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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 5 (1974), 65-76 Printedin Great Britain 65 Edward C. Clark THE OTTOMAN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION* The European industrial revolution adversely affected the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and was instrumental in its final collapse. The eastward flow of European goods grew rapidly in the years following the end of the Napoleonic era in 18I5, and Ottoman lands soon became important markets for many European manufacturers. Their wares increasingly displaced traditional Ottoman products, made Ottoman handicraftsmen jobless, reduced Ottoman internal sources of taxes, and so contributed to eventual European control of Ottoman finances. These phenomena are well known and have received appropriate recognition as symptoms of an economic invasion that was aided by the diplomacy of West European consuls and ambassadors,I and sanctified by largely unquestioned European arguments in favor of laissez-faire.2 On the other hand Ottoman responses to this European economic challenge are relatively unknown, and even the extensive and costly Ottoman industrial efforts of the I84os seemingly have been dismissed as the casual if not comical games of disinterested bureaucrats.3 Such dismissal is warranted in the sense that the attempts largely failed, but is inadequate as a portrayal of Ottoman awareness of, and response to, a growing industrial malaise. What were the nature and magnitude of these Ottoman responses? What were Ottoman objectives ?What main factors contributed to their failures ?What, if any, achievements resulted? These questions are considered here. It should be noted that the Ottoman Porte did not wait until the i84os to introduce new European industrial techniques. To go back but to the I79os and * The authoris indebtedto the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety, the ForeignAffairs FellowshipProgram,and the Universityof Texas at El Paso ResearchInstitutefor their supportof researchupon which this articleis based. I For an extensive treatmentof Ottoman-Europeaneconomic relations see Vernon Puryear, International Economicsand Diplomacy in the Near East, I834-I853 (Stanford, 1935). For contemporary views see Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks (London, 1878), pp. 57-60, and portionsof Dominique Chevallier,'Western Developmentand Crisis in the Mid-NineteenthCentury...,' in WilliamR. Polk and RichardL. Chambers(eds.), Beginningsof Modernizationin theMiddleEast: TheNineteenthCentury(Chicago,I968), pp. 205-22. 2 Even Friedrich List in the I83os and I84os, an implacable foe of laissez-faire argu- ments, had no sympathyfor the Ottomans.See, for example,his The National System of Political Economy, trans. S. S. Lloyd (New York, I966), pp. 419 ff. 3 Ali Riza Seyfi, 'Imparatorluk Devrinde Sanayile?me Komedisi,' Cumhuriyet Gazetesi(Istanbul),31 July, 5 August 1939;OmerCelalSarc,'Tanzimatve Sanayiimiz,' Tanzimat (Istanbul, I940), pp. 423-40. (Also translated in Charles Issawi (ed.), The Economic History of the Middle East, I800-I914 (Chicago, 1966), pp. 48-59.) 5 MES 5 I 66 Edward C. Clark the Nizam-i Cedid, Sultan Selim III took an intense personal interest in improving the manufacture of military goods.' As early as I793-4 he introduced contemporary European processes and equipment for the production of cannon, rifles, mines and gunpowder.2 Numerous difficulties prevented Selim from fully realizing his goals, but he persevered. As late as I804, for example, he initiated the construction of elaborate buildings to house a woolen mill for uniforms and a paper factory near the Bosphorus at Hiinkar Iskelesi.3 Following the overthrow of Selim III few if any industrial improvements seem to have been attempted in the first two decades of Sultan Mahmud II's reign, but this hiatus was followed by a burst of activity. A spinning mill was built near Eyiip in Istanbul in I827,4 a leather tannery and boot works at Beykoz was improved early in the I830s, a part of the paper factory at Hiinkar Iskelesi was converted to cloth manufacturing in the same years,5 the Feshane was established in I835 to supplant hand-manufacture of the new fez headgear,6 a wool-spinning and weaving mill began operating south of the Balkan Mountains at Islimiye about i836,7 a new saw mill and copper sheet-rolling mill were built also about then near Tophane, and in the late I83os both the Tophane cannon foundry and the Dolmabahqe musket works were converted from animal to steam power.8 With the partial exception of the Feshane, these early attempts to introduce European industrial methods were devoted exclusively to the manufacture of goods intended for governmental and military use. The dates of these attempts suggest a simple pattern. During the military reforms of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries before the downfall of Selim III in I807, and again following twenty years of reaction against such reforms9 - from the overthrow of the Janissaries in 1826 to the political containment of Muhammad Ali by 1841, the Ottoman Porte invested imperial funds in individual factory operations with the somewhat over-optimistic hope of transferring European industrial I Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III'iin hatt-i Hiimayunlarz-Nizam-i Cedit, 1789-i807, Tarih Kurumu Yalynlarlndan, 2 Turk cilt VII, no. 14 (Ankara, I946), pp. 6I-3. These are well covered by Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New (Cambridge, Mass., I971), pp. 138-44. Adnan Giz, 'Ilk Sinai Tesislerimiz,' Istanbul Sanayi OdaszDergisi (Istanbul), cilt iI, no. 23 (January 1968), pp. 25, 26. These were so ornate that later tourists mistook them for converted palaces. See James E. DeKay, Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and I832 (New R. Walsh, A Residence in Constantinople..., vol. ii (London, York, 1833), pp. I22-4; 1836), p. 295; R. Walsh, Narrative of a Journalfrom Constantinopleto England (London, 3 1828), p. I5. 4 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, cilt vi (Ankara, I954), p. 241. 5 DeKay, pp. 118-24. 6 Julia Pardoe, The City of the Sultan, vol. in (London, I838), pp. 177-84; Sumerbank Aylzk Endiistri ve Kiiltiir Dergisi (Istanbul), cilt I, no. i (July 1961), p. 24. 7 Ami Boue, La Turquie d'Europe, vol. in (Paris, 1840), pp. Ioo-2; Odalar Birligi, Tiirkiye'de Pamuk Ipligi ve Pamuklu Dokuma Mensucat Sanayii (Ankara, 1958), pp. 4-9. 8 John Reid, Turkey and the Turks (London, I840), pp. 272-6. 9 As one example, Selim III's plan for a new weaving mill at Azadli was dropped upon Selim's deposition (see Anna Naguib Boutros - Ghali, Les Dadian, trans. Archag Alboyadjian (Cairo, i965), p. 91). The Ottoman industrial revolution 67 superiority to Turkey. Typically these efforts concentrated on the final stages of manufacture and ignored or only partly solved associated problems such as internal sources of raw materials, transportation, and other economic infrastructure. More realistic solutions to such problems were undertaken only in the decade which followed. In the I840s Ottoman recognition of disadvantages inherent in Ottoman dependence on foreign manufactures, and of the necessity for a more ambitious form of 'defensive modernization' - economic if not social - apparently reached a peak. In those early years of the Tanzimat from 1841 or 1842 to the eve of the Crimean War a great number of Ottoman state manufacturing facilities were built. In variety as well as in number, in planning, in investment, and in attention given to internal sources of raw materials these manufacturing enterprises far surpassed the scope of all previous efforts and mark this period as unique in Ottoman history. They constituted the main Ottoman hope for a true industrial revolution. The geographical heart of this endeavour lay immediately west of Istanbul in an elongated area bounded on the north and south respectively by the Edirne road and the Marmara Sea, and extending nine miles east-west from the Yedi kule corner of the Istanbul land walls to Kiiuiik (ekmece. There, beginning in I842, Ottoman officials laid out a remarkable manufacturing and agricultural complex in what amounted to an 'industrial park.' Its manufacturing center on the shore near Zeytinburnu contained a foundry and machine works designed for the production of iron pipe, steel rails, plows, bits, stirrups, locks, lanceheads, cannon, swords, knives, razors and other forgings and castings of any desired complexity or quantity. One section was built to produce cloth and cotton stockings. Workers were housed in a two-story barracks 650 feet long, and the entire impressive unit was enclosed by walls approximately one-half mile in circumference. A technical school was established nearby.' Also in this Istanbul complex was a second manufacturing unit built west of Zeytinburnu near Bakirk6y (then Macrikeui to some foreigners). This included a factory to spin, weave and print calicoes, another iron works with a furnace and two forges, a steam-driven machine shop, and a boatyard equipped for the construction of small steamships. The furnace was immediately adjacent to a pre-existing gunpowder works, a fact which prompted more cynical observers to predict an expansive, even explosive future.2 An ambitious model farm project was established farther west toward Yeqilk6y (San Stefano), still within the same complex. Based on French prototypes it was supplied with new strains of livestock, various experimental crops, I Charles MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, vol. ii (London, I850), pp. 603-8. Although generallyunsympatheticwith Ottomaneffortsto industrialize,MacFarlanein 1847-8 personallyvisited most factoriesin the Istanbul-Izmit-Bursaareas. His factual reportsof location,size, workers,equipmentand productionhave provedaccuratewhere comparativedata is available.See vols. I, II, passim. 2 MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 219 ff. 5-2 68 Edward C. Clark and thousands of seedling trees. Students were recruited for a new school of advanced agricultural techniques that was located on the premises.' Still farther west the far boundary of the Istanbul complex was marked by a second pre-existing gunpowder works near Kiigiik Qekmece. This works, the central array noted above, and a salt-evaporating basin on the shore near Yedikule at the extreme eastern boundaryz were the principal components of the Istanbul complex. To some the project appeared destined to become 'a Turkish Manchester and Leeds, a Turkish Birmingham and Sheffield,' all four in one.3 In the i84os all site selections, construction, purchasing, hiring and manufacturing within this area were directed by a single management. In I843 this management set up another major state factory 60 miles east overlooking the Marmara Sea near Izmit. The building itself incorporated significant advances in European construction techniques, the machinery was the finest available, and the factory soon turned out woolen cloth equal to the best in Europe.4 Nearer Istanbul on the north shore of the Marmara Sea at Hereke the same management built a cotton mill which before the end of the i84os they converted to the production of fancy silks for palace use.5 Truly effective Ottoman industrial independence presupposed an internal supply of raw materials for these manufactures, and a crash program was initiated. For iron, foreign geologists and mining engineers conducted explorations and by 1845 began excavating iron ore from deposits on both the Princes' Islands and the mainland nearby at Maltepe, limestone from outcrops west of Istanbul, and coal from seams at Eregli.6 For wool, late in 1842 the Ottoman government established some 15,000 merino sheep on a ranch near Bursa.7 For calicoes in the mid I840s an American agricultural expert planted cotton on the model farm west of Istanbul. He ordered gins and confidently predicted South Carolina-style plantations throughout eastern Thrace. He even brought his slaves, emancipating them first.8 For raw silk the Hereke mill depended on the I A. Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, trans. Lady Easthope, vol. II (London, 1856), p. 324; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 60 ff., vol. II, pp. 606 ff. 2 MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 220. 3 MacFarlane, 4 vol. I, p. 58. Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Archives (hereafter referred to as FO) Sandison to Canning, Bursa, 9 December I843; Journal de Constantinopleet des 195/208, interets orientales (Istanbul; hereafter JC), Nov. I843, p. 2; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 450 ff. 5 The cotton machinery was transferred to Istanbul. See Omer Alageyik, 'Tiirkiye'de Mensucat Sanayiinin Tarihcesi', Istanbul Sanayi Odast Dergisi, cilt II, no. I6 (June 1967), p. 9; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 461 ff. 6 JC, 26 Oct. 1844, p. I, and II Feb. 1845, pp. I, 2; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 223 ff., 612, 615; Ubicini, vol. II, pp. 342 f. 7 FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, 8 Feb. I843; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 5II ff. The former report notes 3,600 sheep, but MacFarlane hears of more. 8 FO 195/290, Carr to Canning, Biyiukdere, 30 Oct. I848; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 59 ff., vol. II, pp. 629 ff. The Ottoman industrial revolution 69 traditional silk-cultivation region surrounding Bursa, fifty miles south across the Marmara. By the mid i84os private entrepreneurs in Bursa were converting from hand-reels to steam-powered silk-reeling mills of the Italian variety. These mills produced superior raw silk, and in I850 the Ottoman Porte built one of the largest of their type in Bursa to supply the Hereke looms.' Apparently part of the same governmental program of the I840s were several more manufacturing facilities operated by other managements. Among these were a tannery set up at Selvi Burnu (Silivri?) in i84I,2 a wool-weaving section added to the Istanbul Feshane in 1843,3 steam-driven stamping machines installed the same year in the Imperial Mint,4 an iron foundry established north of Istanbul at Beqikta? in I844,5 and a porcelain factory to be constructed alongside the Bosporus at about the same time.6 Farther from Istanbul a state factory reportedly produced coarse wool cloth at Balikesir from i842,7 a paper factory was established in Izmir by i844,8 and measures were taken early in the I84os to improve cannon-ball casting foundries at Samako in Bulgaria.9 A new powder mill was built in Baghdad in 1842-7,Io and toward the end of the decade additional large sums were spent on blast-engines and furnaces for copper smelting at Tokat. Similar works for concentrating copper ores near government mines along the Tigris River were improved."I Almost certainly this list is yet incomplete. Nearly all the machinery for these industries had to be imported from Europe. Some was ancient while some was so new as to be still unproved in production. Some was bought piecemeal whereas some, like the Hereke silk works, were bought bag and baggage, including the shop steward and all hands.12 Most if not all foremen, master craftsmen, and skilled workers of necessity came from abroad to assemble, operate and repair factories and equipment. At first most of these foreigners were Englishmen, but subsequently more were hired from Belgium, France, Italy and Austria.13 Wages were lower in the latter countries, and perhaps (as was true of Selim III's industrial program)'4 there was an I Fahri Dalsar, Bursa'da Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 405 ff.; S. Moutal, L'Avenir economiquede la Turquie nouvelle (Paris, 1925), pp. I60, I6I. 2 Boutros-Ghali, p. 79. 3 Alageyik, p. 9. 4 Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Division Commerciale, Bourgueney to Guizot, Constantinople, 6 Jan. 1844; JC, i Dec. I843. 5 JC, 6 June 1844, p. 2; Ubicini, vol. II, p. 342. 6 JC, 6 Feb. I848, p. 2. 7 FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, 8 Feb. 1843. 8 JC, 26 June I844, p. 2; Ubicini, vol. II, p. 343. 9 FO 195/206, Canning to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 2 Cemazielahir 1258. 0I Boutros-Ghali, p. I05. " Warrington W. Smyth, A Year with the Turks (London, FO 78/6II, Cartwright to Aberdeen, Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 464, 608 f., 623 f. I2 13 MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 436, 455. 14 Shaw, p. 140. 1854), pp. 87, I04, 156, I57. Feb. I845; MacFarlane, 22 70 Edward C. Clark attempt to avoid dependence on any one European nation. Many new trades were required. In Istanbul alone were to be found foreign draftsmen, erectors, fitters, pattern makers, moulders, boilermakers, engine smiths, coal viewers, steam engineers, blast-furnace keepers, puddlers, bar-iron rollers, smiths, turners, millwrights, plate rollers and ship-builders.' Even European physicians were hired to suppress malaria and sustain health among the several hundred men and their wives and children.2 These foreigners were the trained elite. Under their supervision were as many as 5,000 unskilled hands, including Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews and Turks.3 The majority were males but many women and girls were employed in the Bursa, Hereke and Feshane operations.4 As in Europe their hours were from dawn to dusk six days a week, other factors permitting.5 During the formative stages of this project management of the entire Istanbul complex together with supporting mines, farm, sheep-ranch, and the Hereke and Izmit ventures was handled by one family- the Dadians. They were members of the Gregorian Armenian millet and already were well acquainted with Ottoman banking, bureaucracy and industry. Their most illustrious immediate ancestor, Haci Arakel Dad, was recommended to Sultan Selim III in 1795 as a self-made mechanical genius.6 Haci Dad contributed substantially to the modernization that year of the gunpowder mill near Bakirkoy and in return was appointed chief engineer and director of the new powder works then under construction at Azadli, a village just north of Kiiuiik ?ekmece. He was given special tax and customs immunities, and when, thanks to water power and newer equipment, his gunpowder proved superior to that at Baklrk6y, Haci Dad was made director of both mills. His heirs included a son and grandson, Ohannes and Bogos Dadian respectively, to whom Sultan Mahmud II transferred the powder-making franchise in i832.7 Ten years later Ohannes and Bogos still ran the two gunpowder plants, each with the title barut cubatz (chief powdermaker), when Ohannes was selected to implement much of the new industrial program.8 On paper the choice was an obvious one. By the early I 84os Ohannes Dadian probably was more experienced in industrial management than was any other Ottoman subject. He had begun 2 FO 195/289, Pisani to Canning, Pera, 9 July I849. Smyth, pp. 156, 157; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 456, 461; FO 195/289, Dadian to Canning, Barouthane, io August I848. 3 MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 451, 464 ff.; Pardoe, vol. III, pp. I77-84. 4 A. D. Mordtmann (ed. Franz Babinger), Anatolien (Skizzen und Reisebriefe aus Kleinasien, 1850-1859 vol. II, p. 466. (Hanover, I925), p. 296; Pardoe, vol. III, pp. 177-84; MacFarlane, 5 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Reports... Respecting Factories for Spinning and Weaving of Textile Fabrics Abroad (London, I873), pp. 183 f. 6 Full name: Mahdeci Dad Arakel Amira Zadaian. Boutros-Ghali, pp. 42, 89-92; Ubicini, vol. II, p. 317 (where Dad is given erroneously as Dael); Shaw refers to him as Erakil Efendi, p. I44. 7 Boutros-Ghali, p. 102. 8 Ibid. pp. 100-2, 119. The Ottoman industrial revolution 71 his apprenticeship under his elder brother in the Kii9iik (;ekmece powder mill in 1813 at the age of fifteen. In or about I820 he became director of the imperial paper factory at Beykoz. In I826 he was made director of the state (?) clothweaving establishment at Eyiip, and in 1832 he succeeded his elder brother as director of the Azadll powder mill. In 1835-6 he spent a year in Europe 'studying certain specialties appropriate to the factories which he had established', and in I837 he was rewarded by Mahmud II for services rendered at the Dolmabah9e musket works.I Sultan Abdiilmecid apparently gave extensive authority to Ohannes Dadian as effective head of the new industrial program. In 1842 Ohannes helped select specific sites for the Istanbul factories, the model farm, the Izmit wool mill, the Bursa sheep-ranch, and possibly the Hereke plant.2 This stage completed and with his nephew Bogos supervising both powder works, Ohannes Dadian left Istanbul late in 1842 for his second one-year trip to Europe. During what perhaps was an Ottoman businessman's version of the European Grand Tour he visited factories in several countries, bought much equipment, hired scores of workers, and examined the wondrous West.3 Factory construction began in 1843 during his absence, and by mid-I844 Abdiilmecid was able to inspect the first results. These were sufficiently encouraging to merit flattering remarks, expensive awards, wider administrative authority (by then including management of the tannery and the cloth mill near the Bosporus at Beykoz and Hiinkar Iskelesi), and governmental financial support for full-scale operations.4 The Dadians placed family members in key positions. Ohannes handled imports and both domestic and foreign government relations. Bogos acted as general supervisor of works, and a son and another nephew of Ohannes were selected to be professors and administrators of the new technical school at Zeytinburnu. More distant relatives became local managers and paymasters at Izmit and possibly at Hereke as well. The Dadians even supplied the construction engineer for the new Baghdad powder mill. Most foreign experts reported directly to them, and foreign workers and machinery continued to flow in during most of the decade.5 The timing of this far-flung industrial program is peculiar. Already in 1838 the Ottoman government had abandoned most state monopolies and other import-export controls by terms of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of Balta Liman.6 By I84I the European powers were able to force this conIbid. pp. 48, 79, 90 f., 99, I02. FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, i8 Feb. I843; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 220, 45I, 6i6. 3 JC, 21 Oct. 1843, p. 2, and 21 Feb. 1848, p. 3; Boutros-Ghali, pp. 79, 8o, 102. 4 JC, I Aug. 1844, pp. I f. 5 FO 195/329, Hensman to Dadian, Istanbul, 14 Nov. 1848; MacFarlane, vol. ii, PP. 473, 599, 607. 2 6 The most complete analysis of the background of this convention is to be found in Puryear, esp. pp. 17 ff. Text in Issawi, EconomicHistory, pp. 39, 40. 72 Edward C. Clark vention on Muhammad Ali, the Porte's nominal vassal in Egypt, and the ensuing foreign competition quickly brought rust and ruin to his factories on the Nile. Thus, any cause for optimism concerning additional investments in factories seemingly already had been eliminated at the beginning of the Tanzimat. Paradoxically this foreboding example did not deter Sultan Abdiilmecid and his advisers. Almost simultaneously they initiated the supreme Ottoman effort to industrialize the shores of the Bosporus and the Marmara. One may well ask why. The reasons for Ottoman high hopes for success despite so complete a surrender to European laissez-faire diplomacy are not immediately obvious, but they can be sought in the contemporary industrial experience in Egypt. Early in the i8oos Muhammad Ali invested heavily in an extensive industrialization program which materially strengthened his independent position. His control of internal markets ensured that despite higher prices Egyptian civilians bought Egyptian textiles and Egyptian soldiers wore Egyptian-made uniforms.' By the early I83os his military capacity was superior to that of the Porte. By 1841, however, European diplomatic and military pressures succeeded in restricting Muhammad Ali to Egypt and in excising his monopolies and protective tariffs in accord with the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention. Despite this set-back the Egyptian military might have continued to consume Egyptian manufactures, but in June of 1841 an Ottoman imperial ferman reduced the Egyptian army by some 80% to I8,000 men. This measure had the support of the European Great Powers as part of their attempt to maintain a political status quo in the Near East. Quite likely Egyptian military consumption was reduced even more than 80%, since from I841 Muhammad Ali was forced to abandon his aggressive foreign policy as well.2 In consequence many Egyptian factories became superfluous and soon were shut down.3 In sharp contrast with European goals for a militarily weak Egypt a strong Ottoman state was part of European - especially English - planning for stability in the Near East. As a result, although like Egypt the Ottoman Porte also lost most state monopolies and other import-export controls, the European Great Powers did not restrict the size of the Ottoman army. Following the overthrow of the Janissaries in I826 the army had adopted much European-style equipment, however, and in so doing had decreased its domestic self-sufficiency. By i841 the need for a massive industrial program became obvious. I For a brief description of Muhammad Ali's industrial-commercial system, see Ali al-Giritli, Tarikh al-sina'afi Misr (Cairo, [1952]), pp. 40-5I, 97-I04, 14I-50, translated and reproduced in Issawi, Economic History, pp. 390-402. 2 Text of ferman in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. I (Princeton, 1956), pp. I21-3; Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge, England, 1931), pp. 191, 226; M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, I774-I923 (London, I966), pp. I04 f. 3 Charles Issawi, 'Egypt since 8o00: A Study in Lopsided Development', Journal of Economic History, xxI (I961), pp. 1-25 (reprinted in Issawi, Economic History, p. 363). The Ottoman industrial revolution 73 The bulk of the new Ottoman manufactures of the 1840s was consumed by the military and the palace, and it can be assumed that Ottoman industrial objectives in that decade at least temporarily excluded the civilian market. Nevertheless some excess silks from Hereke did reach the civilian market through a government store in Istanbul,I and fezes from the Feshane were retailed.2 Also, according to an announcement made in 1845, the new foundries west of Istanbul were so successful that the public was invited to place orders for iron castings, forgings and other metal workings.3 These civilian sales and services were exceptions, apparently, for foreign importers reportedly neither anticipated nor encountered much competition.4 Not even Ottoman military self-sufficiency was remotely approached, however, and by 1848 half-completed or idle Ottoman factories and rusting equipment were ominous signs of impending disaster.5 Some foreign workers were laid-off,6 and late in i849 the Dadians themselves reportedly were removed from office and their properties seized.7 With the Crimean War came the first European loans and Ottoman indebtedness, and the Porte was forced to abandon the greater part of its industrial program.8 There were numerous other contributions to the program's collapse. In 1848, for example, the Kii;iik (ekmece powder works blew up.9 In i855 the silk reeling mill at Bursa was destroyed by an earthquake.Io In the late I84os cotton crops on the model farm west of Istanbul suffered for lack of gins, and the seedling trees died for lack of water." The merino sheep project was mismanaged, and the flock decimated by malnutrition, over-exposure, disease and theft.12 Bottlenecks, too, produced undesirable chain reactions: without access roads and mining equipment exploitation of coal and iron-ore deposits lagged. This meant that iron for plows could not be delivered when scheduled, in consequence 2 MacFarlane, pp. 466 f. Ubicini, vol. II, p. 343. 3 JC, 6 March I845. 4 FO 78/611, Cartwright to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 22 Feb. I845. 5 The Paris revolution of February i848 was the cause of alarm in capitals as far east as Istanbul. A new grand vezir, Sarim Papa, reportedly tightened control of Ottoman finances, including those associated with the new industries. MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 599 ff. 6 FO 195/329, Dadian to Hensman, Istanbul, 13 Nov. 1848. 7 The Times (London), 23 Jan. I850, p. 6. The Dadians apparently regained their personal properties since the family remained prosperous and several individuals were prominent in Porte affairs until the mid-i89os. They continued to hold the title and functions of barutfu basi until sometime between I870 and I889. See Boutros-Ghali, pp. 102-24. 8 MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 6II. For an analysis of the effect of European loans, see Donald C. Blaisdell, EuropeanFinancial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1929), passim. 9 Boutros-Ghali, p. I05. IO Auguste Viquesnel, Voyage dans la Turquie d'Europe (Paris, I868), vol. I, p. 295. I" MacFarlane, 12 MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 619, 629 ff. vol. I, pp. 5I2 ff. Edward C. Clark 74 of which projects at the model farm were delayed, causing the high-salaried agricultural expert to become frustrated and quit. Factory labor, also, was a difficult problem even though thousands of trained handicraft workers had been displaced by the rising tide of European imports. Just as in England and France two or three generations earlier, artisans strongly disliked the impersonal demands of factory life. Their foreign supervisors found their efficiency low, their absenteeism high, their turnover rate appalling, and the number of their holidays incredible.2 As a result there were reports of worker intimidation, of factory construction by corveelabor, and of some workers hobbled in fetters.3 The problem, however, was not just the difficult restructuring of traditional peasant and artisan work attitudes. Foreigners had little incentive to train recruits for their own positions, and apparently few desired or attempted to separate themselves from well-paid employment.4 Foreigners were hired at rates at least twice those current in Western Europe, and although their combined wages were not large in proportion to capital expenditures, they contributed to the continued high cost of factory operation.5 Sickness, boredom, disappointment, anger and frustration eventually reduced their effectiveness and increased their rate of turnover. Some foreigners felt that the greatest problem lay with what they termed 'jobbery' among both the Dadians and the Ottoman papas to whom the former were responsible. These they accused, not without exaggeration, of indifference to sound technical advice, of incompetence in administration, and of excessive enthusiasm for the all-too-common custom of milking the Ottoman cow with insufficient regard for the calf.6 Such foreign testimony, frequently biased, must be placed within a broader frame. The Ottoman Porte attempted an extremely ambitious program, and the problems of raw materials, transport, construction, equipage, operation, maintenance and distribution required intricate coordination. Given much time and unlimited funds a larger group of experienced and dedicated administrators might have accomplished such a task. Pafas could run arsenals and the Dadians could run powder works or individual weaving mills, but the two or three years I FO 195/290, pp. 227, 6I 2 Carr to Canning, Biiyiukdere, 20 Oct. 1848; MacFarlane, vol. II, f., 628 ff. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Reports, p. I87; Hamlin, pp. 57, 58; MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 624 and passim. 3 FO 78/598, Canning to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 21 June 1845; FO 195/208, Sandison to Canning, Bursa, 9 Dec. 1843; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 222 ff. 4 DeKay, p. I20. This observation dates from the early i83os, but there is no evidence for a basic change in either government policy or foreigners' attitudes by the late I84os. 5 For example, Charles Hensman, an English engineer working under the Dadians, was earning 3,210 piasters per month (approximately ?27 Stlg.) in I848: FO 195/329, Cumberbatch to Canning, Constantinople, 25 Jan. 1849. The American agricultural expert and his helpers were hired for a lump sum equivalent to $9,000 per year: FO 195/190, Carr to Canning, Biiyiikdere, 20 Oct. 1848. 6 The Times, 29 Jan. 1845, p. 6; MacFarlane, vols. I, II, passim. For more moderate views of 'jobbery' see Hamlin, pp. 57-60, and JC, i Feb. 1845, p. I. The Ottoman industrial revolution 75 which Ohannes Dadian spent in Europe could not possibly have created in him the managerial wizardry required to carry through such widespread revolutionary changes. His lower echelon supervisors were far more lacking the broad experience and training required for competent support. Despite these difficulties the Porte initially was enthusiastic. Sultan Abdiilmecid, however, was not Sultan Selim III. Whereas Abdiilmecid did make inspection trips, these were more ceremonial than investigatory. He passed out jeweled snuff-boxes and congratulated all concerned but evidenced neither great knowledge nor intense interest.' So far as is known he made no visits incognito after the fashion of Selim III and perhaps was last to hear of the real problems involved.z Reportedly some of the factory goods shown him were the finest European imports with labels and tags carefully removed.3 Even goods that were made in the new factories remained largely dependent on Europe. As a Belgian worker at Izmit observed in 1848, 'It would be very odd if we could not turn out a piece of the finest cloth occasionally, seeing that we have the best machinery of England and France, that the finest wools for the purpose are imported, via Trieste, from Saxony and the best wool countries, and that we Frenchmen and Belgians work it. You could not call it Turkish cloth - it [is] only cloth made in Turkey by European machinery, out of European material, and by good European hands.'4 What achievements, then, can be credited to this attempted revolution of Ottoman industrial methods? Surely not the original objectives, since as techniques of warfare grew increasingly complex during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Empire became correspondingly more dependent upon foreign sources for new and more costly forms of communications and armament. This trend culminated with financial bankruptcy, the Ottoman Public Debt and failure for the attempted industrial revolution. A modest exception to this trend, however, was the domestic supply of cloth and leather for palace finery, military uniforms, blankets, bridles and boots. Despite fire, earthquake, obsolescence and decay, four factories continued to produce wool, cotton and silk goods during the remaining years of slow Ottoman decline. The Izmit wool mill finally was abandoned during World War I, but its looms were transferred at least in part to the Feshane, where wool cloth still is produced today by government agencies at the Defterdar Fabrikasz.5 At Baklrkoy, cotton spindles and looms also continued to manufacture for the military, and in so doing established the rather unenviable record of undergoing absolutely no improvement for more than a half-century.6 Under the name Bakzrkoy Bez Fabrikasz, or more popularly the Basmahane, this factory, too, still operates for the Turkish I Regularfive-daysummariesof the Sultan'sactivitiesin C indicatethat Abdiilmecid visited even the nearestfactoriesno more than once per year duringthe period I843-8. 2 For Selim III's surreptitiousvisits, see Karal,Selim III, pp. 61-3. 3 MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 620 f. Siimerbank.. .Dergisi, cilt I, no. Alageyik, p. 9. 5 6 4 Ibid. p. 453. I, p. 24. 76 Edward C. Clark government. The last of the four is the Hereke mill, whose more luxurious silk and wool products are currently sold to the public through Siimerbank. It is this minor industrial continuity into the present which was the most influential outcome of the original plans. The several Ottoman factories, their machines, and their employees formed a nucleus of experience and precedence that were inherited by the Turkish Republic. When Turkey at last regained control of import-export tariffs in I929, private enterprises were yet too weak to supply domestic needs, especially in the depression environment of the I930S. When in consequence the new state looked to its ancient factories for a solution, it was acting in a manner more traditional than innovative, and the experienced management and workers found there formed part of the cadre for the expansion which followed.' In a real sense, then, it can be argued that important aspects of etatism under Ataturk originated in the otherwise largely ill-fated industrialization efforts of the I84os. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO EL PASO, TEXAS I Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey, the Challenge of Growth (Leiden, I968), p. 9I; interview data collected by the writer in Turkey, February 1967 to March I968.