus and the Sikhs. The religious, caste and class dimensions are intermeshed, but the dominant formations are located in exclusive demographic spaces. For example, the Sikh-Jat-Peasant identity is predominantly rural and Hindus-Khatri-Trader is urban. The Akali Dal is dominated by the SikhJat-Peasants and the BJP by the Hindu-Khatri-Traders. However, the 46 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Congress party represents both these competing identities. To illustrate, out of the total legislators 31 per cent were Sikh-Jat-Peasants. However, the number of Jats elected is 44 per cent between 1967 to 2007. It is clear that Punjab politics is dominated by Sikh-Jat-peasants. In other words, it is religio-caste and class axis which had become a currency in Punjab politics. For example, the Shiromani Akali Dal’s political assertions ranged from religious identity to secular Punjabi identity. And its birth on January 24, 1921, can be traced to anti-casteist thrust of social and religious interactions.10 The underlying politics was to attain freedom in political, social and religious domains. However, its core support base has been the Sikhs and its leadership and cadre comes from Sikh Jats with a rural background particularly in the postreorganisation phase and electoral support from the rural Sikh Jat peasantry, dalit Sikhs, a section of urban Sikh traders and small commission agents and shopkeepers from small towns.11 A sample survey of party activists of the SAD in 2004 shows that 42 per cent are farmers, 27 per cent belong to business and industry, and 25 per cent are petty shopkeepers. An overwhelming majority of 85 per cent of these are Sikhs (see table 4.1 & 4.2). Table – 4.1 Occupation and Party wise distribution of Party Activists CONGRESS 24 Executive (Business and Trade) (38.10) 1 Lower executive (teacher etc.) (1.59) 20 Self-employed (Shopkeeper etc.) (31.75) 8 Land owners (5+ acre) (12.70) 2 Cultivator (< 5 acres) (3.17) 4 Labour work (unskilled) (6.35) Artisan (and semiskilled worker) 4 Retired (6.35) SAD (B) 16 (27.12) 15 (25.42) 23 (38.98) 2 (3.39) BJP 19 (50.00) 1 (2.63) 12 (31.58) AKALI DAL (MANN) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 3 (5.08) 1 (2.63) 5 (13.16) 59 (100.00) 38 (100.00) Un-employed 63 (100.00) Source: IDC Field Survey, 2004 Total 47 3 (100.00) BSP 3 (9.68) 3 (9.68) 12 (38.71) CPI (M) / CPI 1 (3.03) 5 (15.15) 16 (48.48) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.06) 1 (3.03) 8 (25.81) 1 (3.23) 31 (100.00) 8 (24.24) 33 (100.00) TOTAL 63 (27.75) 10 (4.41) 75 (33.04) 33 (14.54) 9 (3.96) 7 (3.08) 1 0.44) 28 (12.33) 1 0.44) 227 100.00) Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.2 Religion and Party wise distribution of Party Activists CONGRESS Sikh Hindu Christian Total SAD (B) AKALI DAL (MANN) BJP BSP CPI (M) / CPI TOTAL 20 50 1 3 6 15 95 (31.75) (84.75) (2.63) (100.00) (19.35) (45.45) (41.85) 42 9 36 25 18 130 (66.67) (15.25) (94.74) (80.65) (54.55) (57.27) 1 1 2 (1.59) (2.63 (0.88) 63 59 38 3 31 33 227 (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) Source: IDC Field Survey, 2004 An analysis of seats won by the SAD in all elections between 1967 and 2007 shows that it has a clear edge in 22 seats and a majority of these are predominantly rural (See map 1). A comparative analysis of the vote share shows that the Akali Dal has secured the maximum votes in rural constituencies i.e. 43 per cent in 1997 assembly elections and around 17 per cent in urban constituencies in 2007 assembly pre-election coalition phase (see table 4.3). As a consequence, it articulates the agrarian interests and appropriates Sikh religious symbols for blurring the emerging contradiction between the agrarian and other sectors of the economy. However, in the post-terrorism period, urban Hindu traders, in response to the pre-election alliance of the BJP based on Hindu-Sikh amity have shown preference for the Akali Dal. The Akalis urban vote share in 2007 increased to 17 per cent from 16 per cent in 1997 assembly elections in pre-election alliance with the BJP. There have been qualitative shifts in the Akali support base. First shift took place at the time of reorganisation of Punjab coupled with green revolution, the rural Jat Sikhs constituted its main support and leadership also came from this section.12 Second shift to took place in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star and anti-Sikh riots in 1985. The Akalis urban vote revolved around 5 per cent but in 1985 it touched 12 per cent mark with the active support of urban Khatri Sikhs. (see table 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) Third shift took place after the resurgence of democracy in 1997, whereby a substantial number of urban Hindus supported the Akali Dal13. (See table 4.6,4.7,4.8 and 4.9) 48 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 49 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.3 Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Rural 1997 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 2002 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 2007 Semi-Urban Urban 1997 Won/ contested Votes polled( %) 1997 Won/contested Votes polled( %) 1997 Won/contested Votes polled( %) BJS/ BJP CPI CPM INC SAD JP/JD BSP OTHERS 4/6 2/9 0/17 7/62 53/62 0/10 1/41 3/155 3.65 3.13 2.09 26.34 42.87 0.28 8.27 13.37 9/9 0/5 0/8 4/32 19/26 0/10 0/18 3/112 12.25 2.69 1.71 25.77 33.44 1.02 6.48 16.64 5/7 0/1 / 3/11 3/4 0/8 0/8 1/72 26.81 3.01 31.44 16.30 0.86 5.55 16.02 2002 Won/contested 1/6 1/8 0/11 32/61 32/62 / 0/61 4/298 Votes polled( %) 2.76 2.22 0.45 34.63 35.99 6.26 17.69 0/29 4/210 4.65 22.45 2002 Won/contested 2/9 1/2 0/2 19/33 9/26 Votes polled( %) 8.16 1.86 0.27 35.46 27.16 2002 Won/contested 0/8 0/1 / 11/11 0/4 18.41 2.75 46.51 8.57 2007 Won/contested 5/6 0/15 0/8 25/70 35/64 Votes polled( %) 3.74 7/9 0.69 0/9 0.31 0/5 39.99 17/35 41.99 11/26 2007 Won/contested 10.98 7/8 0.77 0/1 0.27 0/1 42.85 2/12 33.38 3/4 Votes polled( %) 29.94 1.09 0.07 40.29 17.14 Votes polled( %) 2007 Won/contested Votes polled( %) Source: Election Commission Reports Punjab, 1997-2007 50 / / 0/10 1/71 5.52 18.25 / 0/69 5/336 / 4.54 0/35 8.74 0/235 / 3.67 0/12 8.08 0/95 2.64 8.83 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Rural 1967 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 1969 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 1972 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 1977 Semi-Urban Urban Table – 4.4 Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Year of Election BJS/BJP CPI CPM INC SAD/ASD JP/JD 1967 Won/contested /15 3/14 2/9 29/54 16/35 / Votes polled (%) 3.39 6.43 4.50 38.35 24.34 1967 Won/contested 2/25 1/4 1/3 19/38 8/24 / Votes polled (%) 12.10 3.16 2.02 37.80 19.74 1967 Won/contested 7/9 1/1 /1 /10 / Votes polled (%) 39.79 6.14 0.80 30.48 1969 Won/contested 1/11 2/19 2/8 24/55 23/36 / Votes polled (%) 4.79 6.08 4.65 38.44 30.67 1969 Won/contested 5/11 1/8 0/2 9/38 19/27 / Votes polled (%) 9.56 2.81 1.47 39.63 33.23 1969 Won/contested 2/8 1/1 / 5/10 1/2 / Votes polled (%) 32.75 5.56 41.88 5.12 1972 Won/contested 0/11 7/9 1/10 31/45 14/40 / Votes polled (%) 1.36 8.19 4.54 39.53 31.58 1972 Won/contested 0/13 2/3 0/7 26/35 10/24 / Votes polled (%) 4.93 3.96 2.16 46.81 27.21 1972 Won/contested 0/9 1/1 / 9/9 0/8 / Votes polled (%) 27.53 7.05 46.31 5.00 1977 Won/contested 5/16 4/13 8/8 9/54 43/47 / Votes polled (%) 8.05 7.43 5.98 31.07 36.66 1977 Won/contested 12/15 2/4 / 6/31 14/21 / Votes polled (%) 19.43 5.18 36.95 30.05 1977 Won/contested 8/10 1/1 / 2/11 1/2 / Votes polled (%) 41.02 6.09 37.79 5.78 Source: Election Commission Reports Punjab, 1967-1977 51 BSP / / / / / / / / / / / / OTHERS 6/182 22.99 7/144 25.18 2/34 22.78 4/117 15.37 4/77 13.28 1/41 14.68 3/121 14.79 0/93 14.94 0/30 14.10 1/241 10.82 1/136 8.40 0/72 9.32 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.5 Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Rural 1980 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 1985 Semi-Urban Urban Rural 1992 Semi-Urban Urban BJS/BJP 1/18 CPI 7/10 CPM 4/11 Votes polled( %) 3.24 6.39 1980 Won/contested 0/13 2/7 Votes polled( %) 7.58 7.53 1980 Won/contested 0/10 0/1 Votes polled( %) 1980 Won/contested INC 30/70 SAD 28/45 6.15 44.59 30.56 1/2 21/35 9/23 1.40 44.66 26.54 / 12/12 0/5 22.59 3.37 50.62 5.98 1985 Won/contested 1/5 1/23 0/20 12/70 53/64 Votes polled( %) 1.58 4.84 2.62 35.96 42.40 1985 Won/contested 3/10 0/13 0/7 11/35 20/31 Votes polled( %) 7.14 3.82 1.11 39.12 37.33 1985 Won/contested 2/11 0/2 0/1 9/12 0/5 Votes polled( %) 19.47 4.07 0.18 45.67 12.03 1992 Won/contested 1/31 3/15 1/13 51/70 Votes polled( %) 10.98 4.76 3.23 JP/JD / BSP / OTHERS 0/217 / / 2/159 / / 0/84 / / 3/249 9.07 12.29 17.45 12.61 / / 1/188 / / 1/111 2/36 1/21 9/63 2/81 41.74 6.05 3.04 19.47 10.73 11.47 18.57 1992 Won/contested 3/23 0/4 0/4 27/34 1/19 0/11 0/33 4/51 Votes polled( %) 18.20 1.89 2.29 42.97 5.97 1.46 16.41 10.79 1992 Won/contested 2/12 1/1 / 9/12 0/3 0/5 0/9 0/28 Votes polled( %) 29.95 4.16 52.49 0.65 0.93 6.10 5.73 Source: Election Commission Reports Punjab, 1980-1992 52 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Doaba 1967 Majha Malwa Doaba 1969 Majha Malwa Doaba 1972 Majha Malwa Doaba 1977 Majha Malwa Table – 4.6 Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won Year of Election BJS/BJP CPI CPM INC SAD/ASD JP/JD 1967 Won/contested 2/8 /4 1/3 12/23 1/9 / Votes polled( %) 8.65 5.95 4.13 38.22 6.65 1967 Won/contested 4/13 1/3 1/2 12/22 5/15 / Votes polled( %) 15.15 3.93 3.40 37.82 22.43 1967 Won/contested 3/28 4/12 1/8 24/57 18/35 / Votes polled( %) 8.16 5.42 2.86 36.99 25.19 1969 Won/contested 1/9 1/6 0/4 14/23 5/9 / Votes polled( %) 10.95 4.94 4.46 41.61 18.22 1969 Won/contested 3/8 1/6 1/2 7/23 10/14 / Votes polled( %) 12.31 12.31 5.28 4.16 40.01 1969 Won/contested 4/13 2/16 1/4 17/57 28/42 / Votes polled( %) 6.90 6.90 4.61 2.08 37.89 1972 Won/contested 0/8 1/2 0/4 20/21 0/11 / Votes polled( %) 4.78 3.80 4.78 49.14 12.24 1972 Won/contested 0/13 3/3 0/3 18/19 2/15 / Votes polled( %) 9.85 7.50 3.00 46.96 23.19 1972 Won/contested 0/12 6/8 1/10 28/49 22/46 / Votes polled( %) 3.22 7.12 2.80 39.03 34.85 1977 Won/contested 9/14 1/2 3/3 4/21 8/9 / Votes polled( %) 21.45 2.98 6.62 34.07 20.62 1977 Won/contested 6/10 1/5 2/2 3/22 14/15 / Votes polled( %) 18.77 7.45 3.32 35.02 27.77 1977 Won/contested 10/17 5/11 3/3 10/53 36/46 / Votes polled( %) 11.06 7.59 2.42 32.83 36.90 Source: Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1967-1977 53 BSP / / / / / / / / / / / / OTHERS 7/87 36.40 0/76 17.27 8/197 21.38 2/58 19.82 1/58 10.44 6/119 14.11 2/47 25.26 0/46 9.50 1/151 12.97 0/117 14.27 1/84 7.66 1/248 9.20 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table - 4.7 Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won BJS/BJP CPI CPM INC/ CONGRESS SAD Doaba 1980 Majha Malwa Doaba 1985 Majha Malwa Doaba 1992 Majha Malwa 1980 Won/contested 0/13 1/2 1/4 16/25 6/11 Votes polled( %) 6.44 3.52 6.43 45.09 20.83 1980 Won/contested 0/11 2/3 1/3 15/27 9/18 Votes polled( %) 9.76 5.17 3.49 46.13 27.16 1980 Won/contested 1/17 6/13 3/6 32/65 22/44 Votes polled( %) 5.22 8.03 3.42 44.87 29.06 1985 Won/contested 2/6 0/6 0/8 10/25 11/16 Votes polled( %) 4.64 2.46 2.47 41.25 27.28 1985 Won/contested 2/8 0/7 0/7 10/27 14/21 JP/JD BSP / / OTHERS 1/90 17.69 / / 0/98 / / 1/272 / / 2/119 / / 1/109 / / 2/320 8.29 9.41 21.89 Votes polled( %) 9.23 4.56 1.78 39.25 35.07 1985 Won/contested 2/12 1/25 0/13 12/65 48/63 Votes polled( %) 3.61 5.12 1.76 36.14 42.92 1992 Won/contested 0/17 0/5 0/5 19/25 0/8 0/13 6/23 Votes polled( %) 13.04 2.14 3.54 42.35 1.80 2.85 25.18 9.11 1992 Won/contested 2/16 2/3 0/3 21/27 1/10 0/6 0/21 1/24 Votes polled( %) 26.39 4.25 1.60 51.93 2.52 2.57 5.60 5.15 1992 Won/contested 4/33 2/12 1/9 47/64 2/40 1/18 3/61 5/91 Votes polled( %) 14.50 4.23 2.08 41.48 8.11 1.61 15.64 12.35 Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1980-1992 54 10.12 10.45 0/45 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Table – 4.8 Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won Doaba 1997 Majha Malwa Doaba 2002 Majha Malwa Doaba 2007 Majha Malwa 1997 ** Won/contested Votes polled( %) 1997 ** Won/contested BJS/BJP CPI CPM INC/ CONGRESS SAD JP/JD BSP 5/8 0/1 0/4 5/25 13/16 0/9 1/22 1/66 OTHERS 14.77 0.20 1.65 26.67 28.60 0.50 16.98 10.61 7/8 0/3 0/8 0/24 18/18 0/6 0/13 2/69 14.10 2.45 2.22 28.03 37.32 0.31 2.61 12.95 1997 ** Won/contested 6/6 2/11 0/13 9/56 44/58 0/13 0/32 4/204 Votes polled( %) 4.07 4.12 1.68 26.05 40.81 0.67 6.02 16.58 / 0/25 0/138 Votes polled( %) 2002 Won/contested Votes polled( %) 2/8 0/1 0/4 16/24 7/15 10.36 0.33 0.81 39.02 23.34 13.91 12.22 / 0/18 3/105 1.48 18.75 / 0/57 6/336 4.50 21.68 2002 Won/contested 0/8 0/2 0/3 17/24 7/19 Votes polled( %) 9.00 1.21 0.17 37.58 31.80 2002 Won/contested 1/7 2/8 0/6 29/57 27/58 Votes polled( %) 2.99 3.06 0.27 34.15 33.34 2007 Won/contested 7/8 0/1 0/5 4/25 13/17 / 0/25 1/125 15.96 7/8 0.04 0/7 0.63 0/2 38.30 3/27 30.71 17/19 / 8.48 0/27 5.87 0/120 2007 Won/contested 12.75 5/7 1.03 0/17 0.12 0/7 40.12 37/65 36.70 19/58 / 1.87 0/64 7.40 4/421 Votes polled( %) 4.27 0.88 0.22 42.02 39.36 3.50 9.75 Votes polled( %) 2007 Won/contested Votes polled( %) Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1997-2007 55 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.9 Caste-wise Party preference in 1997 AKALI (B) BJP Sikhs RELIGION 38.00 34.00 Hindu SC 12.00 10.00 Sikh SC 23.00 11.00 Hindus 27.00 45.00 Source : IDC Sample Survey 1997 The BJP has been traditionally seen as a party of urban Hindus. Around 95 per cent of its party activists were Hindus. They are involved in trade and business (50 per cent) followed by small business (32 per cent) (See table 4.1 and 4.2). An analysis of Assembly election results between 1967 and 2007 shows that the BJP has its presence in urban and semi-urban constituencies (See map 2). Traditionally, the BJP has opposed the Akali demands of Punjabi Suba and a Sikh homeland. However, in the post-terrorism phase, the shift in the stance of the BJP from strong Centre to greater autonomy for the states and its opposition to Operation Blue Star and the November 1984 riots increased its acceptability among the rural Jat peasantry. It was mainly political considerations, rather than electoral arithmetic which nurtured the pre-election alliance. S. Prakash Singh Badal, President of the SAD, was of the view that the SAD’s alliance with the BJP was historical and political. It was not an opportunistic alliance.14 Another senior leader of the SAD who was opposed to the alliance considered it as an electoral burden and which was diluting the ideological base of the Akali Dal.15 A quick glance at the data show that the SAD has gained in pre-election coalition. However, the Bharatiya Janata Party has suffered major losses. The BJP’s loss has been the gain of the Congress as both parties compete for the same support base. The regionalisation of the Indian National Congress has ensured its continuation as a major political party in the state. In other words, its continuation has been shaped by meshing its nation-building ideological thrust with pragmatic responses of its regional leadership consisting of former Akalis and Hindu Maha Sabhites. This three dimensional dissonance i.e. pronouncements of its national leaders, Sikh leaders, and Hindu leaders not only provided the much needed electoral sustenance, but also contributed to the existing conflicts.16 56 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 57 Coalition Politics in Punjab Paradoxically, the Congress has to compete with a strong regional party, but within the boundaries defined by the national leadership. The only action which seems to have defied this has been the Punjab Agreement Repealing Act 2004 on SYL passed by the Punjab Assembly much to the annoyance of the national leadership of the Congress.17 The main architect of this was the Chief Minister, Capt. Amarinder Singh, who happens to be a former Akali.18 It was mainly focused on wooing the rural Jat peasantry. Traditionally, its core support base consists of a large majority of Hindu dalits with their ‘uncertain religious allegiance’, and urban Hindu traders, Sikh Khatris and migrant landless labourers. A small faction of the rural Jat peasantry also supports the Congress because of village level factionalism, kinship ties etc. An analysis of party activists shows that 67 per cent are Hindus. The activists are business men (38 per cent), petty shopkeepers (32 per cent), farmers (16 per cent) and unskilled workers (6 per cent). (See table 4.1) An analysis of the percentage of seats won from 1967 to 2007 shows that it has a strong base in the urban constituencies and the dalit dominated Doaba region of the state (see map 3). Further, vote share analysis between 1997 and 2007 shows that the Congress secured maximum of 46 per cent of the votes in 2002 elections in the urban constituencies and 39 per cent in the Scheduled Caste dominated Doaba in 2002 elections (See table 4.4, 4.5, 4.3 and 4.6, 4.7, 4.8). However, Operation Blue Star and brutal riots against the Sikhs in 1984 provided content to anti-Sikh politics of the Congress19. Its alliance with the Communist Party in 1990s was to overcome the accusation of being anti-Sikh and therefore, communal. The Congress party’s support base has kept changing in response to political developments in the state. In the initial years till the mid-sixties the rich and middle peasantry supported the Congress which under the leadership of Partap Singh Kairon initiated reforms in the rural areas.20 Between 1967 and 1980, the Congress support base shifted to urban Sikhs and Hindus, the Scheduled Castes and a small section of the peasantry. In post-Operation Blue Star period, in 1985 a section of urban Sikhs shifted to the Akali Dal.21 However, in 1992 elections held in the background of pervasive terrorism most of the elected MLAs were from rural background and were young. The change in leadership shaped the future politics and brought a qualitative shift in the agenda of the Congress Party. 58 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 59 Coalition Politics in Punjab In the 1997 elections, the urban and semi-urban vote bank of the Congress moved away from it (see table 4.3). The alliance of the Congress with the Communist Party of India (CPI) was termed as political rather than electoral. The CPI has influence among a section of small and marginal peasants and landless labourers in the districts of Faridkot, Sangrur, Bathinda and Ferozepur and among the industrial labourers in urban areas. The Communist Party politics appropriated the pro-minority discourse in negation to Hindu communal assertions and highlighted the economic demands shorn of religious and communal content. It spearheaded tenant movements, the anti-water agitations in different areas of Punjab in the 1950s. It kept the discourse of social and economic justice alive in Punjab. It secured maximum 10 seats in 1972 elections and entered into an alliance with parties opposed to the Congress including BJS from 1967 to 1977. However, in the nineties, it formed a pre-election alliance with the Congress. The Congress and the Communists have a competing support base with the BSP. The BSP used the dalit castes as a political capital for the first time in 1992.22 The BSP is finding a declining response in Punjab. For example, in 1992 it secured 16 per cent votes in Punjab, which declined to 6 per cent and 4 per cent in the 2002 and 2007 assembly elections respectively (see table 10). The ideological content of the BSP has been unable to appropriate the regional culture and economic specificities of Punjab. The puritypollution and Manuwad that constitute the BSP’s main ideological plank do not find expression in the socio-cultural domain of Punjab. The ‘uncertain religious allegiance’ of the dalits made them easy prey to the political parties in the state.23 A detailed analysis of the Dalit factor in Punjab politics can help understand the larger issue of caste dynamics in electoral politics. The ‘uncertain religious allegiance’ of the Dalits and in the absence of caste as a defining parameter for social position, Dalits found representation in all the political parties in the state. It is interesting to note that even the Jat dominated Shiromani Akali Dal gave substantial representation to the Dalits. For instance, in 1969, of the 25 Scheduled Caste elected legislators, 44 per cent were in the Akali Dal. Not only this, in 1977 (48 per cent), 1985 (62 per cent) and 1997 (77 per cent), a majority of the Scheduled Caste legislators were from the Akali Dal. Similarly, in 1967 (52 per cent),1972 (61 per cent), 1980(45 per cent), 1992(63 per cent) and 2002 (48 per cent) a majority of the elected Scheduled Caste legislators were from the Congress. Even the 60 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Bharatiya Janata Party gave representation to the Dalits. For instance, in 1997, 13 per cent of the Scheduled Caste members belonged to the BJP. It is interesting that Dalit legislators have been elected from political parties other than the BSP and the Communist parties. Table – 4.10 Election and Electoral Coalitions in Punjab 1967-2007 Year 1967 Party BJS ADM ADS CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND Parliament Contested Won 8 1 7 0 8 3 3 0 2 0 13 9 9 0 25 0 Vote % 12.49 4.42 22.61 4.28 1.89 37.31 7.69 9.32 1969 1971 BJS SAD CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND 5 12 2 3 11 11 39 0 1 2 0 10 0 0 1977 9 3 1 13 8 45 9 0 1 0 3 0 Assembly Contested Won 49 9 61 2 59 24 13 3 17 3 9 0 19 5 102 48 18 1 255 9 30 8 65 43 28 4 10 2 7 2 6 1 103 38 62 2 160 4 Vote % 9.84 4.2 20.48 3.26 1.79 0.51 5.2 37.45 1.22 16.05 9.01 29.36 4.84 3.07 0.83 0.91 39.18 3.92 8.89 4.45 30.85 6.22 2.2 45.96 5.82 4.5 1972 SAD CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND Party BJS ADM ADS CPM RPI PSP CPI INC OTHERS IND BJS SAD CPI CPM SSP SP INC OTHERS IND 42.3 1.65 4.94 34.85 12.97 3.29 61 BJS SAD CPM CPI INC OTHRES IND SAD JNP CPM CPI INC OTHERS IND 33 72 17 13 89 39 205 70 41 8 18 96 14 435 0 24 1 10 66 0 3 58 25 8 7 17 0 2 4.97 27.64 3.26 6.51 42.84 2.49 12.29 31.41 14.99 3.5 6.59 33.59 0.33 9.58 Coalition Politics in Punjab Year 1980 1985 1989 1992 1996 Party JNP SAD CPI CPM INC(I) BSP OTHERS IND BJP SAD CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND BJP SAD(B) SAD SAD(M) CPI CPM INC BSP JD OTHERS IND BJP SAD CPI CPM INC BSP JD JP OTHERS IND BJP SAD(M) SAD BSP CPI CPM INC JD JP OTHERS IND Parliament Contested Won 9 0 7 1 1 0 1 0 13 12 1 0 10 0 105 0 3 0 11 7 3 0 3 0 13 6 2 0 39 0 3 0 9 0 4 0 8 6 4 0 3 0 13 2 12 1 4 1 28 0 139 3 9 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 13 12 12 1 4 0 1 0 3 0 32 0 6 0 7 0 9 8 4 3 3 0 3 0 13 2 1 0 1 0 31 0 181 0 Vote % 9.97 23.37 1.27 2.53 52.45 0.07 5.03 5.31 3.39 37.17 3.84 2.98 41.53 2.24 8.85 4.17 5.38 1.27 29.19 2.1 3.9 26.49 8.62 5.46 0.71 12.72 16.51 2.58 1.57 3.98 49.27 19.71 1.3 0.93 0.13 4.01 6.48 3.85 28.72 9.35 1.6 2.68 35.1 2.66 0.03 2.01 7.51 62 Party BJP SAD CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND Assembly Contested Won 41 1 73 37 18 9 13 5 117 63 84 0 376 2 Vote % 6.48 26.92 6.46 4.06 45.19 4.36 6.52 BJP SAD CPI CPM INC OTHERS IND 26 100 38 28 117 6 542 6 73 1 0 32 1 4 4.99 38.01 4.44 1.92 37.86 1.09 11.69 BJP SAD CPI CPM INC BSP JD OTHERS IND 66 58 20 17 116 105 37 9 151 6 3 4 1 87 9 1 2 4 16.48 5.2 3.64 2.4 43.83 16.32 2.15 0.74 9.24 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Year Party Parliament Contested Won Vote % 1997 1998 1999 BJP SAD JD CPI CPM INC BSP SAD(M) OTHERS IND BJP SAD DBSM SAD(M) CPI CPM INC BSP JD(S) JD(U) OTHERS IND 3 8 1 1 3 8 4 4 21 49 3 9 1 1 1 1 11 3 2 2 29 57 3 8 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 8 0 Party Assembly Contested Won Vote % BJP SAD CPM CPI INC BSP JD JP SAD(M) OTHERS IND 22 92 25 15 105 67 27 1 30 65 244 18 75 0 2 14 1 0 0 1 0 6 8.33 37.64 1.79 2.98 26.59 7.48 0.56 0.01 3.1 0.65 10.87 BJP SAD DBSM SAD(M) CPM CPI INC BSP JD(S) JD(U) OTHERS IND 23 92 2 84 13 11 105 100 4 2 213 274 3 41 0 0 0 2 62 0 0 0 0 9 5.67 31.08 0.33 4.65 0.36 2.15 35.81 5.69 0.03 0.01 2.94 11.27 11.67 32.93 4.18 3.4 1.06 25.85 12.65 2.73 0.64 4.91 9.16 28.59 2.71 3.41 3.74 2.18 38.44 3.84 0.03 0.1 5.34 2.45 2002 63 Coalition Politics in Punjab Year 2004 Party BJP SAD SAD(M) CPI CPM INC BSP JD(S) OTHERS IND Parliament Contested Won 3 10 6 1 1 11 13 1 26 70 3 8 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 Vote % Party Assembly Contested Won Vote % 10.48 34.28 3.79 2.55 1.81 34.17 7.67 0.01 2.5 2.75 BJP SAD CPI CPM BSP INC SAD(M) OTHERS IND 2007 23 94 25 14 116 117 37 191 438 19 49 0 0 0 44 0 0 5 8.21 37.19 0.75 0.28 4.10 40.94 0.51 1.23 6.79 BJP 3 1 10.06 SAD 10 4 33.85 SAD(M) 3 0 0.36 CPI 2 0 0.33 2009 CPM 1 0 0.14 INC 13 8 45.23 BSP 13 0 5.75 OTHERS 59 0 1.94 IND 114 0 2.33 Source: Election Commission Reports 1967-2009 In fact, the Dalits could not emerge as a vote-bank for the BSP in Punjab. For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) could find a positive response in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), whereas, in Punjab which has the highest percentage of Dalit population in the country, it could find a nominal response. To illustrate, the BSP vote share in Uttar Pradesh increased from 11 per cent in 1993 to 23 per cent in 2002. Both in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the initial response of the Dalits was to identify themselves with the BSP as there was a low degree of representation of the Scheduled Castes. But in Punjab there is a trend to move away from the BSP. For instance, in 1989 BSP could win one seat out of 12 contested seats with 8.62 per cent of votes polled. It secured highest percentage of votes i.e. 19.7 per cent in 1992 elections and 64 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India could win only one seat. It secured highest number of seats in 1996 election when it entered into an alliance with Akali Dal (Badal). This was a new phenomenon and it adversely effected the performance of Congress party. In this election, BSP could win three seats of the four contested with 9.3 per cent votes polled. The BSP in Parliament as well as Assembly elections continued to act as spoilers mainly for Congress party. It acted as a spoiler in 14 and 11 constituencies in 1997 and 2002 elections respectively. In 1998 parliamentary elections BSP could not win any seat with 12.65 per cent of vote share. In 1999, Lok Sabha elections witnessed the BSP as a major spoiler for Congress party. The BSP acted as spoiler for Congress in more than 20 assembly segments. In 2004 Parliamentary elections the BSP percentage of votes increased from 3.84 per cent in 1999 elections to 7.67 per cent. This increase was mainly due to all the 13 seats contested by the party. Why could the BSP not make electoral inroads in the state? Punjab has been known for its liberal religious practices in relation to caste. Both Sikhism and the Arya Samaj have liberated the Dalits from the stringent purity-pollution based behavioural patterns. Further the political and ideological texture of the BSP has been unable to capture the regional, cultural and economic specificities of Punjab. The purity-pollution and Manuwad that are the BSP’s main ideological planks do not find expression in Punjab in view of the role of Sikhism and the Arya Samaj. It is in this backdrop the BSP-Akali Dal alliance in 1996 parliamentary elections made a discernible impact in Doaba region which consists of Hoshiarpur, Jallandhar and Phillaur constituencies. In Malwa region as well the alliance worked to the advantage of the Akalis, particularly in Ropar, Patiala, Faridkot, Bathinda, Sangrur and Ludhiana. This reinforces the religio-cultural ethos which negate the existence of exclusive caste categories for electoral mobilisations. To sum up, the inter-party relationship can be contextualised in the three axes. The dwarfed identity assertions are signposts within which religious minority and caste along with demographic positioning shape the intra and inter party interactions. This has also led to the defining of regional space giving rise to a strong regional party. Regional interests became a filter for the national parties in the political competitive 65 Coalition Politics in Punjab context and found an escape route in mergers i.e. the Indian National Congress and the Akali Dal. The national and regional parties in competition for sectional interests having a bearing on electoral arithmetic, resorted to post-election coalitions or pre-election alliances i.e. the Bharatiya Janata Party and the SAD. COALITION POLITICS: ELECTORAL OVERVIEW Coalition politics in Punjab follows a history of electoral alliances ranging from mergers in the post-partition phase to the more recent pre-election alliances. The electoral coalitions can be mapped in four distinct phases namely – (i) Politics of Mergers: 1947 to the mid-sixties; (ii) Reorganisation of Punjab: 1966 to 1980; (iii) From Autonomy to Secession: 1980 to 1992; and (iv) Resurgence of Democracy and Punjabi Identity: Post-1992 phase. Politics in post-Independence India and partitioned Punjab was shaped by issues related to identity politics and access to political power. The question of separate religious identity, communal and sectarian mobilisation, secular, linguistic and strata based grouping remained dominant in the political discourse. The dynamic interaction of the state with the path of development in the background of co-existence of competing identities produced diverse political formations ranging from merger of political parties to post-election coalitions to pre-election alliances. In the first phase between 1947 and the mid-sixties the two main competing political parties merged, whereas, parties representing sectional interests resorted to agitational politics. The Indian National Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal merged in 1948 and in 1956. The merger was guided by the politics of accommodation by the dominant party and shifting the arena of political activity from popular movements to elite maneuvering. The parties that merged came out of this arrangement within a short span, but a majority of the leaders active in legislative politics continued to function in the Congress as was the case in the pre-Independence phase. The politics of merger reduced the Akali vote share from 15 per cent in 1952 to 12 per cent in 1962.24 66 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India The Communist Party of India (CPI) continued to agitate for the economic interests of the agriculturists and landless labourers. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh continued to agitate for the interests of urban Hindus. The support base of the Jana Sangh increased from 5 per cent in 1952 to 9 per cent in 1962. The Communist Party support base increased about 10 per cent in the Punjabi speaking rural areas. The overall increase was from 5 per cent in 1952 to 7 per cent in 1962. The second phase marked the end of one-party dominance in Punjab. The re-organisation of the state in 1966, the introduction of the Green Revolution strategy and demographic transformation to a Sikh majority state, initiated a new process of political alliances and economic differentiation. Political discourse revolved around restructuring of Centre-State relations and anti-Congressism. In this phase, four coalitions were formed and all during post-election. The first post-election coalition was formed after the fourth general election in 1967 under the Chief Ministership of Gurnam Singh consisting of a United Front of parties opposed to the Congress, with divergent ideological thrust. This minority coalition could last only eight months and fell after the defection of 17 SAD members of the Legislative Assembly (see graph – 4.4). The main opposition party, the Congress gave outside support to the Akali break away group and a minority government under the Chief Ministership of Lachman Singh Gill was formed on November 25, 1967. It could last only nine months as the Congress withdrew support. The third coalition was formed after the mid-term elections in February, 1969, in which the Akali Dal and the Jana Sangh were the main partners. The minority coalition government was headed by S. Gurnam Singh. The Jana Sangh withdrew support. It could last only 13 months. Differences among the coalition partners arose over issues like language, Centre-State relations and the status of Chandigarh. The fourth minority coalition government came into being after the removal of S. Gurnam Singh as Chief Minister. S. Prakash Singh Badal was sworn in as Chief Minister on March 27, 1970, with a new agenda of the coalition government. The Jana Sangh withdrew from the coalition in June, 1970, on the question of the jurisdiction of Guru Nanak Dev 67 Coalition Politics in Punjab University. However, the main differences were on issues relating to the transfer of certain Panjabi-speaking areas to Punjab. This minority coalition could last for 15 months. The post-election coalitions were formed either to keep a political formation out of power or by entering into convenient power-sharing arrangements. These coalitions were marriages of convenience between political parties and were tedious to sustain and relatively unstable. The third phase in Punjab politics brought about a qualitative shift in the mechanics of government formation. The political discourse moved away from autonomy to secession on communal basis. Competitive electoral and moderate politics suffered a severe set-back and the culture of violence became the dominant mode of articulation of grievances. Popularly elected governments were dismissed and elections were postponed. Elections were held to legitimize nondemocratic and communal politics in 1985, 1989 and 1992. An important lesson learnt was that democracy was the only antidote to terrorism.25 The revival of the democratic process witnessed a major shift in the political agenda. The fourth phase witnessed a major shift in the political agenda of the parties. The Akali Dal shifted their stance from Sikh identity to Punjabi identity, from the human rights of ‘Khalistan’ activists to peace at any cost, from state autonomy to co-operative federalism. Similarly, the Bharatiya Janata Party moved from a strong centre to greater autonomy for states. The Congress apologised for Operation Blue Star and the brutal riots of 1984. In view of these shifts and lessons learnt from the decade of terrorism, the political parties entered into pre-election alliances.26 In 1997 Assembly elections the Akali Dal and the BJP on the one hand and the Congress and the Communist Party of India on the other, entered into pre-election coalitions. It was a ‘surplus majority coalition’ of the Akali Dal and the BJP. It completed its full term.27 The Akali Dal-BJP alliance performed better because it provided the Akali Dal with the much needed political space at the national level to shed its anti-national image, and to the BJP it gave a political plank to counter the Congress and the Left propaganda that its politics was anti68 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India minorities. The political parties having recovered from the terrorism phase, started carving out their own autonomous space. The SAD, which again started the pre-Blue Star politics of shaping the Sikh identity coupled with anti-incumbency suffered massive defeat in 1999 election.28 In the 2002 elections, a pre-election alliance as in 1997 took place between the Akali Dal and the BJP on the one hand and the Congress and the CPI on the other. The Congress formed the government with the outside support of the CPI. It was a single party majority government. The merger of the two-member legislative wing of the CPI into the Congress created fissures in the alliance between the two parties. Consequently, in 2007 assembly elections the Congress and the CPI did not enter into a pre-election alliance. However, the SAD and the BJP entered in a pre-election coalition and formed the minority coalition government. The mergers, post-election coalitions and pre-election alliances have their own dynamics. A detailed analysis, in term of political economy of coalition, social matrix and representation, and mapping of party ideologies in terms of policies, legislative and executive decision making will be made. Above all, it would be relevant to analyse the impact of coalitions on governance, democracy, party dynamics, centre-state relations, conflicts and issues relating to the rights of vulnerable groups, distributive justice and identity politics. POLITICS OF MERGER: 1947 to MID-SIXTIES In the first phase, from 1947 to the mid-1960s, one party dominance negated the existence of regional interests and branded these assertions as anti-national. The aura of the national freedom movement led to the Congress Party hegemonizing the whole spectrum of Indian politics. The politics of co-option of regional interests was practised by the Congress to maintain its hold on power. It encouraged the Akali Dal to merge with the Congress for the first time in 1948 and then in 1956. The partition of Punjab necessitated consensus-based political governance, and the Akali Dal legislative wing elected in 1946 was invited to merge with the Congress. The Akali Dal contested the 1946 elections in opposition to the Congress. In the 175 member Punjab Assembly the Akali Dal won 23 of 69 Coalition Politics in Punjab Chart – 4.1 Post-Election Alliances, Single Party and Pre-Election Alliances POST-ELECTION ALLIANCES SINGLE PARTY United Front (Akali Dal + Indian Bharatiya Jan Indian National Sangh + National Congress CPI + Congress (INC) PSP + RPI) (INC) PRE-ELECTION ALLIANCES INC SAD INC SAD INC BSP (S.Akali Dal boycott) BSP (S.Akali Dal boycott) Congress (INC) INC Congress (Interim) BSP (S.Akali Dal boycott) INC + CPI SAD + BJP INC Main Opposition / Alliance G o v e r n m e n t United Front (Akali Dal+ PSP + RPI) CPI (M) Supported from outside (SAD + Bhartiya Jana Sangh) Janta Outside Ministry Akali break support by Congress Akali Dal (s), away other United (Outside Janta party (Congress Front SAD + support CPI CPI (M), supported partners Bhartiya seat outside from outside) (CPI(M) + Jan Sangh adjustments support SSp + RSP + S.P. +CPI) 8.3.67– 24.11.67 Gurnam Singh (C.M.) 25.11.67– 23.8.68 Lachman Singh Gill (C.M.) Minority Coalition Government Single Party Minority Government 17.2.69– 26.3.70 Gurnam Singh (C.M.) 27.3.70 – 14.6.71 Prakash Singh Badal (C.M.) Minority Coalition Government 17.3.72– 30.4.77 Giani Zail Singh (C.M.) 20.6.77– 17.2.80 P.S. Badal (C.M.) Single Party Government Surplus Majority Coalition INC SAD 6.6.80– 6.10.83 Darbara Singh (C.M.) 29.9.85– 11.5.87 SurjitSing h Barnala 25.2.92– 31.8.95 Beant Singh (C.M.) 31.8.95– 21.11.96 Harcharan Singh Brar Single Party Government Time Period and Government 70 INC SAD + BJP Congress (elected CPI MLA’s defected to Congress) SAD + BJP 21.11.96– 11.2.97 Smt. Rajinder Kaul Bhattal 12.2.9724.2.02 P.S. Badal (C.M.) 3.2002 – 2-2007 Capt. Amarinder Singh 3-2007 P.S. Badal (C.M.) Surplus Majority Coalition Minority Coalition Government Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India the 33 seats reserved for Sikhs.29 The Congress won 51 seats including 10 reserved for Sikhs. The Unionist Party won 21 seats including 15 reserved for Muslims. The Independent Christians won 1, Independent labour 2, Independent Dalit 1 and Anglo-Indians 2 seats. The Muslim League won 74 seats. A coalition ministry was formed under the leadership of Sir Khizr Hayat Khan, consisting of the Unionist Party, the Congress and the Akali Dal. The ministry submitted its resignation on 3 March, 1947 and Governor’s rule was promulgated in the state. After independence, the Congress, the Akali representatives and six independent MLAs formed the ministry under the leadership of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava. The SAD passed a resolution on 22nd April 1949, to withdraw from the Congress Government after the Constituent Assembly turned down safeguards for the Sikhs30. Master Tara Singh in October 19, 1949, made a statement that ‘every minority except the Sikhs had been given justice. The Muslims demanded Pakistan and they got it.’31 The SAD adopted a resolution and directed its MLAs to leave the Congress on 20th July, 1950. Interestingly, only one MLA resigned from the Congress Legislative Party. The Akali Dal fought the 1952 general elections on the issue of Punjabi Suba with emphasis on the creation of a Punjabi speaking province.32 During this period in Punjab the issue of reorganisation of the state on linguistic basis acquired communal overtones. Though the Akali leaders emphasized language as the basis for a division of the state, at the popular plane they tended to mix religion with language.33 The indoctrination that the Sikhs were a single political entity and their secular interests were common, provided continuity to the pre-partition politics of the Akali Dal. The growing strength of Master Tara Singh among all occupational groups created the fear that the movement for a separate independent Sikh state might become stronger. To counter the demand for a Punjabi Suba raised by the Akali Dal led by Master Tara Singh, an agitation for Hindi was launched. This advocated a ‘Maha Punjab’ irrespective of language. Communal overtones in this were explicitly visible, though there was not much tension between the two communal groups. The increasing strength of the Akali Dal alarmed the Congress leadership. 71 Coalition Politics in Punjab In 1956 an understanding was reached between the ruling Congress Party and the Akali Dal. Subsequently the Akali Dal stalwarts joined the Congress.34 The Akalis accepted the regional plan at their meeting of 30th September, 1956. The new state was to be divided into so-called Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking regions and two regional committees consisting of the members of the legislature belonging to the respective regions were to be constituted. The Akalis did not contest the second general election held in 1957. But due to internal compulsions and dissensions among the Akalis, the understanding with the Congress did not last long. The Akali Dal decided to take part in politics on its own and asked its members in the Congress to return to their parent organisation. Of the 28 Akali MLAs who had joined the Congress, only 7 returned to the Akali fold.35 It is relevant to note that most of the Akalis who joined the Congress, in 1937, 1948 and 1956 did not return to the Akali fold. Prominent among them were Pratap Singh Kairon (later Chief Minister of the Congress Government), Gurmukh Singh Musafir, (later President of the Congress Party), S. Swaran Singh (later India’s Foreign Minister in the Congress Government), Baldev Singh (later India’s Defence Minister) etc. It is interesting that most of the ‘Sikh’ leaders in the Congress have had a stint in the Akali Dal.36 The success of the Akalis in the SGPC elections encouraged them to launch morchas for a Punjabi Suba in 1959 and 1961.37 The failure of the 1961 morcha discredited Master Tara Singh’s leadership. The 1962 general election was projected by the Congress as a referendum on the Punjabi Suba issue. This challenge was accepted by the Akali Dal. Its defeat in the general election demoralised its leadership. The Akalis won only 19 of the 154 seats and lost even in the Punjabi speaking areas. Master Tara Singh was held responsible for this defeat. He was also accused of sacrilege for he had broken his fast unto death. The data indicate that the Akali Dal lost considerable electoral support in the 1962 elections. This erosion in the Akali support base led to renewed attempts by the Akalis to accelerate the process of communalisation. The demand for a Punjabi Suba was again raised. The political demarcation of Punjab was not considered favourable by the 72 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Akali Dal to its bid to capture political power in the state; hence the demand for a Punjabi Suba. The split of the Akali Dal in 1962 facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of those speaking in the name of the rural Jat peasantry in the organisation. In January 1965, the Sant Akali Dal won 95 of the 138 seats in SGPC elections, giving a crushing defeat to the Master Akali Dal. It also increased its share in political power.38 It coincided with the reorganisation of the state in September, 1966, on a linguistic basis and initiation of the Green Revolution. This was the beginning of coalition politics with anti-Congressism as its main plank. REORGANISATION OF PUNJAB: 1967 TO 1980 In the period 1967 to 1980, the fourth and fifth Vidhan Sabha of Punjab witnessed four coalitions and one minority government. The three coalition governments were formed by the Akalis with the support of its main coalition partner, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. The fourth coalition was that of a breakaway group of the Akalis supported by the Congress. This phase is characterised by the establishment of a Sikh majority with the reorganisation of Punjab on the basis of language. The numerical dominance of the Sikhs as a single political entity was now unchallenged. The electoral dominance of the Congress receded. The other factor that had an overarching impact on the state politics during this period was the initiation of the Green Revolution strategy. The Green Revolution strategy empowered the Sikh Jat peasantry, but led to differentiations between the peasantry and the trading classes. This phase then witnessed a shift in political discourse from political deprivation of the ‘minorities’ to economic discrimination. Therefore, the demand for a separate Sikh state could not find expression, but greater state autonomy became an issue for the emerging agrarian interests. This issue was, however, raised by the Akalis in 1973 and acquired the character of a movement in 1978. The first coalition was formed after the 4th General Election in 1967. In this election, the Congress won 48 seats in the 104-member state Legislative Assembly. The Akali Dal (Sant Fateh Singh) secured 24 seats, the Jana Sangh 9, the Communist Party of India 5, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 3, the Republican Party 3, the Akali Dal (Master Tara Singh) 2 (see table 4.10). A united front of all parties was formed with S. 73 Coalition Politics in Punjab Gurnam Singh as their leader. A minority coalition government was formed. It was a combination of divergent ideological groups with the sole purpose of keeping the Congress out. A common programme was prepared and adopted at Khanna, and the resolution adopted read: Whereas we stand for amity and goodwill among all sections of Punjabis irrespective of caste or creed, and promise to take steps to strengthen the new state of Punjab economically and politically, we resolve to oppose all separatist trends and moves aimed at weakening the unity and integrity of the country.39 The common minimum programme was evolved to provide stability to the government. Similarly, ministry formation was also guided by the principle of giving adequate representation to coalition partners.40 The election results mirrored the social matrix and respective support base of political parties and an effort was made to reflect this into in the government formation. For instance, the Akali Dal won the highest number i.e. 18 of the 24 seats from Malwa region and polled the highest votes i.e. 25 per cent from Malwa as compared to 7 per cent and 22 per cent from Doaba and Majha (see table 4.6). The Jana Sangh reflected its strong urban hold by securing 40 per cent of the votes polled from urban seats contested and with a negligible count of 3 per cent in rural and only 12 per cent in the semi-urban constituencies of Punjab (see table 4.4). The Communist Party made its mark in its pocket constituencies. The exclusive support base of the coalition partners is further reflected in the MLAs’ backgrounds in terms of caste, occupation, religion and the formation of ministry. Around 67 per cent of the Akali Dal MLAs were from agricultural background and 75 per cent belonged to the rural Jat community (see table 4.11). Whereas, dalits including Mazhabis and Ramdasias were 25 per cent (see table 4.11). The representation of the urban Sikh trading community was merely 4 per cent. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the post-coalition partner of the SAD, had more legislators coming from trading and industrial background. More than 56 per cent of its legislators belonged to the urban Khatri and 22 per cent to the Bania castes. This is a reflection of its support base among the urban Hindus. 74 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India The Communist Party of India had more legislators from agricultural background but belonging to the Mazhabi Sikh and Rai Sikh castes. The Congress had 44 per cent of its MLAs from among the rural Jat peasantry. The number of legislators coming from the Scheduled Caste group was twice that of the Akali Dal (see table 4.11). The representation of urban Khatri traders in the Congress was competing with the Jana Sangh. The coalition represented demarcated electoral support base in the allocation of ministerial berths. The negotiations between the SAD and Jana Sangh responded to leadership considerations of S. Gurnam Singh and consequently Jana Sangh got the best deal in Cabinet formation.41 With two ministers, it had the charge of the ministries of Finance, Industry, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies and Health. This coalition proved unstable and could last only eight months. According to Akali activists, the concentration of power in the Jana Sangh ministers led to discontentment among the Akali legislators. The Congress got an opportunity and assured their support to the disgruntled Akalis to defect and form their own ministry.42 In November, 1967, an Akali breakaway group led by Lachhman Singh Gill formed a single party minority government with the outside support of the Congress. The United Front with Akali Dal, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, CPI, PSP and RPI formed the opposition. This government was also shortlived and survived nine months. The Congress withdrew support from the government. The fifth Vidhan Sabha witnessed the third post-election coalition led by the Akali Dal with Gurnam Singh as Chief Minister. The main alliance partner was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It had outside support from other United Front partners of the CPI(M), SSP, RSP, SP and CPI. The Akali-Jana Sangh entered into an agreement on the language question.43 Technically, this coalition can be termed as a minority coalition government since the Akali Dal and the BJS had 51 of the 52 required seats to form the government, with outside support from the Left parties. The seat distribution in the government were 43 with SAD, 8 with BJS, 4 with CPI, 2 with CPI(M) and 38 with Congress. The percentage of votes obtained by the SAD in Punjab was 29.36, perhaps the only time that the semi-urban voters eclipsed the vote share of the 75 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.11 Caste, Year and Party Wise Distribution of MLAs BJP Year SC OBC 1967 1969 1 0.96 12.50 OTHER 8 7.69 88.89 5 4.81 62.50 JAT 1 0.96 11.11 2 1.92 25.00 16 13.68 64.00 2 1.71 8.00 1972 1977 4 3.42 16.00 1980 1985 3 2.56 12.00 1 0.85 100.00 1 0.85 16.67 1992 1997 4 3.42 22.22 2002 2007 Total 4 3.42 21.05 14 1.24 14.74 2 1.71 11.11 1 0.85 33.33 1 0.85 5.26 8 0.71 8.42 5 4.27 83.33 6 5.13 100.00 11 9.40 61.11 2 1.71 66.67 13 11.11 68.42 66 5.84 69.47 1 0.85 5.56 1 0.85 5.26 7 0.62 7.37 SC 2 1.92 40.00 1 0.96 25.00 2 1.92 20.00 4 3.42 57.14 4 3.42 44.44 1 0.85 25.00 1 0.85 50.00 2 1.71 100.00 17 1.50 38.64 CPI OBC 1 0.96 20.00 1 0.96 25.00 1 0.96 10.00 1 0.85 14.29 1 0.85 11.11 1 0.85 100.00 1 0.85 25.00 1 0.85 50.00 8 0.71 18.18 OTHER 1 0.96 20.00 1 0.96 25.00 2 1.92 20.00 1 0.85 14.29 1 0.85 11.11 JAT 1 0.96 20.00 1 0.96 25.00 5 4.81 50.00 1 0.85 14.29 3 2.56 33.33 1 0.85 25.00 1 0.85 25.00 7 0.62 15.91 12 1.06 27.27 SC OBC CPM OTHER 1 0.96 50.00 1 0.96 100.00 5 4.27 62.50 3 2.56 60.00 JAT 3 2.88 100.00 1 0.96 50.00 3 2.56 37.50 2 1.71 40.00 1 0.85 100.00 10 0.88 50.00 1 0.09 5.00 9 0.80 45.00 SC 12 11.54 25.00 10 9.62 26.32 14 13.46 21.21 3 2.56 17.65 13 11.11 20.63 10 8.55 31.25 20 17.09 22.99 1 0.85 7.14 14 11.97 22.58 7 5.98 15.91 104 9.20 22.08 OBC 5 4.81 10.42 5 4.81 13.16 7 6.73 10.61 3 2.56 17.65 8 6.84 12.70 2 1.71 6.25 9 7.69 10.34 5 4.27 8.06 2 1.71 4.55 46 4.07 9.77 INC OTHER 10 9.62 20.83 8 7.69 21.05 17 16.35 25.76 6 5.13 35.29 24 20.51 38.10 15 12.82 46.88 22 18.80 25.29 4 3.42 28.57 21 17.95 33.87 11 9.40 25.00 138 12.20 29.30 JAT 21 20.19 43.75 15 14.42 39.47 28 26.92 42.42 5 4.27 29.41 18 15.38 28.57 5 4.27 15.63 36 30.77 41.38 9 7.69 64.29 22 18.80 35.48 24 20.51 54.55 183 16.18 38.85 Contd.. 76 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India SAD BSP OTHER ALL PARTY SC OBC OTHER JAT SC OBC OTHER JAT SC OBC OTHER JAT SC OBC OTHER 1967 6 18 3 2 4 6 23 8 23 5.77 17.31 2.88 1.92 3.85 5.77 22.12 7.69 22.12 25.00 75.00 20.00 13.33 26.67 40.00 22.12 7.69 22.12 1969 11 3 2 27 1 2 1 5 25 11 17 10.58 2.88 1.92 25.96 0.96 1.92 0.96 4.81 24.04 10.58 16.35 25.58 6.98 4.65 62.79 11.11 22.22 11.11 55.56 24.04 10.58 16.35 1972 6 18 1 2 23 9 19 5.77 17.31 0.96 1.92 22.12 8.65 18.27 25.00 75.00 33.33 66.67 22.12 8.65 18.27 1977 15 2 2 39 2 31 9 25 12.82 1.71 1.71 33.33 1.71 26.50 7.69 21.37 25.86 3.45 3.45 67.24 100.00 26.50 7.69 21.37 1980 9 3 25 1 1 29 14 25 7.69 2.56 21.37 0.85 0.85 24.79 11.97 21.37 24.32 8.11 67.57 50.00 50.00 24.79 11.97 21.37 1985 18 4 17 34 2 3 29 9 40 15.38 3.42 14.53 29.06 1.71 2.56 24.79 7.69 34.19 24.66 5.48 23.29 46.58 40.00 60.00 24.79 7.69 34.19 1992 1 2 8 1 2 2 3 32 12 31 0.85 1.71 6.84 0.85 1.71 1.71 2.56 27.35 10.26 26.50 33.33 66.67 88.89 11.11 28.57 28.57 42.86 27.35 10.26 26.50 1997 23 7 4 41 1 1 1 5 30 11 20 19.66 5.98 3.42 35.04 0.85 0.85 0.85 4.27 25.64 9.40 17.09 30.67 9.33 5.33 54.67 100.00 14.29 14.29 71.43 25.64 9.40 17.09 2002 12 4 25 1 1 1 6 29 11 24 10.26 3.42 21.37 0.85 0.85 0.85 5.13 24.79 9.40 20.51 29.27 9.76 60.98 11.11 11.11 11.11 66.67 24.79 9.40 20.51 2007 16 6 2 25 2 2 1 29 11 26 13.68 5.13 1.71 21.37 1.71 1.71 0.85 24.79 9.40 22.22 32.65 12.24 4.08 51.02 40.00 40.00 20.00 24.79 9.40 22.22 Total 117 29 27 254 9 1 9 12 12 31 280 105 250 10.34 2.56 2.39 22.46 0.80 0.09 0.80 1.06 1.06 2.74 24.76 9.28 22.10 27.40 6.79 6.32 59.48 90.00 10.00 14.06 18.75 18.75 48.44 24.76 9.28 22.10 Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003. Election commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007) Note: Parenthesis figures pertain to percentage of representation of MLAs from party total Year 77 JAT 50 48.08 48.08 51 49.04 49.04 53 50.96 50.96 52 44.44 44.44 49 41.88 41.88 39 33.33 33.33 42 35.90 35.90 56 47.86 47.86 53 45.30 45.30 51 43.59 43.59 496 43.85 43.85 TOTAL 104 100.00 104 100.00 104 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 1131 100.00 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.12 Year and Party wise Distribution of MLAs belonging to Hindu and Sikh Religion YEAR OF ELECTION 1967 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1969 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1972 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1977 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1980 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1985 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1992 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1997 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 2002 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 2007 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs Total % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs HINDU 9 8.65 100.00 7 6.73 87.50 19 16.24 76.00 1 0.85 100.00 6 5.13 100.00 6 5.13 100.00 17 14.53 94.44 2 1.71 66.67 17 14.53 89.47 84 7.43 88.42 BJP SIKH OTHERS 4 3.42 44.44 1 0.85 100.00 5 4.27 55.56 2 1.71 50.00 1 0.85 50.00 1 0.85 50.00 CPI SIKH 4 3.85 80.00 2 1.92 50.00 7 6.73 70.00 5 4.27 71.43 8 6.84 88.89 1 0.85 100.00 2 1.71 50.00 1 0.85 50.00 1 0.85 50.00 5 0.44 50.00 5 0.44 50.00 13 1.15 29.55 31 2.74 70.45 HINDU BSP SIKH 1 0.96 12.50 6 5.13 24.00 1 0.85 5.56 1 0.85 33.33 2 1.71 10.53 11 0.97 11.58 OTHERS HINDU 1 0.96 20.00 2 1.92 50.00 3 2.88 30.00 2 1.71 28.57 1 0.85 11.11 OTHERS HINDU 1 0.85 12.50 CPM SIKH 3 2.88 100.00 2 1.92 100.00 1 0.96 100.00 7 5.98 87.50 5 4.27 100.00 OTHERS 1 0.85 100.00 1 0.09 5.00 19 1.68 95.00 Contd.. 78 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India YEAR OF ELECTION 1967 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1969 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1972 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1977 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1980 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1985 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1992 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 1997 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 2002 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs 2007 % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs Total % out of total MLAs % out of party MLAs HINDU 16 15.38 33.33 13 12.50 34.21 27 25.96 40.91 8 6.84 47.06 34 29.06 53.97 22 18.80 68.75 32 27.35 36.78 6 5.13 42.86 30 25.64 48.39 7 5.98 15.91 195 17.24 41.40 INC SIKH 31 29.81 64.58 25 24.04 65.79 38 36.54 57.58 9 7.69 52.94 28 23.93 44.44 10 8.55 31.25 54 46.15 62.07 8 6.84 57.14 31 26.50 50.00 36 30.77 81.82 270 23.87 57.32 OTHERS 1 0.96 2.08 1 0.96 1.52 HINDU 7 6.73 46.67 2 1.92 22.22 1 0.96 33.33 1 0.85 1.59 1 0.85 1.15 1 0.85 1.61 1 0.85 2.27 6 0.53 1.27 3 2.56 60.00 3 2.56 50.00 2 1.71 28.57 1 0.85 11.11 1 0.85 20.00 20 1.77 31.75 OTHER SIKH 8 7.69 53.33 7 6.73 77.78 2 1.92 66.67 2 1.71 100.00 2 1.71 100.00 2 1.71 40.00 3 2.56 50.00 5 4.27 71.43 8 6.84 88.89 4 3.42 80.00 43 3.80 68.25 OTHERS HINDU JD SIKH OTHERS HINDU 1 0.96 4.17 1 0.85 1.72 2 1.71 2.74 1 0.85 100.00 1 0.09 100.00 3 2.56 4.00 1 0.85 2.44 4 3.42 8.16 12 1.06 2.81 SAD SIKH 23 22.12 95.83 42 40.38 97.67 24 23.08 100.00 57 48.72 98.28 37 31.62 100.00 70 59.83 95.89 3 2.56 100.00 71 60.68 94.67 40 34.19 97.56 45 38.46 91.84 412 36.43 96.49 OTHERS 104 100.00 1 0.96 2.33 104 100.00 104 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 1 0.85 1.37 117 100.00 117 100.00 1 0.85 1.33 117 100.00 117 100.00 117 100.00 3 0.27 0.70 Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003. Election commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007) Note: Parenthesis figures pertain to percentage of representation of MLAs from party total Sikhs predominantly represented in Akali Party, while Hindus predominantly in the BJS/BJP. Both religions find representation in Congress, as also in BSP (Religion permeates the caste base in Punjab) 79 TOTAL 1131 100.00 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.13 Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Region Akali BJS/BJP INC Majha Malwa Doaba Total Majha Malwa Doaba Total Majha Malwa Doaba 1969 Ministers 4 15 5 24 2 1 1 4 MLAs 10 28 5 43 3 4 1 8 ** 40.00 53.57 100.00 55.81 66.67 25.00 100.00 50.00 1972 Ministers 4 8 5 MLAs 18 28 20 22.22 28.57 25.00 1977 Ministers 1 7 3 11 1 2 2 5 MLAs 14 36 8 58 6 10 9 25 7.14 19.44 37.50 18.97 16.67 20.00 22.22 20.00 1980 Ministers 2 10 4 MLAs 15 32 16 13.33 31.25 25.00 1985 Ministers 6 18 4 28 MLAs 14 48 11 73 42.86 37.50 36.36 38.36 1992 Ministers 8 14 9 MLAs 21 47 19 38.10 29.79 47.37 1997 Ministers 9 17 7 33 2 3 3 8 MLAs 18 44 13 75 7 6 5 18 * 50.00 38.64 53.85 44.00 28.57 50.00 60.00 44.44 2002 Ministers 8 10 7 MLAs 17 29 16 47.06 34.48 43.75 2007 Ministers 5 6 2 13 2 3 5 MLAs 17 19 13 49 7 5 7 19 29.41 31.58 15.38 26.53 28.57 0.00 42.86 26.32 Note : Minister/MLAs. With Percentages the proportion of ministers to MLAs. (Data pertains to the time of the Constitution of Ministry) ** 5 MlA from Other Paries joined Akali in 1969 * 1 MLA from other party shifted to Akali in 1997 Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh:Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003 Election Commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007) 80 Total 17 66 25.76 16 63 25.40 31 87 35.63 25 62 40.32 Majha 6 13 46.15 4 18 22.22 2 20 10.00 2 15 13.33 6 14 42.86 8 21 38.10 11 25 44.00 8 17 47.06 7 24 29.17 Total(SAD+BJP+INC) Malwa Doaba 16 6 32 6 50.00 100.00 8 5 28 20 28.57 25.00 9 5 46 17 19.57 29.41 10 4 32 16 31.25 25.00 18 4 48 11 37.50 36.36 14 9 47 19 29.79 47.37 20 10 50 18 40.00 55.56 10 7 29 16 34.48 43.75 6 5 24 20 25.00 25.00 Total 28 51 54.90 17 66 25.76 16 83 19.28 16 63 25.40 28 73 38.36 31 87 35.63 41 93 44.09 25 62 40.32 18 68 26.47 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India rural constituencies when it drew 33 per cent of the votes in comparison with 31 per cent of the vote shared from the rural areas. The vote share of the Jana Sangh was in tune as a subsidiary partner with 9 per cent votes. (See table 4.10). The elected members continued to showcase the traditional support base of their representative parties. The Akali Dal had as many as 60 per cent of its MLAs belonging to the peasantry. In contrast, the party already had only 5 per cent of its MLAs drawn from trading and industrial occupations. Slightly out of tune with its customary base, the Jana Sangh in 1969 elections had 37 per cent of its MLAs from agriculture background. Regionally also, the Jana Sangh had 50 per cent of its MLAs from Malwa rather than its domain of Majha or Doaba (See table 4.6). The demarcations on the basis of religion were most stark and most reflective of the social base of the party. None of the 43 Akali MLAs was Hindu and the BJS had a lone Sikh legislator and 87 per cent of its MLAs were Hindu (see table 4.12). The shift in the representation in Akali political leadership became apparent since 63 per cent of the legislators were rural Jat peasants and 25 per cent were dalits (see table 4.11). In contrast, in BJS a majority of 62 per cent MLAs were from the Hindu Bania/Khatri caste. The Congress reflected its wider social base as its elected members predominantly came from the Scheduled and Backward Castes (39 per cent), Hindu and Sikh Khatris (21 per cent) and Sikh Jats (39 per cent) (see table 4.11). While the Congress did have a dominant representation of the elites i.e. peasantry (53 per cent) it differed from the other parties by having an equitable distribution of votes polled among the rural, semi-urban and urban constituencies, increasing its vote share towards the urban areas (38 per cent in rural, 40 per cent in semi-urban and 42 per cent in urban) (see table 4.4). But its regional share in this election came starkly from Doaba with 42 per cent votes polled and a nominal of 4 per cent and 2 per cent in Majha and Malwa (see table 4.6). The 1969 coalition was shortlived with the Jana Sangh withdrawing its support within 13 months over differences on language, Centre-State relation and the status of Chandigarh. This was a minority coalition government ridden with factionalism in the Akali Dal44, high expectations of the Jana Sangh and the fear of defections in the shadow of the numerical strength of the Congress. 81 Coalition Politics in Punjab There were 28 ministers at the time for the formation of the ministry. The Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal got around 50 per cent of its MLAs as ministers (see table 4.13). The allocation of portfolios to the Jana Sangh got reduced even though they had more ministers. Important departments of Finance, Excise and Taxation and Health were not allocated to them and later it seemed to have provided a reason for the withdrawal of support. The then Chief Minister Gurnam Singh made a statement on the floor of the Assembly which reinforced this interpretation. My honourable Jana Sangh members created a lot of noise over the allocation of Finance to another colleague who does not belong to their party. I must take the House in confidence that at no stage it was agreed that Finance portfolio would be given to the Jana Sangh. It was my prerogative as the Chief Minister and I exercised it. Nevertheless, beneath this demand for key portfolios by the Jana Sangh, in reality is the desire to use the State machine to rehabilitate themselves among the people.45 Further executive business in the Assembly centred on the coalitions’ concern over economic development and on Centre-State relations and language.46 While economic development was the rallying point, the language issue and Centre-State relations remained contentious among the coalition partners. This along with factionalism within the Akali Dal led to the downfall of the Gurnam Singh ministry. A fourth collation, also a minority coalition government, came into being within the fifth Vidhan Sabha itself after S. Gurnam Singh was replaced by Prakash Singh Badal as Chief Minister. He was sworn in with a new agenda for the coalition government.47 The Jana Sangh bargained for three cabinet berths and one minister of state. The Jana Sangh could get the Ministry of Finance and Industry with change in the leadership of the Akali Dal Legislature Party. Akali factions, clamouring for ministerial berths, threatened to destablise the government. The Chief Minister amended the rules to co-opt these legislators as chairpersons of financial corporations which were earlier treated as offices of profit.48 The Jana Sangh again withdrew support to the coalition on the issue of transfer of Punjabi-speaking areas to Punjab. The withdrawal was sparked by the question of Guru Nanak Dev 82 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India University’s jurisdiction and the exclusion of Hindi language by Punjabi University. The 1977 election was unique in that it was an anti-emergency election that saw the Janata Party and its allies voted to power in the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha. A surplus majority coalition government was formed. The Akali Dal also fought under the banner of the Janata Party. The Akalis won 58 seats, the Janata Party 25, CPI 7 and CPI(M) 8 (see table 4.10). The Janata Party in Punjab was led by the SAD Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal and had the smallest ministry (16) with only 20 per cent of its MLAs provided with ministerial berths, in contravention of the trend in coalition governments. The legislature saw dissentions on account of both intra-party Akali factionalism (AkaliNirankari conflict, limits to state autonomy) as well as clash of interests between the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the SAD.49 These post-election coalitions revolved around anti-Congress and anticentralism. The Akali Dal supported by the Sikh majority of the newly organised state found itself within striking distance of forming a government. As an alternative to the Congress, the other parties of the state such as the Jana Sangh and the CPI rallied to ally with and support the Akalis in a post-election coalition. Such coalitions were marked with the co-option of leaders representing divergent ideological frameworks and regional interests. These were marriages of convenience of the leadership with the sole aim of capturing power with their ranks regarding each other with suspicion, and a clash of ideological moorings. Even in the CPI’s support base itself, the inherent contradiction between the landed peasantry and the landless workers resulted in a decline in this base. While the flavour of religious symbols was stark in its differentiation, economic issues cut across religious divides to regroup people according to their agrarian and trade interests. The social matrix was represented in the power structure as a differentiated group in Akali led coalitions, whereas in the Congress government diverse elements were given representation. In other words, these elements were not presented as representing differentiations, but as articulating specific cultural and linguistic interests in the decision making process. 83 Coalition Politics in Punjab These coalitions brought a competition between a single party and multi-party alliance. For instance, this led to appropriation of the dominant political discourse of religious symbolism by the Congress Party. The post-election coalition brought into focus elite manoeuvrings rather than massification of democracy. To illustrate, a large number of offices of profit were declared offices of non-profit in the 1970s to accommodate legislators. This distorted governance in the state with disproportionate discretion granted to the legislatures. The legislature became an arena to raise contentious ideological issues to appeal to differentiating support bases. From autonomy to secession: 1980s to 1990s This phase is characterised by an assertion for state autonomy. The differentiation in the economy was sharpened with the political assertion of the Sikh Panth. Three simultaneous trends emerged during this period and these included demand for state autonomy without unduly disturbing the existing political arrangements; the demand for self-determination within the constitutional framework and the slogan of Khalistan. The path of development and the denial of legitimate claims of people to access their own language, culture and resources produced conditions of structural disequilibrium. The differentiation in the economy sharpened political assertions. Their range, from state autonomy to the demand for Khalistan, reflected the factionalism in the Akalis and their inability to congregate under one banner. Political demagogues used communal and religious symbols and their forms to outdo and eliminate each other with a view to increasing their support base for greater leverage in politics. This provided an ideological cover to the use of violence. The differentiation in the economy sharpened political assertions but the political process represented sectional interests. Demands were articulated by using methods ranging from peaceful to just short of physical violence to even violent acts. The first major agitation after 1980 was launched in February, 1982, against a bus fare hike by the Akalis, the CPM, the CPI and the Janata Party. These parties gheraoed the State Assembly and the Governor could not open the budget session for over two hours. 84 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India The Congress Party, which was faction ridden, allowed the situation to drift and then degenerate into communal conflict. In the meantime, sacrileges were committed in religious places, the demand was raised for relaying Gurbani from the Golden Temple, and banning the sale of tobacco, meat and liquor in Amritsar. However, all these assertions, to a very significant extent, could not adversely affect the four-party opposition alliance. In April, 1982, Indira Gandhi came to Kapoori village in Punjab to formally launch the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) project. The four-party alliance sensed Indira Gandhi’s strategy to use this to win the Haryana Assembly election to be held in May that year and, therefore, launched a morcha in Kapoori against the SYL.50 At the same time, the ruling party also started appeasing the extremist sections in the Akali Dal like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, with disastrous consequences. The emergence of a strong Sikh leadership in the form of Sant Bhindranwale started questioning the SGPC leadership. In order to counter the threat posed by the extremists, moderates within the Akali Dal shifted the venue of the morcha from Kapoori to the Golden Temple. This was the end of the four-party alliance. This further led to the communalisation of the secular demand. The Akali Dal continued its morcha but called it dharma yudh from August 4, 1982. Akali volunteers continued to court arrest, off and on. Even after the arrest of over two lakhs persons, no compromise could be reached. It is this state of affairs that enhanced the appeal of the militants among the middle and small peasantry. The morcha started waning because of increasing state repression and factional flights within the Akali Dal. Instead, the Akali leadership took recourse to specific programmes. On April 4, 1983, it organised a rasta roko agitation on July 17, a protest day and on August 29 a rail roko. Efforts were made to stop work in all offices with a kaam roko call. On its part, the Congress allowed the situation to drift. It half-heartedly pressed for or offered negotiations and blamed the Opposition and the Akali Dal for blocking a solution to the economic and secular demands. However, the ruling party unilaterally accepted the religious demands of the Akali Dal on February 27, 1983. It was an attempt to shelve real issues such as the demand for more autonomy, water and territorial issues. This strategy produced two results: 85 Coalition Politics in Punjab (a) It made it difficult for the Akalis to mobilise support for other economic demands. Acceptance of religious demands further aggravated the problem, as the Akali Dal-L coined new demands to protect and promote the economic and political interests of the rural elite. For instance, in January, 1984, the Akali Dal-L raised the demand for the amendment of Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. This demand was not raised by the Akali Dal-L in any of its earlier resolutions or charter of demands; and (b) It helped the Congress to establish its bona fides with the Akali support base. The demand for an independent Sikh state could not find effective expression in political discourse as it was raised as a slogan by a marginal political leadership rather than the mainstream political forces. The demand for Khalistan did not acquire mass support despite the ruthless political and administrative initiatives and the brutal and senseless killings by its protagonists. The manifestations of this violence like Operation Blue Star of 1984, the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in November 1984, and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots thwarted the democratic process. However, attempts were made to hold elections to legitimize nondemocratic and communal politics. The 1985, 1989, and 1992 elections were held in this background. The 1985 Assembly and Lok Sabha elections took place in the context of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord signed in 1984, while the 1989 Lok Sabha elections were held in the background of the failure to honour the same accord.51 In the 1985, Assembly elections, the Congress secured 32 seats with 38 per cent votes and the Akalis secured 73 seats with 38 per cent votes52 (see table 4.10). In the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the Akali Dal (Mann) won 10 seats with 39 per cent votes. Election to the State Assembly were postponed on the pretext that the gun would influence voting and the victorious militants would dictate terms. This was patently an afterthought to rationalize the success of the Mann-led Akali Dal in the 1989 election and to ward off future electoral losses of the same shattering magnitude. Incidentally, parties opposing the election secured more than 61 per cent of the votes. In these elections, the agenda of peace was dominant as was reflected in the signing of the Rajiv-Longowal accord in 1984, creating conditions for 86 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India political participation of the hardlines in Sikh politics in 1989 and providing a ‘façade’ of representative politics in 1992. The 1992 elections were boycotted by the Akali Dal, resulting in a turnout of only 24 per cent. It was, therefore, rightly labelled as an “apology for a representative character of democratic polity.”53 During the destabilisation of the democratic polity in the violent phase of militancy and state control, the 1985-89 and 1992 elections were used to revive legislative politics. In fact the agenda for the 1992 elections was restoration of peace, unemployment, better returns for the crops rather than issues like state autonomy or the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Resurgence of democracy and Punjabi identity: Post- 1990 phase The triumph of democracy and assertion of the people’s agenda for peace over that of party sectional interests characterised the politics of this period. The Akali Dal was quick to respond to the people’s demand for peace within the gamut of its identity-based politics by widening its agenda from politico-religious identity confined to the Sikh identity to the broader agenda of Punjabiyat. The Shiromani Akali Dal President, Mr. Prakash Singh Badal, brought the notion of Punjabi unity to the centrestage of Punjab politics mainly to draw legitimacy for its slogan of ensuring lasting peace in the state. This gave the Akali Dal an added advantage over the Congress which was seen as anti-Sikh due to its role in the November 1984 riots. It is in this background that the Akali Dal structured its campaign with a major thrust on anti-Congressism. In a statement the Akali Dal president, Prakash Singh Badal asked “All Punjabis to join hands in the massive task of social restructuring and economic rebuilding by making sure that anti-people and anti-Punjab Congress regime is routed in the state, lock stock and barrel.”54 The main plank of the Akali Dal was that the unity of all Punjabis could be the only true and dependable basis of lasting peace and there could be no social and political stability without Punjabi unity. This seems to have been prompted by the fact that during the phase of terrorism, legitimate demands like state autonomy, a greater share in river waters 87 Coalition Politics in Punjab and the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab had degenerated into the movement for Khalistan which played havoc with the people’s lives. Both the single party governments stuck to the people’s agenda of peace with the Beant Singh Government promoting prosperity with peace. The marginal shift in the Congress agenda in the post-Beant Singh phase was from an emphasis on liberal market reforms to an emphasis on economic subsidies for most sections of society. The concessions covered the peasantry, urban traders, landless labourers and dalits. The revival of democratic politics and institutions was accompanied by a resurgence of Punjabi identity. Political parties, which had been historically articulating the language question on communal lines, shifted their stance. For instance, the Akali Dal-BJP in their Common Minimum Programme (1997) asserted, “Punjabi being our mother tongue is the state language of Punjab. Every Punjabi is proud of the richness of the Punjabi language and culture.” This was a major shift because the underlying thrust of the dominant political discourse in the pre-1992 phase was that Punjabi was the language of the Sikhs and the Hindus never owned Punjabi as their language. In addition, the Akali Dal in its policy programme adopted on 14 April, 1995, emphasised disputes over the apportionment of river waters, allocation of Punjabi-speaking territories as a discrimination against Punjab rather than the Sikhs (as it used to be in pre-1992 resolutions), and linking the prices of agricultural products with the price index. To quote: Over the decades, Punjab has continually been a victim of the discriminatory and repressive policies of the Centre, in particular the rights of Punjab in respect of its left-out territories and the river waters have been ruthlessly suppressed and undermined ... For pursuance of the above objectives, the spirit of Punjabiat would be strengthened so that these matters get projected as common problems of the entire Punjabis rather than a section thereof (emphasis added) 55. The resolution indicated a shift in the Akali Dal stance from its earlier political pronouncements. The resolution reflected a change in the 88 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India social category of analysis from the Sikhs to the Punjabis. The resolution implies that the demands raised pertain to Punjabis and their nonacceptance is a discrimination against Punjabis rather than Sikhs. And the struggle for realisation of these demands has to be launched in the spirit of Punjabiat rather than as Khalistanis or Sikhs. Another major shift in the political discourse was on issues relating to greater autonomy for the states. The BJP changed its position from a strong centre to greater autonomy for states. The BJP’s 1997 election manifesto reinforced this shift. To quote; We [BJP] shall pursue with the centre for the implementation of the main recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission56, (a) Restore the balance of resources in favour of the states, (b) Ending the misuse of Art 356 of the Indian Constitution57, (c) Consulting states on the choice of governors. All these issues were incorporated in the Common Minimum Programme 1997 evolved by the Akali-BJP alliance. However, it was interesting to note that the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from anti-centrism to co-operative federalism. The Akali-BJP government has opened a new chapter in Centre-State relations, ushering in the age of cooperative federalism in the country. The era of confrontation has been effectively ended and replaced with a forward looking thrust on working together for the overall good of the state and the nation.58 This position marks a radical shift from the anti-centre stance as reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and later in its 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. Further, there was a noticeable shift in the Akali Dal (Badal) resolutions and assertions with emphasis on human rights. The main plank of the Akali Dal was that the unity of all Panjabis would become a reality only if lasting peace was ensured.59 There was also a pragmatic consideration of cementing the Akali-BJP alliance which demanded human rights to be played down and peace at any cost to be reinforced. 89 Coalition Politics in Punjab Peace in Punjab is very dear to us. We will make all endeavours to ensure peace and harmony that will last. The unity of all Punjabis could be the only true and dependable basis of lasting peace and there could be no social and political stability without Punjabi unity.60 This gave the Akali-BJP alliance an advantage over the Congress which was seen as anti-Sikh due to its role in Operation Blue Star and the 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The Congress continued to harp on the restoration of peace as its main achievement; whereas the Akali Dal-BJP alliance presented the maintenance of peace as their main agenda. The Congress wanted to take credit for the restoration of peace, but was reluctant to own the manner in which peace was brought, particularly when a large number of policemen were being hauled up by the judiciary.61 This ambivalent position led to a shift in the mood of the electorate. For the smooth functioning of the pre-election alliance between the Akalis and the BJP a committee was constituted to allocate seats. The main criterion listed by the committee was to allocate seats on the basis of ‘status-quo claim’ and ideological support base62. The BJP staked its claim to 34 seats and was allocated 22 for 1997 and 23 seats for 2002 and 2007 assembly elections. Thus most of the BJP seats were urban and had Hindu candidates. The Akalis, on the other hand, were confined to their traditional support base in the rural and semi-urban areas and the Malwa region of the state. The ‘status-quo claim’ was based on the following principles; (a) Seats which have been contested by one of the coalition partners in previous elections. From this quota 14 and 42 seats were allocated to the BJP and the Akali Dal respectively (b) Seats which the coalition partners have contested against each other in previous elections were allocated on the basis of the number of times a seat was contested by a party irrespective of the outcome. There were 23 seats in this category. The BJP had contested more often from 9 constituencies as compared to the Akali Dal. In the 1997 elections it was allocated 8 seats and in 2002 elections it was allocated 9 seats from this category. 90 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Of the remaining 14 seats, the BJP staked its claim on 7 seats. Its claim was not conceded. There were 3 seats which were contested by the both parties on equal occasions and the Akali Dal was ahead of the BJP in two and the remaining seats were rural and closer to the Akali ethos. The other four seats were contested more often by the SAD. (c) There were 38 seats which the BJP and the SAD had contested, but not in opposition to each other. The BJP staked its claim to 4 constituencies. The SAD had contested three seats more often and therefore these were allocated to the SAD and one seat remained contentious. An analysis of seat sharing in terms of bargaining of coalition partners shows that the BJP managed 12 seats (55 per cent) beyond its quota in 1997 elections as compared to its performance in 1996 parliamentary elections, whereas, the SAD managed 17 seats (18 per cent) beyond its quota. (See table - 4.14 ) Table – 4.14 Bargaining power of different alliance partners : Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (1997 Assembly Election based on 1996 Parliament Election) Performance in 1996 in Assembly Segments of Parliamentary Election Seat managed to Winner Runner get beyond Quota Alliance in 1997 Assembly Election No. of Seats Contested in 1997 Assembly Election BJP 22 2 8 SAD 92 59 16 17 (18%) CPI 15 0 0 15 (100%) CONG 105 32 77 -4 (-4%) 12 (55%) Source: Election Commission Reports, 1996-1997 The Akali Dal and the BJP pre-election coalition won the 1997 elections. This was a surplus majority coalition. It was for the first time in the electoral history of Punjab that the Akali Dal could have formed the government on their own. The SAD won 75 seats out of 92 contested seats and was polled 38 per cent votes (see table 4.10). It maintained its dominance in rural areas with 53 legislatures (71 per cent) from semi-urban 19 MLAs (25 per cent) and from urban 3 MLAs (4 per cent) (see table 4.3). The BJP as a minor partner in the coalition won 18 of the 22 contested seats with 8 per cent votes. A majority of these were Sikh Jats (55 per cent) (see 91 Coalition Politics in Punjab table 4.11) and agriculturists (60 per cent). The urban Hindus, traders and professional were nominal. Interestingly, the 31 per cent of the MLAs belonged to scheduled castes and 9 per cent to backward castes (see table 4.11). The urban Khatris also found representation in Akali Dal. In other words, the SAD represented a wide spectrum of social matrix. Whereas, a majority of BJP legislators (i.e. 14 (78 per cent) were from urban and semi-urban areas and four could win from rural areas (see table 4.3). Among the BJP MLAs, a majority were Hindus belonging Khatri and Bania castes (61 per cent) involved in trading and professional work. It continued to provide representation to scheduled and backward castes constituting around 33 per cent of its legislatures. It would be worthwhile to examine the linkage between social matrix and legislative representation with the ministerial representation. It was a jumbo cabinet with 41 ministers. The Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal allocated berths to its pre-election coalition partner in proportion to the MLAs elected. The SAD had 81 per cent of the legislators and its share in the cabinet was 80 per cent. Similarly, the BJP had 19 per cent of the legislators and its share in the cabinet was 19 per cent (see table 4.13). The wide spectrum of social representation of its SAD MLAs influenced its decision for allocation of portfolios. The portfolio on which the BJP has been traditionally staking its claim were kept with the SAD. The portfolios such as finance, industry, excise and taxation were not allocated to the BJP but were now shifted into the domain of the Chief Minister and his loyalists. The BJP leadership did negotiate for allocation of their traditional portfolios to cater to their support base. To quote a senior BJP leader; ‘We have put forward our claims for Local Bodies, Industry, Finance, Housing and Urban Development, Food and Civil Supplies, Excise and Taxation and Health in this order of priority.’63 A senior Akali leader in an interview mentioned that the BJP’s claim for Finance Ministry was discussed in the Political Affairs Committee (PAC) of the Akali Dal which unanimously rejected it. The BJP could retain some of its traditional departments like Local Bodies, Health and Family Welfare. Other portfolios included Food and Supplies, Forest, Legislative and Legal Affairs, Education and Excise and Taxation (Minister of State), Rural Development and Panchayats (Minister of State). 92 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India This clearly indicated that the respective traditional support bases of political parties have branched into other sectors of economy and preelection coalition works more to the advantage of major partner specially if its is surplus majority coalition. As is evident BJP’s bargaining capacity was much higher in post-election coalitions particularly when the Akali Dal was faction ridden. The other competing political formation i.e. the Congress and the CPI could not register its presence in diverse social, economic and regional support base. The Congress could win 14 seats with 25 per cent votes (see table 4.10). It could win only 3 urban and 4 semi-urban seats (see table 4.3). Not only this, the Congress could only elect 7 per cent of its legislators from Scheduled Castes. Its vote share was lowest so far. In 2002 election, the Congress and the CPI pre-election coalition formed the government. This was mainly because the Akali-BJP coalition formed around a common minimum programme, used to defend the alliance rather than nurture the ideological basis carved in 1997. The process of redefining the religious identities and building bridges with the Sikh fundamentalist fringe elements sharpened factionalism within the SAD and alienated a large section of urban voters.64 The noticeable shift from Punjabi identity to reinforcement of Sikh identity made urban Hindu voters align with the Congress party. The efforts of the SAD to represent a large section of scheduled caste in the 1997 legislature suffered a set back as its policies like free power to peasant landowners made rural based scheduled caste apathetic to the SAD-BJP alliance. A sample survey in 2004 of the SAD (39 per cent) and the BJP (34 per cent) party workers perceived that communal amity is the basis of coalition (see table 4.15). Whereas, the Congress (27 per cent) and the CPI (52 per cent) party workers opined that this alliance was to exploit religion sentiments. The politics of confrontation of the then Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal with Gurcharan Singh Tohra, the then SGPC President and Bhai Ranjit Singh, the Akal Takht Jathedar led to the division within the Akali support base.65 All these factors did not weaken the alliance. The BJP was allocated 23 seats as compared to 22 seats in 1997 elections. 93 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table - 4.15 Party Activist Perception on Basis of the Coalition between BJP + Akali Dal (Badal) Party Congress SAD (B) BJP Amity Between The Hindus and Sikhs Electoral Arithmetic Anti Congress 2 23 4 17 (3.17) (36.51) (6.35) (26.98) 27 (39.13) National Development Traditional allies No Idea Good Governance 17 Total 63 (26.98) (100.00) 8 11 15 8 69 (11.59) (15.94) (21.74) (11.59) (100.00) 2 4 12 7 4 44 (34.09) (4.55) (9.09) (27.27) (15.91) (9.09) (100.00) 1 2 3 (33.33) (66.67) (100.00) 1 14 5 5 6 31 (3.23) (45.16) (16.13) (16.13) (19.35) (100.00) CPI (M) / CPI Total Exploit Religious Sentiments 15 Akali Dal (Mann) BSP Promote Interests of upper castes 9 3 17 4 33 (27.27) (9.09) (51.52) (12.12) (100.00) 45 49 16 8 39 23 22 29 12 243 (18.52) (20.16) (6.58) (3.29) (16.05) (9.47) (9.05) (11.93) (4.94) (100.00) Source : Party Activists Survey, 2004 94 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India The seat sharing principle was based on the status-quo claim as was the case in 1997 elections. The bargaining power of alliance partners indicates that the BJP could manage to get 3 seats (13 per cent) less than its quota as compared to its performance in assembly segments in the 1999 parliamentary elections. The SAD could manage to get 16 seats (17 per cent) beyond its quota. The CPI and the Congress alliance proved to be more beneficial to the CPI as it could manage 2 seats (18 per cent) beyond its quota and the Congress could get 6 seats (6 per cent) beyond its quota (see table 4.16). Table – 4.16 Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (2002 Assembly Election based on 1999 Parliament Election) Alliance in 2002 Assembly Election No. of Seats Contested in 2002 Assembly Election BJP Performance in 1999 in Assembly Segments of Parliamentary Election Winner Runner Seat managed to get beyond Quota 23 11 15 -3 (-13%) SAD 92 22 54 16 (17%) CPI 11 8 1 2 (18%) CONG 105 66 33 6 (6%) Source : Election Commission Reports, 1999-2002 The state Congress leadership was opposed to alliance with the CPI with so many seats allocated to it.66 It was the direct intervention of the Congress high command which made this alliance functional. On the other hand, the CPI leadership opined that it was allocated seats for which it did not stake its claim, for instance, Pakakalan instead of Khanna, Panjgrahin instead of Rampura Phul. In three constituencies67 the Congress rebel candidates were in the contest. Interestingly, 21 per cent of the Congress Party activists reported that the alliance was based on the decision of the central leadership. In contrast, 91 per cent of the CPI activists felt that the coalition was to fight communal forces (see table 4.17). The SAD (78 per cent) and the BJP (84 per cent) viewed the Congress-CPI coalition as mere electoral arithmetic. 95 Coalition Politics in Punjab Table – 4.17 Party Activist Perception on basis of the Coalition between Congress and CPI or CPI (M) If yes, give To remove name of communal the party parties Congress SAD (B) 30 (47.62) 1 (1.69) BJP Akali Dal (Mann) BSP CPI (M) / CPI Total 1 (3.23) 30 (90.91) 62 (27.31) No idea 2 (3.17) 5 (8.47) 4 (10.53) 2 (66.67) 8 (25.81) 21 (9.25) Electoral Arithmetics 8 (12.70) 46 (77.97) 32 (84.21) 20 (64.52) 3 (9.09) 109 (48.02) No other Natural Decision party is allies / Ideological of Central ready for same commonalties Leadership coalition ideology 2 13 12 67 (3.17) (20.63) (19.05) (100.00) 7 4 63 (11.86) (6.78) (100.00) 2 4 42 (5.26) (10.53) (100.00) 1 3 (33.33) (100.00) 2 3 34 (6.45) (9.68) (100.00) 33 (100.00) 13 24 13 242 (5.73) (10.57) (5.73) (100.00) Source: Party Activist Survey, 2004 If we analyse the election in terms of votes polled we find that the Akali vote bank has remained intact but it was divided between the SAD (Badal) which secured 31 per cent and the Akali Dal (Tohra) got 5 per cent votes in 2002 elections. The SAD could win 61 seats. There has been major shift in the vote banks of urban Hindus and Scheduled Castes. The shift adversely affected SAD’s main ally Bharatiya Janata Party as could win only 3 seats and 6 per cent votes. Shift in urban Hindu votes and the factionalism within the Akalis caused defeat to the Akali Dal (Badal) – BJP alliance.68 The SAD suffered defeat in the semiurban and the BJP was routed the urban areas. There has been a major decline of Sikh Jat peasants and Scheduled Caste MLAs in SAD. The Congress and the CPI alliance formed the government in the state with outside support of the CPI. This was a surplus majority coalition. The Congress could win 62 seats with 36 per cent votes. The Communist Party of India could win 2 out of 11 seats allocated (see table 4.10). The Congress made significant improvement in all the three cultural zones. The Congress fielded 44 Sikh Jat candidates and 21 won in the elections. The Congress gained largely from the urban electorates as it was seen to pursue anti-Sikh extremist politics even though the urban votes polled itself declined. The Congress elected almost equal number of Sikh Jats and urban Khatri and Bania traders followed by Scheduled Castes. 96 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India In the 2007 election, the Congress and the CPI could not enter into an alliance. This was mainly because of the opposition of the state level Congress leadership, particularly the then Chief Minister, Capt. Amarinder Singh. Capt. Amarinder Singh in a press statement said that the Left parties had failed to transfer their votes to the Congress in the 2002 assembly elections. He further added that the Left parties had collected their workers from all over the state to work only in constituencies where their candidates had been fielded.69 The Left parties attributed the break in the alliance to the differences on policies. The CPI(M) General Secretary, Mr. Prakash Karat, said that the Left mantra for the polls would be to defeat the SAD-BJP combine and expose the Congress. “We will give a call for the defeat of the SAD-BJP combine and expose the Congress which for the past five years has been pursuing policies that have been harmful to the state as well as the people.”70 The impact of this break in alliance was visible in the political agenda advocated by the Congress. The Congress Party’s political campaign lost its aam admi thrust. For example, one of the advertisements released by the Congress Government claimed that it had “inspired top industrial houses to invest Rs. 86,161 crore in 282 mega projects, thereby generating 20 lakh jobs”. It was also claimed that if the opposition party, the Akali Dal was brought back to power, land prices would crash. A large section of the voters i.e. 53 per cent, as per a sample survey, mentioned that the increase in land prices had no impact on them as they had no stake in land. And 30 per cent opined that it had benefited land speculators and illicit businessmen. Around 12 per cent said that it had benefited rich peasants. Another 5 per cent were of the view that it had become impossible for the common man to own a shelter (see table 4.18). Table – 4.18 Impact of rise in land prices Frequency Per cent No stakes in land 164 52.90 Rich land owners 39 12.58 Land speculators and illicit businessmen 93 30.00 Difficult to own a shelter 14 4.52 Field Survey, February, 2007 Such a claim was contrary to the ideological filter of aam admi used by the Congress-CPI alliance in the last elections. Those who did not have the means might be deprived by the rising prices of land of even their own shelter or a house. The irony of the situation was that the compensation received by the farmers, ranging from Rs. 40 lakh to Rs. 60 lakh for an acre 97 Coalition Politics in Punjab of land, was not adequate to get them a shelter of 5 marlas on the same land. Had the Congress Party, aligned with the Communists, it may not have marketed this as its main electoral plank. Further, alliance with the Communists might have checked the Congress Party’s vacillation between religious identity and a secular Punjabi identity. The Congress Party focused more on the rural Jat peasantry and the Sikh identity by highlighting the termination of river waters agreement and overactive participation in religious celebrations of the Sikhs and the SGPC elections. These policies and pronouncements had an adverse impact on the poll performance of the Congress in 2004 parliamentary elections. In these elections the urban and the dalit vote shifted away from the Congress. The 2007 assembly election results were a reflection of the 2004 parliamentary elections. The Congress Party’s vote share in the 2004 parliamentary elections in semiurban constituencies decreased from 40 per cent to 35 per cent and in urban constituencies from 54 per cent to 48 per cent as compared to 1999 parliamentary elections. Similarly, in 2007, the Congress Party’s vote share in semi-urban constituencies decreased from 35 per cent to 43 per cent and in urban constituencies from 47 per cent to 40 per cent as compared to the 2002 assembly elections (see table 4.3). Traditionally, its core support base consists of a large majority of Hindu Dalits with their ‘uncertain religious allegiance’, urban Hindu traders and migrant landless labourers. The shift from Punjabi identity to a narrow religious identity testifies to the fluid response of the voters. In a sample survey conducted before the elections, around 26 per cent mentioned that the lack of alliance between the Congress and the Communist parties should work to the advantage of the SAD-BJP alliance. Ten per cent viewed that it would work to the advantage of the Congress, whereas, 64 per cent said that it would make no difference to the elections (see table 4.19). Table – 4.19 On lack of Congress-CPI Alliance Frequency Per cent Advantage Congress 32 10.32 Disadvantage Congress and CPI 80 25.81 No impact 198 63.87 Total 310 100.00 Field Survey, February, 2007 The election results showed that the Congress Party had won 7 of the 11 seats which in the 2002 elections were allocated to the CPI, whereas, the Communists acted as a spoiler for the Congress in four seats i.e. Batala, Balachaur, Dina Nagar and Bhadaur. It is clear that the alliance between the 98 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Congress and the Communists had political advantages rather than merely electoral. Therefore, the impact of the alliance should be measured in the political domain rather on an electoral arithmetic scale. The Akali-BJP pre-election coalition formed the government after the 2007 assembly elections. The SAD-BJP alliance won 68 seats and 45 per cent of the total votes polled. The Congress could win 44 seats with 41 per cent votes. The Communist parties could not win a single seat, but could secure one per cent of the votes. The alliance articulated its 1997 election plank of Panjabiat, Punjabi identity and peace along with issues relating to price rise, corruption and mega projects. The rise in the prices of essential commodities, food subsidy and poverty found mention perhaps for the first time since 1967, and emerged as the main issues in the elections. Other traditional issues such as danger to the “Sikh Panth”, federalism and Sikh identity could not find much space in the electoral discourse. To the discomfort of the Congress, a ‘Sikh’ Prime Minister could not emerge as a star campaigner and vote catcher. Most of the election rallies addressed by the Prime Minister were thinly attended and without the usual Punjabi enthusiasm. The fact that the Prime Minister has never presented himself as a ‘Sikh’, but as a professional economist, cannot be denied. Therefore, the extent to which he mirrors the economic reforms agenda and the price rise as its fall-out along with his opposition to free electricity and water to the farmers may have distanced him from the “aam admi”. Similarly, the changed political context from Sikh identity to Punjabi identity has pushed leaders like Uma Bharti and Narendra Modi to the margins of electoral politics in Punjab. In a sample survey in 2007, a majority of SAD supporters (72 per cent) considered alliance with the BJP a symbol of communal amity rather than an electoral arrangement (see table 4.20). Table – 4.20 On SAD-BJP Coalition (SAD Supporters) Frequency Per cent Electoral liability 63 Electoral savvy 24 7.74 For communal amity 223 71.94 Total Field Survey, 2007 310 100.00 99 20.32 Coalition Politics in Punjab On the contrary, a majority of BJP supporters (85 per cent) considered it an electoral necessity (see table 4.21). Table – 4.21 On SAD-BJP Coalition (BJP Supporters) Frequency Per cent For community amity 43 13.87 Electoral liability 2 0.65 Electoral useful 265 85.48 Total 310 100.00 Field Survey, 2007 Seat sharing was based on the status-quo claim as was the case in 1997 and 2002 elections. The bargaining power of the alliance partners indicates that the BJP could manage to get 2 seats (9 per cent) beyond its quota share as compared to its performance in the assembly elections of 2002. The SAD could get 9 seats (10 per cent) beyond its quota (see table 4.22). Table – 4.22 Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners beyond normal quota (2007 Assembly Election based on 2002 Assembly Election) Performance in 2002 Assembly Election No. of Seats Contested in 2007 Assembly Election Winner Runner Seat managed to get beyond Quota BJP 23 3 18 2 (9%) SAD 94 41 44 9 (10%) Alliance in 2007 Assembly Election Source : Election Commission Reports, 2002-2007 If we analyse the elections in terms of votes polled and seats won, the SAD managed to get 37 per cent votes and 49 seats and the BJP polled 8 per cent votes and got 19 seats. The Congress managed to get 41 per cent votes and 44 seats (see table 4.10). The SAD could not get a majority on its own and therefore became dependent on the BJP to form a government. The SAD could not perform in its traditional support base of the Malwa region of the state. In 1997, the SAD got 44 seats in this region which declined to 19 in the 2007 elections (see table 4.8). Many of the SAD stalwarts suffered defeat in this region. Support to the SAD in this region is continuously declining. However, in this elections an open support declared for the Congress by a popular religious sect (Dera Sacha Sauda)71 contributed to the defeat of the SAD. In the other 100 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India two regions i.e. the Doaba and the Majha, the trends of 1997 elections were repeated in 2007. The Congress did not learn from the Akali-BJP alliance in 2002 and its own defeat in the 2004 parliamentary elections that it was not electoral wisdom to cater to sectional interests and to indulge in overactive involvement in identity politics. It could make inroads into the Akali Dal bastion, but suffered a major loss in its own support base of dalits, urban traders, slum dwellers etc. The Congress suffered defeat in the semi-urban areas and was routed in the urban constituencies. The SAD could get elected only 25 Sikh Jats in 2007 as compared to 41 in the 1997 elections. In 2007, the Congress could get elected almost an equal number of Sikh Jats as compared to the SAD. This clearly signifies that the Sikh Jats are not exclusive supporters of the SAD. This shift is significant in the post-Blue Star phase. On the contrary, the number of dalit MLAs in the Congress was reduced from 14 in 2002 to 7 in 2007. And the BJP could maintain in 2007 its 1997 tally of 4 dalits. The number of dalit MLAs in the SAD is 16 as compared to 23 in the 1997 elections (see table 4.11). It is interesting to note that the main political parties represent evenly the caste configuration. The linkages between the social matrix and legislative representation in terms of religious affiliation has shown that the number of MLAs who belonged to the Hindu religious group increased in the SAD in 2007 as compared to 2002 and 1997 elections. Whereas, a majority of BJP MLAs were Hindus belonging to Khatri, Brahmin and Bania castes (58 per cent), a majority of the SAD MLAs were rural based (71 per cent). It represented semiurban (22 per cent) and urban constituencies (6 per cent). Interestingly, it has given increased representation to urban areas as compared to 1997 elections. The number BJP MLAs in the urban areas increased from 28 per cent in 1997 to 37 per cent in 2007 elections. It has also given more representation to rural areas which increased from 22 per cent in 1997 to 26 per cent in 2007. Both the parties could represent a wide spectrum of the social matrix. (See table 4.3) Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal was authorised to give representation to its coalition partner the BJP. The SAD has 72 per cent of the legislators and its share in the Cabinet is 72 per cent. Similarly, the BJP has 28 per cent of the legislators and its share in the Cabinet is 28 per cent. The number of legislators of the SAD decreased as 101 Coalition Politics in Punjab compared to 1997 elections and so in their representation in the Cabinet. The BJP, however, did negotiate for such portfolios as were linked with urban areas.72 It was also reported in the Press that the BJP staked its claim to portfolios like Industries, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies, Health, Transport and Urban Development. The BJP could retain portfolios like Local Bodies, Health and Family Welfare, Forests and Medical Education, Industries and Commerce. But it could not get Urban Development, Excise and Taxation. It also staked its claim to Deputy Chief Minister’s post. In terms of representation of social coalition in the Ministry, 39 per cent were from Majha, 33 per cent from Malwa and 28 per cent from Doaba. The SAD, however, gave proportionately higher representation to Malwa (31 per cent), Doaba (15 per cent) and Majha (29 per cent). Whereas, the BJP gave higher representation to Doaba (43 per cent) and Majha (29 per cent) from among the MLAs elected from each region (see table 4.13). The coalition gave higher representation to rural areas (50 per cent) followed by semi-urban (39 per cent) and urban (11 per cent). The SAD gave proportionately higher representation to semi-urban areas (36 per cent), followed by rural (26 per cent) from among the MLAs elected from these regions. It has not given any representation to urban MLAs in the ministry. The BJP has also given higher representation to MLAs from semi-urban areas (43 per cent) followed by urban (28 per cent) and no representation to rural MLAs from among the elected MLAs from these areas (see table 4.23). Interestingly, the representation of the Jats continued to remain higher i.e. 55 per cent in the ministry. However, the representation of the dalits declined to 11 per cent from 22 per cent in 1997 and that of the backwards increased to 11 per cent from 7 per cent in 1997. The SAD gave proportionately higher representation to the Jats i.e. 40 per cent. But it has decreased from 49 per cent in 1997 ministry. There is a noticeable decrease in the dalit representation from 35 per cent in 1997 to 6 per cent in the 2007 ministry. 102 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Table – 4.23 Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Location Rural 1969 MINISTERS MLAs ** MINISTERS MLAs 13 23 56.52 1977 MINISTERS MLAs 6 43 13.95 1980 MINISTERS MLAs 1985 MINISTERS MLAs 1972 22 53 41.51 1992 MINISTERS MLAs 1997 MINISTERS MLAs * MINISTERS MLAs 23 53 43.40 MINISTERS MLAs 9 35 25.71 2002 2007 Semi Urban 10 19 52.63 5 14 35.71 6 20 30.00 10 19 52.63 4 11 36.36 Akali Urban 1 1 100.00 0 1 0.00 0 3 0.00 3 0.00 Total Rural 24 43 55.81 1 1 100.00 11 58 18.97 1 5 20.00 BJS/BJP Semi Urban Urban 1 2 5 2 20.00 100.00 2 12 16.67 2 8 25.00 INC Total Rural Semi Urban Urban Total 4 8 50.00 6 31 19.35 8 26 30.77 3 9 33.33 17 66 25.76 9 30 30.00 4 21 19.05 3 12 25.00 16 63 25.40 15 51 29.41 12 27 44.44 4 9 44.44 31 87 35.63 14 32 43.75 5 19 26.32 6 11 54.55 25 62 40.32 5 25 20.00 28 73 38.36 33 75 44.00 13 49 26.53 0 4 0.00 5 0.00 6 9 66.67 3 7 42.86 2 5 40.00 2 7 28.57 8 18 44.44 5 19 26.32 Note : Minister/MLAs. With Percentages the proportion of ministers to MLAs. (Data pertains to the time of the Constitution of Ministry) ** 5 MlA from Other Paries joined Akali in 1969 * 1 MLA from other party shifted to Akali in 1997 Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh:Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003 Election Commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007) 103 Rural 14 24 58.33 6 31 19.35 7 48 14.58 9 30 30.00 23 53 43.40 15 51 29.41 23 57 40.35 14 32 43.75 9 40 22.50 Total(SAD+BJP+INC) Semi Urban Urban 11 3 24 3 45.83 100.00 8 3 26 9 30.77 33.33 7 2 26 9 26.92 22.22 4 3 21 12 19.05 25.00 6 20 30.00 12 4 27 9 44.44 44.44 16 2 28 8 57.14 25.00 5 6 19 11 26.32 54.55 7 2 18 10 38.89 20.00 Total 28 51 54.90 17 66 25.76 16 83 19.28 16 63 25.40 28 73 38.36 31 87 35.63 41 93 44.09 25 62 40.32 18 68 26.47 Coalition Politics in Punjab The Akali-BJP coalition functioned smoothly in the first two years as the BJP central leadership decided to allow a free hand to the SAD chief Minister S. Prakash Singh Badal. In the midst of Parliamentary elections in 2009, the BJP central leadership also used SAD platform to present National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as a formidable and united forum, in a massive rally organised by SAD leadership in Ludhiana. However, in the background of 2009 parliamentary election results, weakening of L.K. Advani and nomination of Nitin Gadkari as BJP President, this coalition came under scrutiny. In Parliamentary elections, the SAD could win only four seats as compared to eight in 2004 Parliamentary elections, with 34 per cent votes while the BJP managed to retain only one seat out of four seats secured earlier in 2004 with 10 per cent votes. Interestingly, in 2009 Parliamentary elections, the BJP won only in one assembly segment as compared to 19 seats won in 2007 Assembly elections. However, the SAD could win in fifty-one assembly segments in 2009 Parliamentary elections as compared to forty-one assembly seats won in 2007 Assembly elections. Within the BJP, this defeat was attributed to indifferent attitude of the SAD leadership towards their urban support base and the party activists. The coalition partners bargained with each other to share the spoils of power in negation to the norms of secular and democratic governance. For instance, the State BJP core committee demanded a complete rollback of the revised power tariff in the State. And, it expressed concern over continuation of free power supply to farming sector and “that too at the cost of taxing other categories of consumers”. 73 Historically, the BJP has support amongst urban Hindus and the SAD support base is amongst the rural Jat-Sikh peasantry. The tinge of communal arithmetic is being increasingly invoked by a faction of the state BJP leadership. This faction has been nurtured and guided by the communal political ethos of the first four unsuccessful SAD-BJP coalition governments formed in the pre-Operation Blue Star phase. It is worth noticing that in the post-2009 Parliamentary elections and in anticipation of the 2012 Assembly elections, political bargaining amongst the coalition partners for everyday governance is acquiring communal overtones.74 A comparative analysis of the SAD led coalition with the Congress led coalition in terms of reflection of social coalition in the cabinet shows following trends: 104 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India (a) The Akali-BJP coalition gave higher representation to the Sikh, whereas the Congress tried to balance it. (b) The Akalis overrepresented their stronghold Malwa region and the Congress overrepresented Doaba and Majha regions. The impact of pre-election coalitions brought exclusive support bases of political parties into the competitive spectrum. The major parties i.e. the Congress and the Akalis increased their vote share in other parties stronghold. For instance, the Akalis increased their support in urban and semi-urban, three cultural zones and other than Sikh Jat castes. The Congress could expand its base in rural Punjab. These two parties having diluted their ideological positioning, relied on policy interventions.75 The BJP could not compensate for their ideological compromise with proactive policy interventions to keep their support base intact. There has been a sense of neglect and perception of relative deprivation amongst the urban voters as compared to rural. The social spectrum was represented in the legislative coalition but power sharing at the level of decision making was seen to be discriminatory by a section of dalits. Their assertions have become visible in non-electoral spaces. The culture of coalition formation has its roots in the pre-independence phase. The Congress and the Muslim League were the two axes around which the coalition politics revolved. The Akali Dal and the Hindu Maha Sabha clearly stated that to protect the interests of their support base they might even form a coalition with the Muslim League. After independence, in partitioned Punjab, the SAD merged with the Congress twice and regionalised the national politics of the Congress. For instance, factions in the Congress supported the Punjabi Suba and Save Hindi agitations, whereas, the mandate of the Indian National Congress was to oppose both. This politics of merger was replaced by coalition politics in the reorganised Punjab. Therefore, it would be appropriate to characterize the phase between 1967-1980 as the initiation of coalition politics which coincided with the decline of one-party dominance in legislative politics. The decline of one party dominance initiated two distinct trends in the party dynamics in Punjab. The effective number of parties by seats were more in post- 105 Coalition Politics in Punjab coalition phase i.e. 3.5 in 1967 and 3.2 in 1969. Whereas, in the preelection coalition phase it was 2.4 in 2002 and 2.9 in 2007. The effective number of parties by votes was the highest i.e. 4.5 in 1967(see table – 4.24). Table – 4.24 Taagepera and Shugart Index for General Assembly Elections of Punjab from 1967 to 2007 Election Year Effective Number of Parties by Votes Effective Number of Parties by Seats 1967 4.5 3.5 1969 3.9 3.2 1972 3.5 2.1 1977 4.0 3.1 1980 3.4 2.5 1985 3.3 2.1 1992 3.9 1.8 1997 4.2 2.2 2002 4.1 2.4 2007 3.1 2.9 Source: Calculated from the data of Election Commission Report, 1967 - 2007 It can, therefore, be hypothesised that at the micro level political parties follow the strategy of expansion in post-election coalitions and the strategy of consolidation in pre-election coalition. However, the Congress remained capable of forming a government on its own, averaging above 30 per cent of the votes. Whereas, the SAD with consistent vote share needed a coalition partner to be electorally viable and more so politically stable. It is interesting to note that only the SAD base which was 25 per cent of the vote share in post-election increased to 35 per cent in pre-election coalition formation (see graph – 4.1). Whereas, the support base of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Communist Party of India, and the Indian National Congress decreased in pre-election coalition politics. 106 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India GRAPH - 1 Graph – 4.1 PARTY WISE SUPPORT BASE Partywise Support Base Election 1969) to PreCOALITION Election(1997-02-07)] Coalition (1997-2002-2007)] [POST[Post ELECTION (1967 - (1967 1969) TO–PRE ELECTION 45.00 40.00 38.36 34.92 30.00 25.14 25.00 0.77 20.1 to 35.1 3.16 0 to 10 1.87 0 to 10 5.01 0 to 10 7.46 0 to 10 5.00 More than 35.1 9.40 0 to 10 10.00 0 to 10 15.00 More than 35.1 20.00 20.1 to 35.1 PERCENTAGE OF VOTE POLLED 35.45 35.00 0.00 POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION SAD SUPPORT BASE BJS /BJP SUPPORT BASE Based on constituency wise data for assembly elections CPI SUPPORT BASE CPM SUPPORT BASE INC SUPPORT BASE PRE AND POST COILATION SUPPORT BASE Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab 1967-2007 The Bharatiya Janata Party support base declined as it underplayed its ideological thrust and could not make policy interventions for its urban base through executive decisions. The Congress gained in urban areas not because of executive decisions but because it was seen to pursue antiSikh minority politics. In the absence of urban centric policy interventions the urban votes polled continued to decline (see graph – 4.2). Graph – 4.2 Party wise Support Base - Location wise RURAL SEMI URBAN URBAN 45.00 40.39 39.24 38.4038.76 36.43 40.00 36.12 35.36 34.11 35.00 31.49 30.00 27.66 26.83 25.56 25.00 20.00 More than 35.1 More than 35.1 20.1 to 35.1 More than 35.1 More than 35.1 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 5.84 4.581.730.38 0.90 0.71 0.03 1.921.69 6.25 2.20 2.98 0 to 10 0 to 10 3.41 10.01 to 20.1 to 35.1 10.50 10.01 to 20.0 than More 35.1 4.13 0 to 10 More than 35.1 10.77 20.1 to 0 to 1035.1 20.1 to 2.67 0 to 1035.1 5.00 20.1 to 35.1 10.00 More than 35.1 14.36 15.00 0.00 (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) SAD (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) BJP (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) CPI Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab 1967-2007 107 (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) CPM (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) INC Coalition Politics in Punjab The pre-election coalition helped the SAD to increase its support base, outside its stronghold i.e. Malwa, i.e. in Doaba and Majha (see graph – 4.3). Graph – 4.3 Party wise Support Base – Region wise MAJHA MALWA 45.00 DOABA 40.00 38.97 37.46 37.95 39.99 35.54 34.82 34.74 35.38 35.00 30.03 30.00 27.76 25.24 25.00 20.00 20.1 to 35.1 More than 35.1 20.1 to 35.1 More than 35.1 More than 35.1 More than 35.1 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 4.31 3.80 0.80 0.68 1.01 2.45 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 0.18 0 to 10 1.53 2.53 0 to 10 0 to 10 5.00 5.42 0 to 10 0 to 10 3.82 0 to 10 10.01 to (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) 4.64 0 to 10 10.01 to 20.0 (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) 9.86 7.50 10.01 to 0 to 10 20.0 0 to 10 More than 35.1 5.00 12.02 More than 35.1 20.1 to 35.1 10.00 13.84 13.66 12.71 20.1 to 35.1 20.1 to 35.1 10.01 to 20.0 15.00 0.00 SAD (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) BJP (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) CPI (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) CPM (POST ELECTION 1967 AND 1969) (PRE ELECTION 1997, 2002 AND 2007) INC Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab 1967-2007 In so far as the representation of the social matrix in the legislature and cabinet formation is concerned, there are imbalances. For example, out of the 1131 MLAs in the state from 1967 to 2007, the plurality i.e. 44 per cent were from among the rural Jat peasants, whereas dalits were 25 per cent, OBC were 9 per cent and urban traders (Khatris) were 22 per cent (see table 4.11). The representation of rural Jat peasants is much higher than their population. The representation of various caste groups in the legislature in pre-election coalition became more distributive, for instance, in postelection coalition Sikh Jat peasants had a greater share than in pre-election coalition in the Akali Dal. In fact, in pre-election coalition the SAD had a more even representation of the dalits and OBCs. Similarly, the Bharatiya Janata Party had more dalits, OBCs and relatively reduced number of urban Khatri and Bania traders. It clearly shows that pre-election coalitions capture the social spectrum relatively in an even manner. The SAD in 1969 gave less representation to BJP MLAs as compared to 1997 and 2007 pre-election coalitions. The BJP was in power at the Centre in 1997 which empowered the state BJP leadership to have a better bargain which 108 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India could not be reversed as survival of coalition in terms of number was dependent on the BJP. Interestingly, the share of ministers of the SAD was higher in pre-election coalitions rather than in post-election coalitions. However, the social matrix was better represented in the cabinet in preelection coalition. The share of Jats in the ministry declined from 64 per cent in 1969 to 51 per cent in 1997 and 55 per cent in 2007 elections, (see table 4.25) whereas, the share of the dalits in the ministry increased in 1997 but again decreased to 11 per cent in 2007 elections. Table -4.25 Year and Caste wise Distribution of Council of Ministers at the Initial Constitution of Ministries Caste YEAR 1969 1972 1977 1980 1985 1992 1997 2002 2007 Total Total SC OBC Other Jat 4 4 2 18 28 14.29 14.29 7.14 64.29 100.00 2 1 5 9 17 11.76 5.88 29.41 52.94 100.00 2 2 3 9 16 12.50 12.50 18.75 56.25 100.00 3 2 5 6 16 18.75 12.50 31.25 37.50 100.00 6 1 9 12 28 21.43 3.57 32.14 42.86 100.00 8 4 8 11 31 25.81 12.90 25.81 35.48 100.00 9 3 8 21 41 21.95 7.32 19.51 51.22 100.00 5 2 8 10 25 20.00 8.00 32.00 40.00 100.00 2 2 4 10 18 11.11 11.11 22.22 55.56 100.00 41 21 52 106 220 18.64 9.55 23.64 48.18 100.00 Source : Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who’s Who of Members (1960-2007), Chandigarh: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003. Election Commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007) Resume, Punjab Legislative Assembly In post-election coalition, the SAD gave higher representation to rural Jats as compared to dalits. The BJP tried to accommodate the dalits and Jats to increase its support base. However, in pre-election coalition the 109 Coalition Politics in Punjab Bharatiya Janata Party negotiated higher representation for urban traders. Further, in post-election coalition higher representation was given to legislators from Doaba where the coalition base was weak whereas, in pre-election coalition regional representation was in proportionate to the number of MLAs. The coalitions have tended to give relatively even representation to the active social spectrum in government formation, which in turn has made an impact on its durability. The post-election coalitions in Punjab were the least durable as is evident from the number of days the ministries could last. The pre-election coalitions have completed their full terms (see graph – 4.4). Graph – 4.4 GRAPH - 4 DURABILITY OF GOVERNMENTand AND Tenure TENURE Durability of Government 2000 1870 1838 1825 1800 TIME SPAN IN DAYS 1600 1400 1283 1217 1200 972 1000 800 589 600 402 400 261 448 444 272 200 82 0 United Front Gurnam Singh Akali Break Away (INC support) Lachman Singh Gill Post Election Alliance . 4th SAD + BJS (United Front) Gurnam Singh SAD + BJS Parkash Singh Badal INC Giani Zail Singh Janta INC Darbara Ministry Singh Parkash Singh Badal SAD Surjit Singh Barnala INC Beant Singh Interim Harcharan Singh Brar INC Smt. SAD + BJP Rajinder Kaur Parkash Bhattal Singh Badal Post Election Alliance. 5th Single Party . Pre election Single Party Single Party Single Party Single Party. Single Party 6th Coalition .7th .8th .9th .10th 10th .10th Pre Post Election coalition .11th Cong + CPI Capt. Amrinder Singh Pre election defection .12th VIDHAN SABHASTRENGTH, NUMBER, CM OFOF GOVERNMENT VIDHAN SABHA CMAND ANDTYPE TYPE GOVERNMENT Source : Resume of Punjab Assembly Coalition politics has mirrored the changing character of Indian democracy. The dynamic relationship between electoral promises and performance of the party system has provided alternative space for coalition politics. During the phase of one party dominance, electoral promises were commensurate with the mandate of the government. Non-fulfilment of electoral promises, therefore, raised issues relating to the path of development and the nature of state and institutional arrangements. With the introduction of economic reforms electoral promises were not in convergence with the mandate of the government. In other words, in the earlier phase, electoral promises were ideologically in convergence and in the later phase these were ideologically divergent. This shift created a crisis of trust in the 110 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India leadership and the party system. Political parties stared relying excessively on electoral arithmetic through the appropriation of social differentiations and pro-poor discourse.76 Not only this the alliance of the Congress with the CPI was to provide content to its pro-aam admi and anti-communal stance. It is worth noticing that the Congress in Punjab is branded a communal party. The Congress and the CPI alliance is guided more by immediate political and electoral needs. It is precisely because of this reason that the local Congress and the CPI leadership were not inclined to enter an electoral alliance and consequently in 2007 elections alliance could not materialise. Therefore, it is the political context which brings out differentiation between the behaviours of historical political coalitions and pragmatic coalitions. On the other hand, the Akali-BJP coalition has arisen from a historical context. It has shown a tendency to evolve broad boundary conditions for linkages between the social matrix, legislative and executive coalition. It is within these boundary conditions that dynamics of coalition takes place i.e. from seat allocation to cabinet formation. Another trend which acquired currency in the coalition era is that multidimensional ideological spaces are increasingly replaced by social differentiations in a political space. These differentiations are articulated in policy interventions to compensate for the absence of ideological mobilisation. It has been noticed that if the interactive relationship between legislative policy interventions and social polarisation remains static, the coalition becomes weak and unstable. If the coalition partners become dynamic in legislative (policy compatibility) and social spectrum (ideological compatibility) the possibility of the coalition becoming more durable and stable increases. For instance, the SAD has formulated policies which are consistent with the social base. On the other hand, the BJP did not make much effort in this direction and lost its electoral base to the Congress, which led to the weakening of the Akali-BJP coalition. It may be correct to state that democracies in transition have the tendency to register short-term power gains by forming coalitions, leading to a sharpening of social polarisation to maintain their exclusive electoral base. 111 Coalition Politics in Punjab ENDNOTES 1 This has posed a dilemma for political analysts to capture competing identities. Although Punjab political history provides evidence to support contradictory viewpoints, namely, that political parties sometimes reflect communal antagonisms and sometimes moderate them, the predominating tendency in Punjab legislative politics has been towards political communal coalition-building, whether this is done by a single broadly aggregative party or by inter-party alliance and coalition. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 362. 2 Even a pamphlet published by the Shiromani Akali Dal on May 19, 1960, held the view that only a small minority of urbanite Hindus were opposed to the formulation of a Punjabi-speaking state. To quote: “Recent agitation over the Punjabi-Hindi controversy has highlighted the fact that it is the Hindu urbanites living in the cities of Amritsar, Jullundur, Ludhiana and Ambala who alone appose the formation of the Punjabispeaking state. These urbanite Hindus do not form the majority of the Hindu population and can in no way form a substantial minority in the Punjabi-speaking zone.” A Plea for a Punjabi State. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, p. 27. According to the 1971 Census, the total population was 13,472,972 with 37.54 per cent being Hindus, i.e. 5,057,754. The number stated Hindu as their mother tongue stood at 2,711,490; assuming all these to be Hindus, the percentage of Hindus mentioning Hindi as their mother tongue is estimated at 53.61. Pramod Kumar et.al., Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends. Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984, p. 39. 3 The Moga declaration was adopted on April 14, 1995. To quote, ‘the spirit of Punjabiat would be strengthened so that these matters get projected as common problems of the entire Punjabis rather than a section thereof’. Kanwaljit Singh, The Policy Programme of Shiromani Akali Dal. April 14, 1995, p. 4. 4 J.H. Hutton, Census of India 1931: India: Imperial Tables, 1933, Vol. 1, pt. II, p. 582. 5 The argument advanced that wherever, the Hindus, the Sikhs are in minority and the Muslim League ministry is a possibility, it is desirable to join the coalition to protect ‘Hindu’ and ‘Sikh’ interests. Vir Savarkar the leader of Hindu Maha Sabha described its policy in 1943 and later in a telegram to the Master Tara Singh. To quote: 112 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India In the Hindu minorities provinces wherever a Muslim ministry seems inevitable – whether it was sponsored by the Muslim league or otherwise – and Hindu interest can be better by joining it, the Hindu Maha Sabha should try as a matter of right to capture as many seats as possible in the ministry and do their best to safeguard the interests of the Hindu minority. He further added, “coalition ministry if they are actuated by just and patriotic motive can be an effective process which will train us in a team work, remove the sense of annihilation and lead to national consolidation in spite of differences of race and creed”. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: the Story of the Struggle. (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), p. 73. 6 Ibid. p. 152. 7 Census of India 2001. 2004. First Report on Religion Data. New Delhi: Registrar General & Census Commissioner. 8 Census of India. 2001. India: Final Population Totals. Series 1, p.1. 9 Pramod Kumar and Rainuka Dagar, ‘Gender in Dalit Identity Construction in Punjab’ in Harish K. Puri (ed.) Dalits in Regional Context. (Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2004). 10 In 1920, a religious conference where ‘Amrit Parchar’ took place and many of the members of congregation there belonged to the scheduled castes. Some of them had been baptised and they were later taken to Sri Darbar Sahib for ‘Ardasa’ (Prayer) and distribution of Karah Parashad. The irony of the situation was that the priests present at Sri Darbar Sahib refused to allow participation of these “Harijans” (scheduled castes) who had been baptised, in the Ardas, and this annoyed the congregation present there, who protested at this unSikh-like discrimination and insisted at the participation of the Harijans in the Ardasa and their sharing in the distribution of Karah Parshad. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, op.cit., 1970, p. 20. 11 Till mid-sixties a coalition of the urban Sikh traders, peasantry and Sikh service class under the leadership of Master Tara Singh dominated the Akali politics. But in post-reorganisation phase rural Jat peasantry became dominant both in the Akali Dal and the SGPC. 12 The Jat Singh legislators in general and of the Akali Dal in particular belonged to the upper strata. The two groups into which the Akalis had split represented different tendencies and styles of functioning. Sant Fateh Singh represented the incremental-conformist group and a section of the religious fundamentalists, whereas the Master Akali Dal represented the extremists and a minority of the religious fundamentalists and incremental conformists. 113 Coalition Politics in Punjab H.S. Deol, Analysis of Political Elite in Punjab with special reference to the Legislature, (Ph.D. thesis submitted to Panjab University, 1979). 13 Pramod Kumar, ‘Transcending the Divide’. Deccan Herald, February 16, 1997. 14 Interview with Prakash Singh Badal, President Akali Dal, February 5, 2005. 15 Interview with senior Akali leader, December 7, 2005. 16 To illustrate, Sachar Formula was adopted by winning the support of the “Akali Congressmen” (who joined Congress in 1948) and was opposed by Arya Samajist Hindu Congressmen. Factional fight between Bhim Sen Sachar group and Gopi Chand Bhargava group kept on conceding demands of Akali or Hindu Congressmen. The national leadership seem to be distraught by this game. Sardar Patel reported having reprimanded the state leadership. You do not seem to understand... the political and religious game behind it. Harish K. Puri, ‘Religion and Politics in Punjab’ in Moin Shakir (ed.) Religion, State and Politics in India. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 331. 17 ‘SC orders centre to construct SYL canal’. The Tribune, June 4, 2004. 18 Stated in an interview by Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister, Punjab 10 September 2004, ‘I have to protect the interests of Punjab farmers’. 19 Pramod Kumar, ‘Electoral Politics in Punjab: From Autonomy to Secession’ in th Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds.) India’s 1999 Elections and 20 Century Politics. (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2003), p. 379. 20 Harish K. Puri, op.cit., 1989, p. 331. 21 M.S. Dhami, ‘Religio-Political Mobilisation and Shifts in the Party Support Base in 1985 Punjab Assembly Elections’ in Moin Shakir (ed.) Religion, State and Politics in India. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 352. 22 The BSP was founded in 1984 by Kanshi Ram. Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India. Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 145. 23 Paul R. Brass on the basis of his study of Punjab Assembly elections over the period 1952-1972 argues: ‘A thorough going polarization of Punjab politics has been prevented by the presence of a large Scheduled Caste population, of uncertain religious allegiance, to whom all parties must appeal. Second, the leading secular parties in Punjab, particularly Congress and the CPI, have successfully appealed to both Hindus and Sikhs in the past.’ 114 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India Paul R. Brass, ‘Ethnic Cleavages in the Punjab Party System, 1952-72’ in Myron Weiner and J. Orgood Field (eds.) Electoral Political in the Indian States: Party Systems and Cleavages. (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975), p. 60. 24 Pramod Kumar et.al., op.cit., 1984, p. 45. 25 Pramod Kumar, ‘Need for Reposing Faith in People’. The Tribune, May 13, 1990. 26 In the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the Akali Dal entered into pre-election alliance with the Bahujan Samaj Party and seat adjustment with the Bharatiya Janata Party. The alliance adversely affected the Congress Party’s performance and resulted in an erosion of the support base of the Congress among the Scheduled Castes. (Of the 13 parliamentary seats, the SAD won 8 and the BSP 3). 27 The SAD and the BJP formed the ministry together irrespective of the fact that the SAD was in majority show that the alliance is based on mutual understanding and to advantage Punjab. Interview with Sukhbir Singh Badal, SAD Member Parliament. January 2006. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Akali Dal entered into an alliance with the BJP. The Shiromani Akali Dal won the largest number of seats i.e. 8 and polled 33 per cent of the votes. The Bharatiya Janata Party won 3 seats and polled 12 per cent of the votes. The Congress, the BSP, and the communists entered into a pre-election alliance and could not win even a single seat. 28 In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the pre-election alliance of SAD-BJP failed miserably with the Congress-CPI alliance winning nine seats. 29 Gur Rattanpal Singh, The Illustrated History of the Sikhs. (Chandigarh: Akal Printmatics, 1979), p.84 Paul R. Brass, op.cit., 1974, p. 358. 30 The Sikh members of the assembly prepared a charter of demands in November, 1948 which was not accepted. 1. Representation to be given to the Sikhs on the basis of 1941 census without excluding Sikhs who had migrated to other provinces. 2. They should be given 5 per cent representation in the Central Cabinet. 3. Sikhs should have one Minister and one Deputy Minister in the Central Cabinet. 4. The post of Governor and premier of the province should alternatively go to a Hindu or a Sikh. 115 Coalition Politics in Punjab 5. 50 per cent representation in the Provincial Cabinet should be given to the Sikhs. 6. Gurgaon district and Loharu State should be separated from the East Punjab. 7. 40 per cent of the services be reserved for the Sikhs. 8. If the above demands were rejected the Sikhs should be allowed to form a New Province of 7 districts, i.e. Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ambala. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, op.cit., 1970, p. 167. 31 Ibid. p. 190. 32 “The Shiromani Akali Dal is in favour of the formation of provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis throughout India, but holds it as a question of life and death for the Sikhs that a new Punjab be created immediately.” Ajit Singh Sarhadi, op.cit., 1970, p. 221. 33 The SGPC which was under the control of Nationalist Sikhs which was captured by the Akalis. At the same time Government of India later its acceptance of regional formula paved the way for its merger in the Congress. In 1955, the Akali Dal won 112 seats and the Khalsa Dal supported by the Congress could win only 3 out of 132 contested seats. This convinced the Congress of the growing strength of the Akalis and the Government of India in December 1953 appointed the State Re-organisation Commission. In 1954 the Akalis launched a vigorous agitation for the Punjabi Suba demand. For example, processions were taken out, by Akalis at Ludhiana (on the eve of Guru Gobind Singh’s birthday) and at Amritsar (the Hola Mohalla procession) on December, 1954, and March, 1995, respectively. The continued and persistent agitations and protests worsened the situation. The morchas launched acquired communal colouring. 34 The State Reorganisation Commission recommended the merger of Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. PEPSU was merged in Punjab in 1956. The new State was divided into so-called Punjabi-speaking and Hindi speaking regions and two regional committees, consisting of the members of the legislature belonging to the respective regions, were provided. Thus in October, 1956, a convention was held at Amritsar. It was attended by the members of the Akali Dal Working Committee, the Akali MLAs from Punjab and PEPSU the Jathedars and other prominent leaders. It formally resolved to amend the Constitution of the Akali Dal so as to continue its activities towards the religious, educational and economic welfare of the Sikhs. Interview with Capt. Kanwaljit Singh, General Secretary, SAD on December 7, 2005. 116 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 35 Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 125. 36 Ibid. p. 129. 37 In January, 1960, elections to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prakandhak Committee were held. Giani Kartar Singh opposed Master Tara Singh but failed miserably. He could win only four seats against 132 of the Akali Dal out of the total number of 140 seats. 38 In the fifties, when Master Tara Singh (a Khatri himself) was President of the SGPC, the non-Jat Sikhs controlled 54.6 per cent of the key positions in this institution. Now, the SGPC came under the control of Jat Sikhs whereby the influence of non-Jat Sikhs diminished drastically. 39 ‘Sangh-Akali Bid to Form Government: Complete Accord Reached’. The Tribune (Ambala), March 2, 1967. 40 S. Gurnam Singh speech in Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 26 March 1970. The Chief Minister emphasised that he made every effort to accommodate its coalition partner. 41 Interview of Balramji Das Tandon, senior BJP leader, October to December 2005. “In 1967, the Jana Sangh had two minister but had all the relevant portfolio’s like Finance, Industry, Health, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies etc.” 42 The C.M. preferred Jana Sangh Ministers over the Akali Ministers and did not care for the Akali Jathedars. It created resentment in senior Akali Minister and Akali Jathedars who were not prepared to tolerate it for a longer period… Congress Govt. in the centre contacted S. Lachhman Singh Gill the senior most Akali Minister in Front Govt. and assured him that if he defected with a considerable number of MLAs, the Congress Assembly party will give him an unconditional support and all the defectors will be designated as Ministers. White Paper on Sikh Issues. Batala: S. Narinder Singh Bhuler, 1983, Vol. 1, p. 103. 43 Devinder Pal Sandhu, Sikhs in Indian Politics: Study of a Minority. (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1992), p. 113. 44 Keeping in view the mandate and the decision of the Akali Dal, I brought the Bill in the Legislative Assembly for abolition of the Legislative Council. Sant Chanan Singh came to Chandigarh and persuaded the members not to abolish the Council…. Even after that both the Sants tried their utmost to flout the decision of the legislators and the Shiromani Akali Dal by persuading several members of the Parliament to see that Council was not abolished. 117 Coalition Politics in Punjab Speech made by outgoing CM Gurnam Singh on the floor of the assembly on 26.3.1970. S.C. Arora, Turmoil in Punjab Politics. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1990), p. 132. 45 Speech made by outgoing CM Gurnam Singh on the floor of the assembly on 26.3.1970. 46 I frankly tell the House that though the Jana Sangh in Punjab had staged right about turn on its attitude towards the Punjabi language after the creation of the Punjabi speaking State, their outlook on this crucial question is still revolving in the old grooves. Though they claim that Punjabi should be given the status of a State language and should be developed as a lever to unify the Punjabi speaking people irrespective of their religion, they in their own way are persisting in the policy of making Punjab a bi-lingual state. Naturally, I opposed all the attempts of the Jana Sangh leaders in this direction, though all along I did my best to promote Hindi as the National Language. Speech made by outgoing CM Gurnam Singh on the floor of the assembly on 26.3.1970. 47 1. Besides steps to “restore Hindu-Sikh unity, the Government will develop and promote Punjabi as the state language and Hindi as the national language. 2. Educational facilities will be extended both in the rural and urban areas with a view to achieving hundred per cent literacy in the state within the next few years. 3. The Government will root out corruption from public life as well as from the administration. 4. And try to bridge the gap between the common man and the administration. 5. Special emphasis will be placed on schemes for the welfare of members of the Scheduled Castes and the Backward Classes. 6. Immediate steps will be taken to distribute the evacuee lands to landless Harijans. A sizeable revolving fund will be created for their welfare schemes. 7. In the field of agriculture, a new strategy will be evolved to maintain Punjab’s position as the granary of India and also to promote the cultivation of commercial crops. Small land-owners will be given special incentives. 8. The programme for rural electrification as also rural development works and construction of link roads in the state will be streamlined with a view 118 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India to electrifying every village and connecting every village with the main roads. 9. A blueprint for the growth of industries, particularly large and mediumscale industries, both in the private and public sectors, will be prepared and special incentives will be given to new industrial entrepreneurs. 10. Industrial workers, government employees and teachers will be given a fair deal, and all loopholes in the existing legislation relating to them will be plugged. 11. Efforts will be made to remove anomalies in the Pay Commission and Kothari Commission grades. S.C. Arora, op.cit., 1990, p. 129 48 Ibid. p. 130. 49 It was primarily the intra-party conflict among the coalition partners which continued to rock the working of the ruling alliance. The inter-party differences and the ideological incompatibilities of the two partners did not pose a serious obstruction in the working of the coalition. Arun Mehra, ‘Akali-Janata Coalition: An Analysis’. Punjab Journal of Politics, 1985, 9(1), p. 85. 50 Pramod Kumar, ‘Punjab Crisis: A Political Diagnosis’. Mainstream, Nov. 14, 1987, p. 18. 51 Mr. S.S. Barnala the then Akali Chief Minister, was alleged to be appeasing the militants and consequently the Congress government in the centre dismissed the ministry. The moderate leaders like Mr. Prakash Singh Badal and Mr. G.S. Tohra were arrested and hundred of others were sent to distant Jodhpur Jail to languish in detention for some years. Liberals who had full faith in the system were isolated and those nursing serious grievances against the system were patronised. This approach adopted to counter the people who were a potential threat to the legislative power of the ruling party at the centre. Political rivals (even when they subscribe to the same political beliefs) were attacked and political forces representing extreme views were patronized. President’s rule was thought to be the most conducive, if not the sure instrument, to put down militancy. That these measures failed is not a surprise. 52 The massive Akali victory of 1985 should not be termed as an expansion of the support base of the SAD. It is evident from the aggregate votes polled by the SAD and Cong. (I) that SAD polled only one per cent more votes than Cong. (I). 119 Coalition Politics in Punjab Jatinder Kaur, Punjab Crisis: The Political Perceptions of Rural Voters. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 126. 53 Pramod Kumar and Yogendra Yadav, ‘The Real Contest in Punjab’. The Tribune, February 9, 1992. 54 Statement issued by Sardar Prakash Singh Badal at meet the Press Club, November, 1996. 55 Kanwaljit Singh, op.cit., 1995. 56 The Sarkaria Commission was set up on June 9, 1983 to restructure India’s Centre-State Relations. 57 Art 356 of the Indian Constitution deals with the provision in case of failure of constitutional machinery in state. 58 Lok Sabha Election 1998: Manifesto of Akali Dal. 59 ‘In the following year when elections for the state assembly were held, ‘peace’ continued to be the core issue. Recognising the changing political scene at the national level, and the growing significance of BJP, the Badal Akali Dal did everything possible to consolidate its alliance with the state unit of the BJP. It merely abandoned its politics of regional identity and spoke a very different language.’ Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Return of the Region: Identities and Electoral Politics in Punjab’. Economic and Political Weekly, 2005, 41(3), p. 227. 60 Statement issued by Prakash Singh Badal at Meet the Press at Chandigarh Press Club, November 1996. 61 Sarbjit Pandher, ‘A Peace Card Which May Spell Trouble’. The Hindu (New Delhi), January 25, 1997. 62 For 1997 and 2002 assembly elections a committee consisting of Capt. Kanwaljit Singh and Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa of the SAD and Balramji Das Tandon and Madan Mohan Mittal of the BJP was constituted to decide about the seat sharing. The BJP asked for 35 seats. After number of meetings 22 seats were allocated to BJP. 63 In 1967s ministerial allocations were according to our choice. In 1997 claims were registered but the portfolios of Industry and Finance could not be given to the Bharatiya Janata Party as the CM kept Industry and Finance was allocated to a senior Akali leader. The allocation of the Finance portfolio was not contested as the state finances were in doldrums. Series of Interviews with Balramjit Das Tandon, Senior BJP leader, October to December, 2005. 120 Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India 64 Pramod Kumar, op.cit., 2003, p. 384. 65 P.S. Verma, ‘Akali-BJP Debacle in Punjab: Wages of Non-performance and Fragmentation’. Economic and Political Weekly, 1999, 34(50), pp. 3519-3531. 66 Capt. Amarinder Singh was not in favour of allocating 11 seats to CPI. He was of the view “Every Single seat allotted to the CPI is to add to the tally of the SAD”. Interview with Capt. Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister, Punjab, 10 September, 2004. In a press statement on 23 August, 2006, Capt Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab maintained, “I have told party president Sonia Gandhi that alliance with the left parties – CPI and CPI(M) would not benefit the Congress in any manner since their votes do not get transferred to us”. “I was the PCC president then and I had a harrowing time trying the convince the left leaders to send their cadres for Congress support but they failed to do so”. ‘Capt., Dullo don’t See right on left’. Hindustan Times, August 24 , 2006. 67 These constituencies were Sri Hargobindpur, Mansa and Dhuri. 68 If the percentage of votes of the BJP, the Akali Dal (B) and the Akali Dal (Tohra) are added and converted into seats, the Akali Dal and the BJP would have formed the government. 69 Raveen Thukral, ‘Capt., Dullo don’t see right on left’. The Hindustan Times, August 24, 2006. 70 ‘No Alliance with Congress: Karat’. The Hindustan Times, October 11, 2006. 71 Raveen Thukral, ‘Sirsa Dera Add Spice to Malwa Contest’. The Hindustan Times, February 9, 2007. 72 Gautam Dheer, ‘SAD-BJP Fissures on Portfolios’. The Indian Express. March 3, 2007. 73 ‘BJP Demands Complete Power Tariff Rollback’, The Hindustan Times, December 23, 2009. 74 The BJP state leadership charged the SAD for discrimination of their support base in terms of allocation of funds, conferring ministerial status to their appointees as Chairpersons of boards and corporations and sharing of various other spoils of power. Interview on February 12, 2010 with Sh. Balramji Das Tandon, Member BJP Core Committee. 75 The continuation of coalition politics in Punjab has not only witnessed the competitive populism but on a positive note has led to the ‘gradual discarding 121 Coalition Politics in Punjab of radical stances by political parties all over the state’. This has been evident in the form of the Manifestos of Akali Dal and its ally BJP to maintain ‘peace, brotherhood, communal harmony, socio-economic welfare, all round development and sustainable and profitable agriculture through diversification. Ashutosh Kumar, ‘Electoral Politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal’. Economic and Political Weekly, 2004, 39(14-15), p. 1519. 76 For example, the Congress party in Punjab was caught between Assembly election (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004) became victim of the paradox between electoral promises and government mandate. In the 2002 Assembly elections its promise of free electricity to farmers contributed to its victory over its opponent the Akali Dal. The election manifesto committee was headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh, present Prime Minister of India. After coming to power, it started implementing the mandate of government to introduce economic reforms and consequently it performed poorly in 2004 Parliamentary elections. The Congress party was quick to announce the implementation of sops like free electricity in the wake of forthcoming Assembly elections. This was opposed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Not only this it also passed Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on SYL much to the annoyance of the Central leadership. In other words, the Congress in competition with a regional alliance started appropriating anti-centre constituency in the state. 122